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SUMMARY
RISK MANAGEMENT OF U.S. BANKS IN LESS DEVELOPED
COUNTRIES: A COUNTRY-RISK ANALYSIS
by
Henry Bola Martins
The object of this research is to determine whether
U.S. commercial banks could have predicted in advance the
debt crises of the developing countries, i.e., whether a
particular LDC would reschedule or default on its loans. A
secondary purpose was to determine whether the debt crisis
was the fault of the banks or the developing countries who
reneged on their loan contracts. What do the banks have to
do to prevent this from happening? What do they have to do
to manage country risk effectively?
The study begins with a historical account of the
United States banking system to the period of debt
rescheduling by the LDCs. It continues by describing the
different types of risks in international banking. Next it
discusses the theoretical issues of LDC debt, including
sustainability of debt policy, optimal level of country
borrowing, optimal bank foreign lending, and credit
rationing by the banks. This is followed by a description
of the regulatory aspects of country risk management.
The important issue of country risk management by U.S.
banks is next, including a discussion of the various
assessment methods used and a review of the major empirical
studies that used econometric methods for predicting the
incidence of external debt defaults.
The empirical research investigates debt rescheduling
by less developed countries. Linear discriminant function
and logistic discrimination approaches were used to
determine the predictive ability of any particular subset
of economic variables.	 The sample comprises data on 37
countries over a period of 10 years, 1974-1983. This
period was chosen because it was a time of important
economic transition.
The results of the discriminant and logistic analyses
show modest discriminatory power for predicting the
rescheduling of debt of a country with the set of economic
predictors used.
Henry Bola Martins 1990All Rights Reserved
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TabLe 1.1: FOREIGN BRANCHES OF U.S. BANKS
U.S. Banks	 Nuier of	 Total Assets	 Total Assets of All
with Overseas	 Overseas	 Overseas Branches	 U.S. Co41u)ercia( Banks
Year	 Branches	 Branches	 (S Billions)	 (S Billions)
1960	 8	 131	 3.5	 255.7
1964	 11	 181	 6.9	 343.9
1965	 13	 211	 9.1	 374.1
1966	 13	 244	 12.4	 401.4
1967	 15	 295	 15.7	 448.9
1968	 26	 375	 23.0	 498.1
1969	 53	 459	 41.1	 527.6
1970	 79	 536	 52.6	 576.2
1971	 91	 583	 67.1	 640.3
1972	 108	 627	 77.4	 732.5
1973	 122	 699	 118.0	 827.1
1974	 125	 734	 151.9	 919.5
1975	 126	 762	 176.5	 964.9
1976	 127	 731	 219.4	 1,030.7
1977	 124	 730	 258.9	 1,166.0
1978	 137	 761	 306.8	 1,303.9
1979	 139	 789	 364.2	 1,351.0
1980	 143	 787	 401.1	 1,537.0
1981	 151	 841	 462.6	 1,653.7
1982	 162	 900	 469.2	 1,820.0
erations had increased to 139 with 789 overseas branches
and assets of $364 billion. Table 1.1 shows development
patterns in the foreign expansion of U.S. banks.
Many reasons can be cited for this extraordinary
increase. The boom in the establishment of foreign
branches and subsidiaries was concurrent with the rapid
expansion of U.S. multinational corporations around the
world. With the global expansion of their clients,
domestic banks attempted to meet their clients' new needs
and began to set up branches and subsidiaries in the major
and emerging financial center of the world.
Another reason was the massive growth of foreign trade
and foreign direct investment. Moreover, this period also
marked the arrival of a new financial institution, the
-3-
Euromarket, which enabled foreign branches of coirtmercial
banks to raise needed funds outside the United States
without being subject to domestic reserve requirements and
interest rate ceilings. Meanwhile, U.S. balance-of-
payments deficits resulted in restrictive regulations on
capital outflow. Between 1965 and 1974, U.S. banks were
affected by the Voluntary Credit Restraint Program, which
restricted the making of foreign loans directly from their
domestic offices. Heavy domestic loan demand and the tight
credit policies of the U.S. during 1966 and 1969-70 gave
additional inmetus to U.S. banks to look overseas. To keep
capital at home, banks were encouraged to fund their
overseas lending from external sources. Obviously, banks
without foreign branches were at a great disadvantage when
it came to competing for international business.
In the course of the last several years, lending to
the less-developed countries (LDCs) has become one of the
most serious issues facing the international capital
markets because of a rapid increase in the volume of inter-
national capital flow to LDCs and a change in the transfer
mechanism from official sources to private commercial
banks. Until about 1970, LDCs with limited development
capital or balance-of-payments deficits had to rely largely
on foreign grants, IMF stand-by credit, suppliers' credits,
and development loans from official lending agencies of
foreign governments (see Table 1.2). Supplier and trade
-4-
TabLe 1.2: TOTAL FLOW OF FUNDS (DISBURSEMENTS) TO LDCS (U.S. $ MllOOS)a
	
1969	 1970	 1971	 1972	 1973	 1974	 1975
Total officiaL	 4838	 5503	 6040	 6714	 8845	 10303	 14611
Goverrwnent	 3711	 4185	 4421	 4816	 6333	 6983	 10199
InternationaL organizations 	 1127	 1318	 1619	 1898	 2512	 3320	 4412
Total private	 4062	 4733	 5168	 7409	 10510	 13357	 17894
SuppLiers	 2083	 2297	 1919	 2384	 2415	 3097	 3670
Financial ,narketsb	 1955	 2135	 3243	 5018	 8091	 10259	 14197
Other privateC	 24	 301	 6	 6	 4	 1	 27
Total	 8900	 10236	 11208	 14123	 19355	 23660	 32505
(a) Co1çutations based on the public and publicly guaranteed external debt disbursement of 84
LDCs.
(b) Loans from private banks and other private financiaL institutions plus publicly issued and
privately placed bonds.
Cc) Debts resulting from nationalized properties and unclassified debts.
SOURCE: World Bank, World Debt Tables, EC-167/477.
credits for financing exports from industrial countries was
the LDCs' major source of private loans until 1970, but
much of that money was provided under the umbrella of
foreign nations' official credit or insurance agencies..'
Supplier and trade credits were supplemented by direct
bond placements in foreign capital markets, which increased
from $612 million for the decade 1956-65 to $380 million in
1970 alone. This funding was quite limited, however, both
compared to supplier credits of $2.297 billion and relative
to the need for $11.1 billion indicated by current-account
deficits in the same year.
The LDCs' access to commercial banks as well as inter-
national bond markets increased steadily during the l970s,
as shown in Table 1.3. The worldwide recession and quadru-
pled oil prices of 1973-74 pushed the LDCs' foreign
-5-
TabLe 1.3: DEBT OUTSTANDING (DISBURSED) FRON PRIVATE SOURCES (U.S. S BllOflS)a
Year	 I	 Suppliers	 Financial Marketsb	 other	 Total
1969	 6.7	 5.8	 0.7	 13.3
1970	 7.6	 7.2 (28%)	 1.1	 15.9
1971	 8.4	 9.3 (29%)	 1.1	 18.9
1972	 9.2	 12.6 (35%)	 1.0	 22.9
1973	 10.0	 18.3 (45%)	 0.8	 29.2
1974	 11.4	 25.6 (39%)	 1.2	 38.2
1975	 12.1	 36.5 (42%)	 1.1	 49.7
(a) Coaxitations based on the public and publicly guaranteed external debt outstanding of 84
LDCs.
(b) AnnuaL growth rate is shown in parentheses.
SOURCE: World Bank, World Debt TabLes, EC-167/77.
exchange requirements (deficits on current-account balance
of payments) far in excess of what they were likely to
obtain from traditional foreign official sources, despite
the creation of a significant new official source of finan-
cing in the form of the IMF oil facility in 1974-75. Thus,
while funds from foreign official sources to LDC5 increased
consistently in absolute terms, they subsequently decreased
as a proportion of the total foreign exchange needs of
LDCs. This meant that LDCs had to rely increasingly on
commercial banks to meet their remaining financial needs.
Origins of the Debt Prob1e
Over the past two centuries, periods of rapid expan-
sion of external capital flows and development loans have
been followed by interruptions in debt service, partial or
total debt repudiation, and a series of bank failures.
Sudden brief bursts of lending after 1800 were typically
-6-
ignited by exogenous shocks that created new opportunities
for profits. Immediately following an exogenous shock came
characteristically high spirits with investors attempting
to position themselves strategically. Bank expansion and
"bond mania" during the 1870s provided funds to Russia,
Spain, Turkey, Egypt, and several Latin American countries,
as well as to the United States for railroad and canal
construction.
Throughout the time that the feeling of high spirits
about the economic situation of the 1920s prevailed,
floating one loan frequently came to be regarded as
adequate justification for further issues to the same
borrower or the same country, regardless of the escalating
load of indebtedness. Extensive defaults by Latin American
and East European nations followed the build-up of foreign
lending in the 1920s. By 1932, there were already defaults
totaling about $2.6 billion. The sudden breakdown of world
trade, swiftly declining prices for developing countries'
exports, accelerating debt service ratios, and a resulting
unavailability of foreign currency to meet external debt
payments were the major reasons for the defaults of the
l930s.
During the period between World War II and 1973,
external capital flows financed post-war construction in
Europe and Japan, as well as development in Asia, Africa,
and Latin America.	 Developing countries' external debts
-7-
rose only slightly during the reconstruction period, but
began to expand in the early 1950s with the massive growth
in world trade and income, as well as the emergence of most
of the developing world as nations. External debt in-
creased faster than export earnings but did not produce
default or affect debt servicing.
The international lending that is widely discussed
today is simply a result of the growth of the Euromarket--a
phenomenon of the 1960s. In a Euromarket transaction, the
borrower takes a loan in a financial center in a currency
other than the one used for domestic transactions in that
financial center. The first such transactions were made by
East European countries with London banks in order to avoid
placing their foreign currency reserves--at that time,
mainly U.S. dollars--in the United States.
The Euromarket differs from traditional domestic and
international capital markets in its regulation (or lack
thereof), institutional structure, method of interest rate
determination, and in the way funds are channeled from
lenders to borrowers. The key distinguishing factor is
that the Euroinarket is unregulated, because its transac-
tions are made outside the country whose currency is
involved. U.S. dollar-denominated deposits, loans, and
bonds in Europe, for example, are not subject to U.S.
banking or security regulations. Hence the Euroinarket can
be defined as a market for lending in currencies other than
-8-
that of the country of domicile. 2
 The size of the Euro-
credit market, netting out all purely interbank loans, grew
from $57 billion in 1970 to about $945 billion at year-end
l98l. This is equivalent to an average compounded growth
rate of 29 percent, which by far outstripped the growth
rate of commercial bank domestic banking activities.
The global debt problem of developing countries origi-
nated in particular from the first massive increase in oil
prices in 1973-74. This price hike, or "shock" as it was
popularly called, was to have profound social, political,
and economic consequences. Several reasons can be cited
for the aggravation of the problem; a major one was the
effects of global recession from 1980 to 1982. Generally,
it can be said that the global debt problem, which reached
its height in 1982, was severely exacerbated by lower
inflation and higher interest rates in the world economy.
As did many individuals and institutions, nations suddenly
found themselves paying debts with less-inflated, more-
expensive funds rather than with highly inflated, "cheap"
money. When the funds were borrowed, inflation was high
and real interest rates were low or negative, but the funds
became expensive within a low inflation, high real interest
rate environment.
The pattern of the tremendous growth of international
debt in the 1970s and early l980s can be seen in Table 1.4.
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When analyzed nominally, the unpaid debt of 142 non-oil
developing countries more than quintupled, from $130
billion in 1973 to an estimated $711 billion in l984.
When the debt owed by the five OPEC countries that are not
in a capital surplus situation (Algeria, Ecuador, Indone-
sia, Nigeria, and Venezuela) is added, the total unpaid
debt of developing countries stood at approximately $812
billion in 1984. A large proportion of the developing
countries' total debt is owed by a relatively small number
of countries. The twenty-five "major borrowers" accounted
for 79 percent of the external debt of all developing coun-
tries in 1983. The ten largest borrowers accounted for
more than 50 percent, and the five largest (Brazil, Mexico,
Argentina, Korea, and Indonesia) accounted for more than 33
percent.6
The greatest share of this external debt is sovereign
debt: the sum of money owed overseas by national govern-
ments, by their decentralized agencies, or by private firms
with public guarantees. Nevertheless, a significant part
of the debt is owed by the private sector without public
guarantees. In 1981, for example, the World Bank estimated
that 80 percent of developing-country long-term debt was
public or publicly guaranteed, and 20 percent was private.7
In some countries, such as Chile, private debt is a much
larger percentage of the total, producing special problems
in cases of debt rescheduling.
- 11 -
During the 1973-84 period, non-oil developing coun-
tries saw the nominal value of their debt rise at an annual
rate of approximately 15.4 percent. Although in real terms
(deflating by an index based on export prices) the increase
was a modest 8.3 percent per year, the growth rate of real
debt exceeded both the growth rate of real gross domestic
product of these countries (4.4 percent) and the expansion
of export volume (7.1 percent). This means that while high
inflation rates during the 1970s eased the load of unpaid
debts, the increase in real debt during 1973-84 never-
theless surpassed the growth of real resources.
The increase in the burden of servicing the unpaid
debt rose more rapidly than the increase in the level of
the unpaid debt itself, especially after the late 1970s.
Interest and amortization payments by non-oil developing
countries on medium- and long-term debt grew from $18
billion in 1973 to $61 billion in 1979 and to $108 billion
in 1982 (Table 1.5). The rapid increases in debt service
obligations during 1979-82 resulted not only from high debt
levels and nominal interest rates, but also from the expi-
ration of grace periods for loans contracted in the
mid-1970s. 8 A general calculation of real debt service
payments may be done by deflating interest amortization
payments by either export or import unit values. Both
approaches are shown in Table 1.5.
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A very disturbing signal was the manner in which
short-term debt (original maturity of less than one year)
rose in the overall picture. Short-term debt rose from 8.7
percent of the total in 1973 to 14.6 percent in 1974-79 and
to 18.1 percent in 1980-82 (Table 1.6). Since short-term
debt is easily affected by abrupt interruptions in normal
renewal once creditor confidence erodes, its rising share
indicates a source of instability. Short-term borrowing is
also not a reliable form of financing long-term devel-
opment; in theory, loan maturities should be equivalent to
the maturities of investment projects.
The debt service ratio, when calculated as interest
and amortization payments on medium- and long-term debt
divided by exports of goods and services, remained fairly
stable at about 15 percent for non-oil developing countries
through 1977, then rose from 19 percent in 1978 to
approximately 24 percent in 1982. Increases in the debt
service ratio were greatest for the group of countries
which were termed "major exporters" (mostly middle-income
countries that mainly export primary commodities). The
debt service ratio of low-income countries, with greater
reliance on fixed-interest loans on concessionary terms,
was lower in 1984 than it was in 1973. What this signifies
is that the burden of external debt increased conspicuously
in real terms by this process also. On the other hand, it
has to be pointed out that the debt burdens of individual
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countries did not follow a consistent pattern. This can be
readily illustrated: in 1982, the interest/export ratio
was about 6 percent for Nigeria (an increase over the 1979
figure of 1 percent), 39 percent for Brazil (25 percent in
1979), more than 20 percent for Peru (12 percent in 1979)
and rounding out the data, approximately 13 percent for
Colombia and the Philippines (7 percent in 1979) .
The sharp increase in the price of oil in 1973-74 and
again in 1979-80 has to be regarded as a major cause of the
debt problem of non-oil developing countries. In 1973, the
"industrial countries" had a combined current-account
(total trade in goods and services) surplus of $20.3
billion, but a year later this had changed dramatically to
a deficit of $10.8 billion. Meanwhile, the total deficit
of non-oil developing countries increased from $11.3
billion to $37.0 billion from 1973 to 1974 and to $46.3
billion in 1975 (Table 1.7)
In order to finance a current-account deficit, a de-
veloping country could elect to (a) deplete its inter-
national reserves; (b) reduce economic growth and restrict
non-oil imports; or (C) borrow from external sources. From
the trend of events, it is not difficult to see that the
last option was the most attractive and the least painful.
At that time, bankers had become more aware of the lending
opportunities in developing countries. International
commercial banks acted as intermediaries and recycled the
4-C
In0
-
	
4)	 I4.
	
-	 04..
41
	C 	 UC
--a413
	
3C	 CI)
	
P40	 3
	
4CC	 -
	
C---	 a.4)
>0 4-i
	
-	 C3
	
411.	 0
	
4.14)	 I.)ULL
4-IC4) 4)01.1.1.3
	
1.4)	 3w
	
<C	 oCC.
	
4)	 001
	
4. 0	 4-C
	
. Cfl	 00
	
C-'	 •	 0(5
(5
4..
	
.4) >	 In*
	
(5--	 (5	 '-04.1
	
4)	 (5Cfl
	
(53 0
	
1-CW
	
LQ	 a)	 Cfl•-
	
3	 1.
	>' 	 >-	 04-i
	
.L	 4CC
•
	
03C 01	 410
	0(5J L	 U
	
O)CflO	 0	 >-C	 u	 a..	 151.
	
C5)I)	 a.L41 0)0)
	
(5	 C'-	 14.
	
04.i0	 ---	 0
	
OC ISU	 U)-
	
4-aC	 0	 4).
. 0 QUC-I -E CX
	
C3	 CSE	 10(50 0)0 -,
-(5 .- 30 15C
	
4.1	 .00
	
- (5 1.>.	 C
	
CS •	 OL V
	
4.1(5(I) Q.(5
	
GiL
	
--(5	 E	 4.14)
	
C.	 ..- 1._c
-WV (51.
>0)41 410. 0.0
	
C .--- 1.	 41
	
I5Z+-	 04..	 1.(5 --
	
C. -CI)	 0 CCS
	4)15(I)	 -a.)_CS --X
	
.0-InWO)	 0(I)
	
4-I-Ua.15	 41(I)
	
0_i	 3L •
	 ) 000	 1.
	
L..(5	 4.C4J
	
1-C	 5) 1.	 4)_c
	-4) 	 (54.1WCSU3O)C
	
03-oCG)	 )->(I)C3_c 00) 0
	
W153GI	 CSCL	 _c C
• .4.iO)	 V
.	 •_C	 •
	
(5	 -0
	
wa. ui-i -.c	 ow
	
CS - Q0)4.0	 C--
u-,C'4-CU	 OL.
X 150 410 •.1-
-
4)0)	 --.OL.---0L	 S_C	 I.ILE0
	
(5(5(5.0	 -C4-0
-3V-3< 1.
	-.tCnoO.L'-O	 -4)4)CSNU_c0_c
J!ilIll!i
-	 '
	
01 0) 41 C-	 U *- 0
	
1. LI <I- 5-'	1 U)	 a)
-._ -S
(5.0UV
'1 5	 •#
0.
N-,
0'
00
4-C30
U
C0ULU
-a
1.
0
U-
I
uJU
Cl)
- 16 -
11)C0
4,
0'
U)
uJ
U-U,
I.-.
UJ
I-
>
0
(I)
wC-)
>
10U,
PC;
41
.0
CU	 Ii)OIflQ	 It.0	 CIg	 IILI1II)
o	 seo
0	 C.J C\j	 U1 C Lfl	 T	 -	 C C
- 	 I	 I	 C	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I
	ori-r	 0.11%	 ..-I)	 LI C1t9
0.	 i N. r Lfl	 I 11% r
	
11%C'JDrCJ	 -411'.	 '0
0	 CJ('J	 -	 -SW	 ('J-.?'00'uu'.
.O"-	 N- N1C%J	 I I0S
oo.r----	 i1.-	 -N-.
a	 uG. -'0 N-u0'	 L1111%O	 ('J
('.J(SJ	 U1.'0	 0'N-.-.-
	
0N- O-4 C%J-*N-	 cjN-NN--0'	 -t ' C'J ('J -	 N-	 N)	 F'.l	 - CO	 C I4 C-
N1L1%	 O.11
N-.	 II-'.JC%JC%J	 N-C	 r'.jDO	 O"ooN-.-Os	 '0'0 C Lfl CO	 C- C- CO C
w	 -.C1J	 C'.jj	 .C%JCO
COU)rfl'OI1%C'J N--4	 I1%	 NS*
2	 .	 '.	 111171
r'	0.N-11%	 .-itC%J
CO CO .- Os 0 sO LI'.	 rh CO '0-0-11% rhOs C	 CO F	 CO	 -
.t..-'ON-p.l'O	 N-Os	 (Jre)rfl	 .-N.N.C'J
000 N- 0 CO N- - (N	 '0 (N - Ill -O	 - C	 '4 th	 C C4	 C-I C	 C I I
	
Os'.-O.-.tr	 01-4 -ON-	 0.0.rhO'
0-4U-I0I1%'O 0,O OsF0I	 0ss0s0
C- (N, .	 CI	 1111
	N--rhPh0 -0
	
IJ'.'O CO0.'4t%LI'.U'l
0 CO	 N- 11% .-	 N- i1% h 0. - '4fl 0
o	
;-	
rn '0 r	 . rh	 - ' I....	 CO
FhIt'.,ON-.rh '0
	
'0.-- 0.'0'0'0N-r-
C%J	 Ph-SC- .-COJ--S
0
L
InW	 I$	 -LCCI)	 01.0	 0	 4J4-41	 q14-.	 O.oInOW CL-
	
L
41
1.	 LC0U4W4104.0	 'Q.L44LUC	 U	 O)L.L	 '	 (I)
-. J_aaaU')	 C.1C4I*EO41
41	 •>4.)41-41'4-C)CO)	 i..41-(L	 LDI-'.---.LC.L 0)	 C
•-	 .-O	 >.--.-0.W	 C
-	 C a- - 0 0 --' E 1
	
u- a.- 414.	 0*'-
oCL4104..4.. Z 	 .-iOL1---L'0-.-.
><tLjX
-cfl000c
- 17 -
OPEC current-account surpluses. These countries were
growing about twice as fast as the industrial countries and
demanded additional credit to keep growing. By increasing
their level of indebtedness, the developing countries were
able to delay the economic adjustment to higher oil prices
and to maintain their high levels of government spending
and investment. Moreover, the industrial countries
implemented expansionary monetary policies leading to
greater inflation, which also made the impact of higher oil
prices less severe.
By 1978, the OPEC current-account surpluses had almost
disappeared. The import capacity of the OPEC countries had
increased while inflation had eroded some of the real gains
from the price increase. The industrial countries accumu-
lated current-account surpluses in 1978 of $32.4 billion,
which provided sufficient funds for new credits to the
non-oil developing countries.
The current-account positions of the oil-importing
countries had just begun to improve over the tremendously
negative situation of 1974 and 1975 when the OPEC oil price
shock in 1979-80 caused a relapse. 	 This greatly upset
financial flow. The oil-exporting countries' current-
account surpluses rose from $6 billion in 1978 to $63
billion in 1979 and $110 billion in 1980. Correspondingly,
the current-account deficits of the non-oil developing
countries went from $42 billion to $88 billion, and the
- 18 -
industrial countries again moved from surplus to deficit
(Table 1.7). But this time, reactions of lender nations
created different circumstances for developing countries.
The industrial countries implemented tight monetary
policies which restricted economic growth and led to higher
interest rates. Funds were available to lend to the devel-
oping countries, but at average interest rates exceeding 15
percent. Consequently, the developing countries turned to
short-term debt, substantially shifting the composition of
their total debt. Long-term debt grew only 13.4 percent
per year between 1980 and 1982, compared to 20 percent per
year in the late seventies.
Even though most international lending experts
(especially William Cline) 1° have referred to the sharp
increases in oil prices of 1973-74 and 1979-80 as the
single most important external cause of the debt problems
of non-oil developing countries, a few experts disagree.
They contend that a major part of the expansion of bank
lending to developing countries was not coincident with
these two periods of increased financial needs. They also
argue that bank lending to developing countries had already
risen in the late 19605 and early 1970s before the first
oil shock. They further contend that official development
assistance and official nonconcessional flows did not
increase very much in real terms between 1970 and 1973, but
- 19 -
that real private bank lending grew 144 percent during
those years.
William dine estimated that the oil price increases
added $260 billion to the debt of the non-oil developing
countries from 1973 to 1982. He attributed 54 percent of
the increase in the debt of the non-oil developing
countries during that ten-year period to the oil price
shock. dine derived his estimate by creating a hypothet-
ical "no oil shock" figure for comparison. To arrive at
this figure, he assumed that oil prices rose at the same
rate as the U.S. wholesale price index since 1973. He also
assumed that the non-oil developing countries imported the
same amount of oil relative to total imports as in 1973.
Overall, the percentage of oil imports to total imports
rose from 6 percent in 1973 to 20 percent in 1982. Thus,
changes in the price of oil imposed an additional debt
burden on the non-oil developing countries, which he esti-
mated to be $260 billion over the ten-year period.
Debt Structure Changes, Interest Rates, and Recession
There have been several structural changes in debt
associated with the increase in commercial bank lending.
By year-end 1972, the developing countries' external debt
was equally divided between official and private creditors.
After the first oil shock, developing countries favored
private creditors to finance their current-account
- 20 -
deficits. Because of this move, the proportion of long-
term debt owed by non-oil developing countries to private
creditors (mostly banks) increased from 45 percent in 1973
to an estimated 78 percent in 1984 (Table 1.8). The
strongest growth was in funds from the syndicated loan
market, as the loans from commercial banks went beyond the
more traditional private debt sources, e.g., bonds and sup-
plier's credits (Table 1.9). This trend continued. By
1984, the commercial banks' share of the total guaranteed
medium- and long-term debt of non-oil developing countries
to private creditors jumped to about 86 percent.11
As was discussed earlier, the maturity structure of
debt also became shorter. The average maturity for a new
loan in 1972 was 18 years, according to the World Bank
(1983). By 1981, the average maturity had fallen to 14
years. Between 1979 and 1981, short-term debt of the non-
oil developing countries increased from $58.8 billion to
$97.2 billion. During the periods of high interest rates
in the early eighties, long-term debt was either difficult
to obtain or expensive. As a result, many of the larger
developing countries contracted large amounts of short-term
debt.
Short-term debt can take many forms including lines of
credit, letters of credit, and import financing. Short-
term debt must be rolled over or renewed periodically at
the discretion of creditors. When credit conditions tight-
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ened during 1982 and 1983, many banks attempted to reduce
their short-term lines of credit, only to find that the
countries were dependent on the lines. A good example is
Mexico, which increased short-term debt from $8 billion in
1977 to $32 billion in mid-1982, equivalent to an increase
in the proportion of short-term debt from 41 percent to 50
percent over the period.
Another important change was an increase in the use of
variable (or floating) interest rates between 1972 and
1981. In 1972, only 6.5 percent of disbursed debt had a
variable interest rate feature. By 1981, the share of debt
with variable interest rates was 37.4 percent. The use of
variable interest rate loans made lending more attractive
for commercial banks because it eliminated the risk asso-
ciated with fixed rate loans. With variable rate loans,
the principal payments are accelerated as the inflation
rate increases. This protects the lender from capital
losses resulting from higher inflation but is an added
burden on the borrower. For borrowers, the use of variable
interest rate loans tied the country closer to world
financial markets and made the country more vulnerable to
sudden changes in interest rates.
The next structural change was increased involvement
of a number of U.S. regional and smaller European banks in
international lending between 1972 and 1981. Before 1973,
lending by private creditors was mainly in the form of
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trade credits and was done only by large international
banks. Smaller European and U.S. regional banks were not
involved in international lending. There were few large
syndicated loans to developing countries. In contrast,
during the late seventies, smaller European and U.S.
regional banks became involved in lending to developing
countries and financing international trade. Such banks
entered international lending because economic growth in
the industrial world was much slower than in the developing
world and there were fewer loan opportunities. Inter-
national loan losses at the time were extremely unusual and
mainly related to private sector companies. Hence, these
new participants in international lending felt comfortable
in lending to a foreign public corporation whose debts were
guaranteed by the domestic government. The new banks
entering the international lending market increased the
supply of funds available for international lending.
In order to discuss the final structural change, the
following points have to be recognized. Assuming that the
massive increase in oil prices set the stage for the
tremendous increase in external debt over the last decade,
then the global recession and skyrocketing interest rates
of 1982 contributed extensively to the problem. The devel-
oping countries became accustomed to low real interest
rates in the 1970s. Real interest rates can be defined as
nominal interest rates (in this case the prime rate) minus
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the expected inflation rate. 12
 William dine, in his
general calculation, stated that, between 1961 and 1970,
London Inter-Bank offer rate (LIBOR) on U.S. dollar
deposits minus the U.S. wholesale price increase produced
an average real interest rate of 4.2 percent on non-oil
LDC5' external debt. This rate dropped to an incredible
-0.8 percent in the period 1971-80. Even though nominal
interest rates were high in 1979 and 1980 (LIBOR averaged
13.2 percent), so too was the U.S. inflation rate. But
when inflation began declining in 1981-82, it was not
accompanied by a corresponding decline in nominal interest
rates.	 This resulted in high real interest rates (7.46
percent in 1981 and 10.95 percent in 1982). In fact,
William Cline has also calculated that this surge in
interest rates, caused by expansionary fiscal and tight
monetary policies in the U.S., accounted for approximately
$41 billion in total excess interest payments in the period
1981-82 beyond what would have been anticipated on the
basis of real interest rates over the previous two
decades.13
Although there is considerable coincidence between
skyrocketing real interest rates and the world-wide reces-
sion of 1980-82, it is safe to say that the high real
interest rate had a strong effect. Between 1973 and 1979,
real growth in industrial countries averaged 3.2 percent
annually. It then fell to 1.2 percent in 1980-81 and to
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-0.3 percent in 1982.14 Commodity export prices for devel-
aping countries also fell victim to the recession, and by
1981-82, they had deteriorated drastically. If 1980 is
assumed to equal 100, export unit values fell to an index
of 94 in 1981 and to 90 in 1982 for developing countries.
Import unit values rose to 103 in 1981 and returned to 100
by 1982.15 dine estimated that a total loss of $79
billion was suffered by non-oil developing countries as a
result of the worsening situation of trade bases (goods and
services). 16 Adding to the problem was the fact that real
export volume was also a victim of the 1980-82 world
recession. Real export growth, which recorded an average
of 8.1 percent in 1971-80 for non-oil developing countries,
was measured at 9.9 percent for 1981 and then drastically
declined to 1.8 percent in 1982.
The preceding events were a factor in Cline's decision
to establish that the ex ante impact of all of these
exogenous shocks was to increase the debt of non-oil devel-
aping countries by $401 billion. These figures are
summarized in Table 1.10, which also shows that the total
increase in external debt of these countries since 1973
amounted to $482 billion. Although these figures are not
strictly comparable to actual debt increases after the
fact, because countries did pursue adjustment measures to
reduce external deficits (and debt), nonetheless, they
strongly suggest that a very large part of the increase in
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Table L1O: IMPACT OF EXOGENOUS SHOCKS ON EXTERNAL DEBT OF NON-OIL DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Effect
	
Amount
(	 Bit lions)
OIL price increase in excess of U.S. inflation, 1974-82 cumuLative
	 260
Real interest rate in excess of 1961-1980 average: 1981 and 1982
	
41
Terms-of-trade Loss, 1981-82	 79
Export volume loss caused by world recession, 1981-82
	 21
Total	 401
Mernorandun Items
Total debt: 1973	 130
1982	 612
Increase:	 1973-82	 482
SOURCE: William R. dine, International Debt and the Stability of the World Economy, Institute
for International Economics (SeptenDer, 1983).
developing-country debt in the last decade may be attrib-
uted to the impact of global causes that were exogenous to
the developing countries themselves.
Domestic Policies
In addition to these exogenous shocks, the developing
countries' domestic policies can be blamed for the deterio-
ration of their debt situation. In Mexico, government
action was responsible for the peso becoming seriously
overvalued, and thus for deficits surging to 16.5 percent
of GNP in 1982. The government also strictly followed a
strategy of high growth that probably exceeded capacity
growth and failed to take into account the substantial
weakening of the oil market in 1981.
In the case of Brazil, a high-risk strategy of
pursuing high growth that depended on rapid accumulation of
external debt proved to be an oppressive burden when the
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international economy weakened and exports declined instead
of continuing their earlier rapid growth. These policies
contributed greatly to the severe recession that started in
1981 and lasted until 1983. In addition, overvaluation of
the cruziero followed a failed attempt to bring down
domestic inflation by placing a 40 percent ceiling on
devaluation in 1980.
In the case of Argentina, pre-announcement of a
government plan to reduce inflation through devaluing the
exchange rate by less than the domestic inflation rate
resulted in a tremendously overvalued peso, high imports,
poor export performance, and a massive increase in the
level of debt in 1981. Chile had seen strict monetary and
fiscal policies reduce inflation in the 1970s. However, it
followed Argentina's example in trying to reduce inflation
by pre-announcing an exchange rate devaluation by less than
the rate of domestic inflation. As a result, Chile too
faced an acute overvaluation of the peso, which, coupled
with the decline in the price of copper, increased the
level of debt.
Slackness in management of state agencies in Venezuela
contributed to the build-up of short-term debt after 1976,
despite the presence of surpluses in the petroleum agency.
In Venezuela and Mexico, attempts to maintain an overvalued
currency in a fully convertible basis, along with domestic
interest rate policies, led to capital flight. In Argen-
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tina and Venezuela, outflow of capital is estimated to have
accounted for roughly one-third of total debt, and in
Mexico, approximately one-fifth.
In addition to short-term policy errors, long-term
development strategies have been disastrous. Excessive
protection in programs of industrialization based on import
substitution, inadequate pricing of capital, over-pricing
of labor, overly ambitious and inefficient government
enterprise activities, and other distortions have been a
significant hindrance to growth in many developing coun-
tries. 17
Debt Rescheduling of the LDC5
Debt reschedulings were relatively uncommon from about
1948 until 1979. The first major debt rescheduling to
occur during this time was in 1954, when Argentina re-
scheduled $500 million of loans. At that time, the Paris
Club, an unofficial organization of government lenders, was
formed to facilitate the debt restructuring.
Between 1956 and 1979, there were 41 cases of debt
reschedulings. The majority of these reschedulings
involved government lenders only and were handled by the
Paris Club. Debt to international organizations and com-
mercial banks generally was not included in the resche-
duling process.	 Several of the debt reschedulings were
actually aid consortia (loans raised among a group of
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international banks formed by groupings of existing banks
usually drawn from different countries) and not true debt
reschedulings. For example, the reschedulings of India's
debt between 1974 and 1976 and of Pakistan's debt in 1974
were considered aid consortia. The maturity of their debts
was extended to more than twenty years, and the interest
rates were substantially reduced.
Table 1.11 lists the countries that rescheduled their
debts between 1956 and 1979 and the amounts involved. Only
fifteen countries were involved in debt reschedulings
during the entire period. With this relatively small
number of countries, the international financial markets,
IMF, and the commercial banks could easily monitor the
situation and increase credit exposure if required. All
but four of these countries rescheduled their debt several
times. India rescheduled seven times during this period,
while Chile, Ghana, Indonesia, and Turkey each rescheduled
four times, and Argentina, Peru, Pakistan, and Zaire on
three occasions each.
	 Apparently, once a country
rescheduled its debt, it was likely to do so again.
Although most of the debt reschedulings involved
mainly government creditors, commercial bank debt resche-
duling started to occur frequently in the late seventies.
Bank reschedulings are more difficult because of the large
number of parties involved. The rescheduling of a loan
syndication requires the approval of all of the lenders.
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TabLe 1.11: DEBT RESCHEDULING, 1956-79
Amount	 Amount
Year	 Country	 ($ MilLions)	 Year	 Country	 (S Millions)
1956	 Argentina	 500	 1972	 Canbodia	 2
1959	 Turkey	 440	 1973	 India	 340
1961	 Brazil	 300	 Pakistan	 107
1962	 Argentina	 270	 1974	 Pakistan	 650
1964	 BraziL	 270	 ChiLe	 450
1965	 Argentina	 274	 India	 194
Turkey	 220	 Ghana	 190
Chile	 90	 1975	 India	 248
1966	 Indonesia	 310	 ChiLe	 230
Ghana	 170	 1976	 Zaire	 280
1967	 Indonesia	 110	 1977	 Zaire	 210
1968	 Indonesia	 180	 India	 200
Peru	 120	 India	 120
Ghana	 100	 Sierra Leone	 52
India	 100	 1978	 Peru	 1,212
1969	 Peru	 100	 Turkey	 1,100
1970	 Indonesia	 2,090	 1979	 Turkey	 3,200
Ghana	 18	 Zaire	 1,000
1971	 India	 100	 Sudan	 500
1972	 ChiLe	 258	 Togo	 200
Pakistan	 236
SOURCE: Euromoney, August, 1982.
Moreover, bankers do not always have the influence on
government policy that government lenders may have. As a
result, bankers try to get the IMF or governments involved
in the debt rescheduling process.
The shock of the increasing and, through 1983, accel-
erating rate of debt rescheduling has dramatically changed
international banking. Rescheduling negotiations occur
either through mutual agreement between a debtor country
and its creditors or because a country has either defaulted
or is likely to default in the near future. By definition,
any failure to service a loan agreement on schedule,
regardless of the reason, is a default. However, a
distinction is usually drawn in the literature between a
narrower definition of default, the inability to service
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debt, and a repudiation, which refers to the unwillingness
to service a debt on schedule. Examples of repudiation can
be found in the cases of Cuba, North Korea, and the
People's Republic of China in the 1950s and possibly Iran
in the 19805.
Whether a country will be able to service its foreign
debt on schedule is dependent upon the willingness of the
government to favor foreign debt service over economic and
political goals. When the perceived burden of the current
pattern of debt service exceeds the perceived benefits,
then a country will seek to reschedule. Thus a re-
scheduling may be requested by one country while a similar
country with a more onerous foreign debt continues to make
payments according to the original agreement. In other
words, whether a rescheduling occurs may depend on
perceptions, political will, or negotiating ability as well
as on the actual economic conditions of the country.
In order to prevent the debtor from favoring one
creditor over another, both government (official) and bank
creditors favor multilateral rescheduling negotiations over
bilateral ones. Government creditors tend to use the Paris
Club, a facility provided informally by the French
Government. Of the forty-three official multilateral debt
negotiations that occurred between 1975 and 1983, thirty-
four occurred under the auspices of the Paris Club. Other
government rescheduling negotiations were organized by
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various aid consortia, which conducted five negotiations
and OECD, which held three. Private banks lack the formal
rescheduling mechanism of the Paris Club, but their
negotiations tend to coalesce around several standing
"rules.' 1 The banks with the largest exposure in the
country will generally handle most of the direct nego-
tiations. No bank can receive more favorable terms than
another bank in the agreement, and a rescheduling agreement
is usually accompanied by an agreement with the IMF. From
1978 through 1983, 83 percent of the multilateral bank
rescheduling agreements were made conditional upon the
country agreeing to follow economic policies recommended by
the IMF.
This dependence on the IMF reflects the inability of
banks to monitor the economic policy and institutions of a
debtor country. Assuming that a country's debt crisis was
begun or exacerbated by the government policies of the
debtor nation, the private creditors will seek assurances
that the government will change these policies. It is
difficult for a consortium of banks to obtain these assur-
ances. While the banks involved in a rescheduling may
stick together until the agreement is reached, their common
interests are much more limited after the new debt service
schedule has begun. An LDC government can play one group
of international banks against another with the threat that
if any group insists too adamantly on the country's coin-
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pliance with the policy understandings of the rescheduling
agreement, then that group will be excluded from future
lending opportunities involving that country.
In a recent attempt to circumvent this problem, many
of the international banks have sponsored a joint infor-
mation clearing house and analysis center. While an organ-
ization might reduce the endemic shortage of accurate
information concerning LDC economies, it seems unlikely
that a private authority will be able to monitor agreements
as effectively as the IMF, which wields a powerful finan-
cial club. The IMF can provide financing from its own
sources or withhold such financing if its conditions are
not met. It is extremely unlikely that private banks will
extend authority to some outside organization to commit the
banks to make or refuse loans. The banks and the LDC are
always free to enter private negotiations.
Although every bank rescheduling agreement is differ-
ent, some generalizations are possible. The terms of the
reschedulings in the period 1978-1983 tended to be rigorous
with respect to interest and liberal with respect to
principal. Interest arrears were rarely rescheduled. Of
the fifty-one bank rescheduling agreements for thirty
countries during the period 1978-1983, only eight of the
agreements for four countries allowed interest in arrears
to be rescheduled. However, in fifteen agreements for
eleven countries, the banks agreed to make new loans as
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part of the rescheduling agreement, resulting in partial or
full capitalization of interest.
This insistence on the part of the banks that interest
payments must be made on schedule regardless of whether or
not the principal is rescheduled is primarily a result of
how banks calculate their earnings. In the U.S., it has
long been the practice that a loan must be declared non-
performing if interest payments are overdue a significant
period of time. The International Lending Supervision Act
of 1983 gave this practice the force of law by requiring
that any loan be declared non-accrual if interest payments
are more than ninety days in arrears. A non-per-
forming/non-accrual loan must be reported to shareholders
in a public corporation, and the bank's auditors usually
require that the loan be reduced in value to reflect an
estimate of its actual worth. Thus non-receipt of interest
not only directly reduces the bank's earnings but also, if
the book value of the loans is lowered, reduces the bank's
net worth or capital. (Since assets equal liabilities plus
net worth, by definition, a reduction in the valuation of a
bank's assets leads to an equivalent reduction in the
bank's net worth).
It is for this reason that banks are willing to allow
interest payments to be rescheduled only when the amounts
are small. The foreign bank debt of the four countries
that rescheduled interest arrears, Bolivia in 1983, Nica-
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ragua in 1980-83, Senegal in 1982, and Sudan in 1981 and
1983, amounts to a relatively small proportion of foreign
bank debt. In contrast, countries that received funds to
capitalize interest included the LDCs with the largest
proportion of foreign debt: Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico.
Beginning in 1980, debt reschedulings started to take
on a more ominous nature. The doubling of oil prices, high
interest rates, and the world-wide recession provided a
very tough economic setting. In 1980, eight countries, led
by Turkey and Zaire, rescheduled debts valued at $5.1
billion (see Table 1.12). The trend continued in 1981 when
twelve countries rescheduled their debts. However, most of
the countries involved were small African or Latin American
countries, and the debt problem was not considered too
serious at the time. Since relatively few problems had
occurred during the first petrodollar recycling, the second
recycling in 1980 was not feared.
However, there were three major differences between
the two OPEC current-account recyclings. First, the indus-
trial economies restricted their monetary policies from
1980 to 1982 to avoid the inflationary impact of the
increase in oil prices. After the initial spurt caused by
energy prices, inflation slowed dramatically in the indus-
trial countries. Second, the world entered a protracted
recession lasting three or more years. The slowdown in the
world economy, a decline in world trade, and a slump in
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TabLe 1.12: DEBT RESCHEDULING, 1980-83
	
Amount	 Amount
Year	 ($ MilLions) Year	 (S Millions)
1980	 Turkey	 3,000	 1983* Mexico	 24,550
Zaire	 1.008	 Brazil.	 13,600
Nicaragua	 437	 Argentina	 6,000
Yugoslavia	 420	 Chile	 4,100
logo	 68	 Yugoslavia	 3,800
Sierra Leone
	
40	 Peru	 2,820
Liberia	 30	 PoLand	 2,600
Bolivia	 29	 Ecuador	 2,350
Nigeria	 1,830
1981	 Turkey	 3,100	 Zaire	 1,600
Sudan	 638	 Costa Rica	 1,366
Zaire	 574	 Morocco	 1,200
BoLivia	 444	 Romania	 767
Pakistan	 263	 Dominican Republic	 660
Nicaragua	 190	 Cuba	 583
Jamaica	 103	 Sudan	 550
logo	 93	 BoLivia	 536
SenegaL	 77	 logo	 384
Central African RepubLic	 55	 Zambia	 320
Uganda	 27	 Madagascar	 195
Liberia	 25	 Senegal	 173
Uruguay	 170
1982 PoLand	 4,600	 Jamaica	 166
Romania	 1,778	 Honduras	 122
Sudan	 174	 MaLawi	 87
Madagascar	 103	 Niger	 29
Senegal	 84	 Liberia	 25
Nicaragua	 55	 Guyana	 24
MaLawi	 24	 CentraL African RepubLic	 13
Liberia	 27
Guyana	 14
Uganda	 10
* Covers arrangements signed or agreed in principLe.
SOURCES: WorLd Debt TabLes, 1983-84 Edition, and Euromoney, August 1982.
commodity prices made it extremely difficult for the LDCs
to earn enough foreign exchange to service their debts.
Finally, the U.S. dollar gained strength from 1981 to 1983.
Since most debt was contracted in dollars, the relative
cost of servicing the debt appreciated with the dollar's
strength.
With the world-wide recession continuing in 1982, the
debt problem became more pronounced. In 1982, ten coun-
tries had to reschedule their debts. When Mexico, which
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owed about $85 billion, announced in August 1982 that it
was close to default and had to reschedule its debt, the
problem finally got the attention that it deserved. Then
in December 1982, Brazil, the most indebted developing
country, with a debt of $86 billion, announced that it
would also reschedule its debts. During 1983, twenty-nine
countries, including Mexico and Brazil, negotiated debt
reschedulings of $68.8 billion. Fourteen of the twenty-
nine countries had already rescheduled their debts at least
once between 1980 and 1982. Of the total debt rescheduled
in 1983, debt to commercial banks represented 84 percent or
$57.9 billion, according to the IMF Survey (1984). The
remaining $10.9 billion was government-to-government debt
which was rescheduled by the Paris Club.
One general explanation of the record number of debt
reschedulings is that it was the result of a unique com-
bination of adverse economic shocks which occurred from
1980 to 1983. The 1980 to 1983 world recession was one of
the longest and deepest on record. The recession was
accompanied by high real interest rates, higher oil prices,
an oil supply crisis, a decline in commodity prices, an
increase in the value of the dollar, and a decline in world
trade. As an example, the prime rate in the United States
had not averaged more that 11.0 percent for longer than a
year since World War II. The prime rate was 15.27 percent
in 1980, 18.87 in 1981, and 14.86 in 1982.
	
The largest
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cumulative decline in commodity prices since the depression
occurred from 1981 to 1982. In 1981, the commodity price
index of the IMF fell 14.7 percent and then fell another
12.2 percent in 1982. Thus, the severity and the length of
the recession mark the 1980 to 1983 period as the worst in
post-war economic history.
Another explanation for the record number of debt re-
schedulings is related to the supply of credit. It is
logical that if commercial banks suddenly stopped lending
to the developing countries, there would be massive re-
schedulings, and in fact, commercial bank lending to the
non-oil developing countries did slow dramatically in 1982
and 1983. From 1979 to 1981, net new bank lending to the
non-oil developing countries expanded at annual rates ex-
ceeding 22 percent. In 1982, bank lending increased only
8.8 percent, as shown in Table 1.13. In monetary terms,
new bank lending was $49 billion in 1980 and $51 billion in
1981, which covered about half of the current-account
deficits of the non-oil developing countries. 	 New bank
lending in 1982 fell to $25 billion, enough to cover 29
percent of the current-account deficits. Seven billion
dollars of reserves, as well as other sources of financing,
had to be used to cover the current-account deficits.
In 1983, new lending by commercial banks declined to
an estimated $15 billion, one-third the level in 1981. New
lending would probably have been even less if not for the
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TabLe 1.13: BANK LENDING TO MOM-OIL DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 1977-82 (S Billions)
1977	 1978	 1979	 1980	 1981	 1982
Net bank lending	 15	 25	 40	 49	 51	 25
Growth in bank lending (%) 	 14.9	 19.3	 26.6	 26.2	 22.2	 8.8
Current-account positions	 -29	 -41	 -61	 -89	 -108	 -87
Bank lending as a percent
of current account (X)	 52	 61	 66	 55	 46	 29
Change in reserves	 13	 17	 13	 5	 2	 -7
SOURCE: IMF, InternationaL Capital Markets, Develonents and Prospects, 1983, Occasional Paper
#23.
"involuntary" lending required by IMF stabilization
programs; in 1983, 90 percent of the bank lending to Latin
America was required by rescheduling programs.
The change in OPEC current-account balances was one of
the causes of the decline in new bank lending. When the
OPEC current-account surplus evaporated in 1982, one of the
major sources of new funds for the banking system was lost.
In 1982, the OPEC current account recorded a deficit of $2
billion after a surplus of $65 billion in 1981. In 1983,
the OPEC current-account deficit expanded to $27 billion,
which tightened international credit conditions even more.
To conclude, the huge debt reschedulings of the early
eighties have to go down as one of the phenomenal events in
modern international economic history. The factors most
directly and immediately responsible for bringing the
external financial positions of many developing countries
under such severe strain in 1982 were higher oil prices in
1973-74 and 1979-80, unprecedented high interest rates in
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1980-82, declining export prices and volumes connected with
global recession in 1981-82, and inappropriate domestic
economic and financial policies.
Debt-Relief Proposals
When the critical nature of the debt problems became
universally evident by early 1983, a variety of debt-relief
proposals were suggested. Programs advocated for attaining
debt relief were divided between those favoring solutions
through an increase in debt and those favoring solutions
that would reduce it.
Programs of the former type viewed debt problems as
mostly problems of liquidity, capable of being eased and
eventually resolved by an increase in lending. A very good
example of this was the proposal introduced in 1983 by Lord
Lever, the former British Minister, advocating a substan-
tial increase in official loan guarantees through export
credit agencies.
On the other hand, debt-reducing programs focused on
debtor solvency. Their proponents argued that without an
easing of the debt service burden, many countries would be
unable to recover financial strength. Their assertion was
that both the countries and their creditors would be better
served by agreeing to an early financial reconstruction,
and they pointed to similarities in some respects to
Chapter 11 arrangements under U.S. bankruptcy laws. It was
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their contention that if the negotiations were held under
appropriate international supervision, the agreements would
restore growth to the debtor countries, improve the global
economy, and present banks the opportunity of eventually
recovering a higher proportion of their loans than if they
continued to seek repayment in full.
In 1983, Peter Kenen, a professor at Princeton Univer-
sity, and Felix Ruhatyn, former chairman of New York's
Municipal Assistance Corporation, proposed the creation of
a new international agency to take over claims owed to com-
mercial banks and assume responsibility for adjusting terms
with the debtors. The initial cost would be borne by
banks, which would sell their loans to the agency at a
discount.	 However, the residual credit risk would then
pass to the agency and its official shareholders.
These proposals required official support and finan-
cial commitment at a level that was not politically
feasible. The global recovery of mid-1983 made the fate of
the proposals questionable. The slowdown of the world
economy after 1984 along with the failure of debtor coun-
tries to resume adequate growth became signals for action
to be taken in new directions.
The U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, James A. Baker
III, set forth a basic international strategy for dealing
with the debt problem. This strategy has subsequently
guided official policy. The Baker plan was presented at
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the meetings of the World Bank and International Monetary
Fund in September 1985 in Seoul, Korea. That plan sought
to reinforce the tripartite strategy that had developed
after 1982: adjustment by debtor countries, additional
bank lending, and financial support from international
agencies and industrial country governments. The Baker
plan's guidelines were that banks should expand their
exposure by approximately 2.5 percent per year, amounting
to $7 billion annually for fifteen major debtor countries.
The plan also expected the international agencies to orient
their programs more fully toward growth and less toward
contractionary adjustments and required multilateral
development banks in particular to increase their net
disbursements by approximately $3 billion annually.
Moreover, it expected debtor countries to adopt structural
reforms oriented toward improved longer term growth,
especially trade liberalization, encouragement of foreign
investment, and reduction of the role of the state in their
economies.
Not surprisingly, the Baker plan has been criticized
as insufficient. Bela Balassa, Bueno, Kuczynski, and
Simonsen all indicated that to ensure adequate growth, the
Baker plan's capital-flow targets should be increased from
$10 billion to $20 billion per year. They also felt that
the bulk of the additional funds should come from the
official sector, in view of the already extended position
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of the banks and the difficulty of mobilizing cohesive bank
participation in raising even the original fund Baker
proposed.18
As interest in debt-relief programs was fading, oil
prices suddenly collapsed in 1986 and Mexico experienced
extreme external-sector difficulties through mid-1986. The
suspension of interest payments in February 1987 rekindled
interest in debt-relief programs. During the first quarter
of 1987, some of the debt-relief proposals suddenly became
topics of important discussions in the U.S. Congress.
Senator Bill Bradley's plan was the most widely publi-
cized debt-relief proposal to originate with a U.S. leg-
islator. Senator Bradley disagreed with the Baker plan,
saying that it would prolong the debt problem by piling
more debt on top of existing debt. He contended that the
past strategy for dealing with the problem had benefited
banks at the expense of the U.S. agricultural and manufac-
turing firms and workers, who had lost out when exports
dropped as Latin American debtor countries were forced to
cut back their imports.
Senator Bradley proposed that for a period of three
years, the banks forgive 3 percentage points of interest
and 3 percent of principal annually. At the end of the
period, full servicing of interest and of the remaining
principal would resume. For their part, the debtor coun-
tries would adopt economic reforms of their own choosing, a
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plan Senator Bradley considered to be more sustainable than
reforms imposed from outside by the Baker plan.
A plan by Jeffrey D. Sachs of Harvard University is
more concentrated than that of Senator Bradley in terms of
narrower country coverage as well as more extensive
relief. 19 One of the major differences is that, while the
Bradley plan would be available for the full range of
debtor countries, Sachs' proposal would require that
outright debt relief be limited to those countries that
have experienced declines of 15 percent or more in per
capita GNP since 1980. At the same time, his proposal
would forgive all interest payments over a period of five
years, and countries that had experienced declines in per
capita income of more than 25 percent would be forgiven
interest over 10 years. The extent of forgiveness in this
proposal is far greater than in the Bradley plan. But
since the Sachs plan forgives only interest, it accom-
plishes a greater cash-flow relief per unit of bank loss
than the Bradley plan, which, by also forgiving some prin-
cipal, inflicts a loss that has no counterpart in current
cash-flow reduction.
The Bradley and Sachs plans differ in degree, but the
Kenen, Sarbanes, LaFalce, and Weinart plans differ in kind
from both of these. This alternative family of plans stems
from an idea first proposed by Peter B. Kenen of Princeton
University, that some international entity could buy up
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debt from the banks at a discount and pass along the
benefit of the discount to the debtor country.2°
Sometime in late 1986, Senator Paul S. Sarbanes
suggested that a new entity purchase the debt held by banks
at a discount, and pass on the discount to debtor countries
in the form of lower interest rates. Senator Sarbanes
proposed that the capital base necessary for such an entity
come from Japan's large external surplus.
Richard Weinert proposed that the existing secondary
market in developing-country debt could provide the valu-
ation basis for the purchase of debt from the banks, and
that the existing discount would then be passed on to the
debtor country. Congressman John J. LaFalce proposed
legislation in March 1987 that followed this approach. The
LaFalce plan would use approximately $4 billion of the
IMF's holdings of gold (about 10 percent) for the creation
of an international debt adjustment facility to purchase a
country's loans at a discount in the secondary market and
to restructure them to pass on the benefit of the discount
to the debtor. The purchase program would be initiated by
a request from the country, but be implemented only after
agreement on a detailed plan of future economic management.
The facility would also seek to use debt-equity swaps and
commodity linked bonds to expand the degree of restruc-
turing.
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Alfred Herrhausen of Deutsche Bank proposed the
creation of an Interest Compensation Fund (ICF) to stabi-
lize and limit the interest payments of eligible developing
countries (eligibility would be determined by need and the
debtor's commitment to an approved adjustment program).
The ICF would be financed jointly by governments,
international financial institutions, and banks on the
basis of their respective exposure to the debtor, and would
be managed by the IMF. It would limit interest rates to a
pre-agreed level, but allow for a recovery of earlier
unpaid interest if rates subsequently fell below this
level.
Finally, the obvious lack of enthusiasm on the part of
the international banks to the Baker plan of 1985 has at
long last led to consideration by the U.S. administration
of different proposals. On March 9, 1989, Nicholas Brady,
U.S. Treasury Secretary, in a speech to the Brookings
Institution and the Bretton Woods Committee Conference on
Third World Debt specified that the United States govern-
inent will look favorably on guarantees to encourage
commercial bank creditors to pass the discounts on their
third-world debts on to the debtors as a form of debt
relief.	 This is contingent on the bankers undertaking
renewed lending to third-world debtor countries. The
speech also indicated that the U.S. has explicitly ended
opposition to the idea of guarantees as a means of inducing
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commercial banks to forgive some developing countries'
debt.
The following are key points in Treasury Secretary
Brady's suggestions. The debtor nations must concentrate
particular attention on the adoption of policies which can
better encourage new investment flows, strengthen domestic
savings, and promote the return of flight capital. This
requires sound growth policies which creates confidence in
both domestic and foreign investors. He specified that the
IMF and the World Bank should emphasize the reduction of
future stock of debt and sustaining strong growth. He also
brought up the point that total capital flight for most
major debtors was roughly comparable to their total debt.
Brady went on to urge the creditor community--the com-
mercial banks, international financial institutions, and
creditor governments--to provide more effective and timely
financial support. Commercial banks need to work with
debtor nations to provide a broader range of alternatives
for financial support, including greater efforts to achieve
both debt and debt-service reduction and to provide new
lending. He further stressed the negotiation of a general
waiver of the sharing and negative pledge clauses for each
performing debtor, to permit an orderly process for banks
to negotiate debt or debt-service-reduction transactions.
Another point stressed by Brady was more timely and
flexible financial support. There is a need to make the
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way "financial gaps" are estimated and filled less rigid
and less cumbersome. He also indicated that while it is
accepted that the IMF should continue to estimate debtor
financing needs, there is still a question of whether the
international financial institutions should delay their
initial disbursements until firm, detailed commitments have
been provided by all other creditors to fill the financing
"gap." To conclude, Brady emphasized that sound policies
and open, growing markets within the industrial nations
will continue to be an essential foundation for efforts to
make progress on the debt problem.
In the next chapter a distinction will be made between
domestic and international lending. The subject of country
risk will be thoroughly discussed, with a focus on economic
risk, political risk, sovereign risk, and transfer risk.
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CHAPTER II
TYPES OP RISKS IN INTERNATIONAL BANKING
In every lending, credit risk is the likelihood that a
borrower will not be able to repay the principal or pay the
interest when it becomes due. One of the major respon-
sibilities of the lending institutions is to minimize that
risk. The bank as a typical lending institution is,
therefore, very interested in the economic status of the
borrower and analyzes that status very carefully. Past
performance and forecasts of future development are
reviewed. The bank is interested in knowing the purpose of
the loan, and from which cash flow the interest and prin-
cipal would be paid. In many instances, the bank will ask
for collateral to further reduce credit risk because of the
difficulty in evaluating the customer's future economic
performance.
What differentiates international lending from
domestic lending is the general notion of country risk and
the presence of sovereign risk. When repayment dif-
ficulties exist in sovereign lending, the lender's ability
to recover the borrower's current assets is very limited,
and recovery becomes almost impossible when the debtor is a
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government or one of its agencies. Recovery of assets is
very difficult because of the lack of a legal enforcement
system common to both lender and borrower.
Several experts, most notably Kharas, 1 have emphasized
that borrowing by a government implies that debt-servicing
capacity will depend not only on the country's growth
prospects but also on the government's ability and willing-
ness to tax and to generate a fiscal surplus. It should be
pointed out that willingness alone is, of course, not
enough to guarantee ability.
Sovereign risk, which was noted earlier as a key
factor in the differentiation of international lending from
domestic lending, can be divided into two categories:
political stability and willingness to pay. The degree of
political stability is an important element of credit-
worthiness because political instability might bring about
economic or social discontinuities that would be detri-
mental to the borrower's economy, which would, in turn,
reduce the capacity to service debts. Furthermore,
political instability might develop into situations which
would be detrimental to the interest of foreign lenders,
such as repudiation of debt or prevention of foreign
currency transfer.	 Finally, the international lenders
might not be totally familiar with the political and
economic systems of the borrowing country and this unfamil-
iarity would increase the discount factor of risk.
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In international lending, conunercial bankers emphasize
the importance of a country's willingness to repay. Even
when individual projects are economically feasible and
permit borrowers to repay their loans, the government of
the country could prevent the borrower from complying with
its obligations. Unlike the case with domestic credit,
foreign lenders have no resort when a country is not
willing to pay its obligations. In fact, the immediate
cause for a number of defaults in Eastern Europe during the
1930s was the inability to transfer funds rather than the
borrowers' inability to repay their obligations. Many
defaults in Latin American obligations in the 1930s were
governmental defaults which were due to a decrease in
government revenues.
Alexander K. Swoboda 2 developed three aspects of
sovereign borrowing that are relevant to the stability and
efficiency of international lending. First, he stressed
that ownership of assets ultimately financed by government
borrowing may not be vested in the government's hands,
exacerbating the recoverability problem not only for
foreign lenders but also for the borrowing government.
Secondly, private borrowing by developing nations is often
at a disadvantage relative to government or government-
guaranteed borrowing. A very good example of this is that
often a prejudice develops against private borrowing
because of servicing problems; thus it carries a higher
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transfer risk than government borrowing. This
discrimination against private borrowing may contribute to
the prominence of syndicated lending to governments over
the issue of private debt in different forms (such as bond
finance). Since it is unlikely that government investment
decisions and project selection will obey as strict a
profitability criterion as will those of private
investment, the riskiness of sovereign lending may increase
with the proportion of borrowing that is done by
governments and their agencies or borrowing that bears
government guarantees.
Swoboda's third point is that sovereign borrowing by
governments makes it all but impossible to tie loans to
specific projects. He believes that this has two major
undesirable consequences. The first is that debt-servicing
difficulties tend to affect all loans to a country
simultaneously. Failure of one project can lead to debt-
servicing problems in all other projects since there is no
way of making an individual loan bear the risk of an
individual project. A second and related consequence is
that it becomes very difficult to recognize actual losses
on past loans and simultaneously engage in new lending.
In other words, new loans have to bear the burden of
capital losses on past projects financed by old loans.
When a firm experiences difficulties in domestic lending,
the firm can obtain new loans at reasonable terms after a
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restructuring has shared past losses between the creditors
and the debtor. Moreover, loans that are not extended to
the firm in difficulty can be transferred to firms that
have more worthwhile projects. In international sovereign
lending, once a country's debt-servicing problems lead to a
write-down of its liabilities in the books of lending
banks, new loans are unlikely to be forthcoming to any
entity or project except at significantly harder terms.
The new projects, which may offer a perfectly acceptable
risk-return tradeoff at normal interest rates, may well not
be worthwhile at these harder terms.
Country Risk
Country risk is the additional risk, beyond the usual
commercial risk in domestic lending, that exists when
lending to a foreign country or to a borrower residing in a
foreign country. 3	Some banks use a broader definition
which includes local currency as well. Country risk is
thus defined as the probability that a significant
proportion of all outstanding foreign loans for a
particular country will not be serviced according to the
terms laid down in the original loan agreement. Country
risk is due to economic, social, and political conditions
within a country that may affect a borrower's ability or
willingness to repay principal and interest on schedule.
Hence, country risk should be considered in addition to
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credit risk because country-specific factors influence all
economic activities of a country, be they national or
private units.
Risk in commercial lending is essentially the like-
lihood of default, repudiation, or rescheduling. A loan is
in default when the creditor declares that the borrower has
failed to comply with some aspect of the loan agreement. A
repudiation of a loan is the explicit refusal of the
borrower to pay the principal or interest as originally
agreed. Rescheduling is an agreement between both parties
to alter the schedule of payments. Default and repudiation
usually incur loss for the lending bank; rescheduling need
not result in direct loss for the bank.
Default and repudiation are usually initiated by an
inability to pay or, simply, bankruptcy. However, there is
a fundamental difference between ordinary bankruptcy of an
individual unit within a national economy and that of an
entire government. Ordinary bankruptcy usually indicates
negative net worth. Most countries have bankruptcy laws
that protect creditors and prevent private units from di-
vesting themselves of liabilities while maintaining control
of assets; that is, creditors are compensated for their
losses to the extent allowed by the debtors' assets.
A lender extending credit to a government entity,
however, enjoys no such legal protection. A government may
repudiate all or part of its debt without losing control of
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its assets and without being legally bound to compensate
the lender in any way. The most powerful default or repu-
diation deterrent is the ability to declare a repudiating
government ineligible for future loans. Such a declaration
is not limited to the institution in question; because of
the nature of banking, ineligibility most likely will
extend across the financial market. Not all loans within a
country involve the same level of country risk. Local
currency loans extended by a bank's foreign branch to local
residents typically involve only the normal credit risk, as
such lending is generally funded locally. This suggests
that a distinction must be made between local currency
lending and cross-border foreign-exchange lending.
However, this research is concerned only with cross-border
foreign-exchange lending.
A good way to explain country risk is to imagine a
bank lending money to a foreign corporation doing business
in another foreign country. The foreign corporation will
very likely do most of its business in local currency. It
will also have to comply with the laws and regulations that
are in effect in the country where it is doing business.
Imagine a scenario in which a foreign corporation is
in possession of the local currency needed to pay all of
its obligations but is unable to obtain the foreign
exchange needed to pay foreign creditors, or where it has
the needed foreign exchange but is prevented from trans-
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ferring it abroad by local laws or regulations. It is very
clear that what is happening here is not the inability of
the foreign corporation to pay its obligations, but rather
its inability to convert domestic currency into foreign
exchange and to transfer it abroad. This situation could
also occur if the loan is made to, or guaranteed by, a
government. Even though a government could tax its resi-
dents or print money to pay its domestic obligations, it
cannot tax the residents of foreign countries or print
foreign money to pay external debts. Again the non-payment
is due to its inability to convert domestic currency into
foreign exchange. Of course, a government's refusal to pay
its obligations is also a possibility.
Because international lending always involves a
foreign currency, there can be a foreign-currency risk for
the borrower only, for the lender only, or for both. A
French bank verifying a letter of credit of a Nigerian bank
in Canadian dollars involves a foreign-currency risk for
both parties. An Italian consortium bank lending yens to a
Japanese company means a foreign-currency risk for the
lender only. A West German bank lending Deutsche marks to
a British company is a typical foreign-currency risk for
the borrower. When foreign-currency risk is mentioned as
part of the country risk, what is meant is the foreign-
currency risk that the lender runs. There are two parts to
this risk.	 The first part originates from equivalence
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adjustments, binding the borrower to pay an amount which
may be considerably different in local currency from what
was due when the obligation was contracted. Examples of
this are recent lendings to the private sector in Mexico,
which show that solvency can be seriously impaired. The
second part deals with the borrower's inability to remit
foreign currency at the time of payment because the author-
ities of his country have introduced foreign currency
remittance regulations which relate to the borrower's
liability in foreign currencies. Both of these cases show
the lender facing a country-risk problem which emanates
from the economic policies of that country.
Sovereign Risk
Sovereign risk arises when, because of the legal
status of the borrower, the lender is not protected if he
experiences difficulty in recovering his loan. Sovereign
risk is most often spoken of synonymously with country
risk, since it is generally true that governments are able
to generate the money necessary to service their debts in
their domestic currency. Sovereign risk involves only the
risk that the government cannot raise the foreign exchange
to service its debts.
In international lending, the lender and the borrower
are residents of two different independent countries with
different sets of laws and regulations that affect both
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lender and borrower. It is the risk of future unfavorable
action by a borrower's government that is most disturbing,
e.g., new, more binding limitations or orders forbidding
the transfer of funds abroad, moratoria, increased taxes,
or other governing directives that adversely affect
external creditors. The difficulty here is that the
creditor may also be unfavorably affected by laws initiated
in his own country because of, for example, the freezing of
funds or export bans.
Transfer Risk
Transfer risk arises from balance-of-payment dif-
ficulties; it dominates most discussions on country-risk
evaluation. Transfer risk is incurred when a borrower who
has domestic currency to repay his debt is prevented from
paying by the host government policies which make foreign
exchange unavailable. Transfer restrictions implemented in
countries that are members of the International Monetary
Fund are published in the IMF's Annual Report on Exchange
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions.
Transfer risk involves only the risk that a private
sector company with the ability and willingness to pay will
not be able to obtain the necessary foreign currency to
service its debts. However, most countries' banking
systems allow the government first claim on the country's
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foreign exchange, making transfer risk to some extent
generally greater than sovereign risk.
There is no transfer risk if a bank has a branch with
local deposits in a country; the loan would be part of
local lending operations, and it would be a domestic loan
in the host country. However, if foreign currency was con-
verted by the lender for the purpose of creating the local
currency to be lent, then the lender would run not only the
risk that the funds may not be transferable when the loans
become due, but also the risk that the local currency may
have been devalued while the loan was outstanding. The
causes of transfer problems could be economic conditions,
political actions of a government, or both.
In 1983, the Federal Reserve, Comptroller of the
Currency, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
clearly recognized transfer risk in sovereign lending
caused by the possible inability of a country to raise
enough foreign exchange to service debt. 4 This recognition
is significant because not very long ago, some prominent
bankers declared that sovereign lending had no risk what-
soever because countries do not disappear. The three
agencies proposed a five-point program of regulation:
(a) stricter examination of country exposure, which
included expectation of higher capital-to-loan ratios for
banks with greater concentration of country exposure;
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(b) greater public disclosure of the country exposure
of banks;
(c) the definition of new loan classifications: loss,
reservable, and debt-service impaired, with requirements
for write-off or provisioning into reserves in the first
two cases, respectively;
(d) stretchout of reported income from loan fees; and
(e) increased cooperation with bank regulators abroad
and, possibly, greater sharing of IMF information.
Economic Risk
Economic risk is the result of innate or exogenous
economic developments which inimically affect the balance
of payments of a country, such as economic policies that
result in high domestic demand or in a decline in demand
and prices of a country's exports. Defaults induced by
revolutionary changes have not been common occurrences
during the last few decades; outright refusals to pay
external debts happened only in Cuba, Ghana, and Southeast
Asia when new regimes took over. However, payment diff i-
culties due to economic causes have occurred with dis-
turbing frequency.
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Political Risk
Political risk arises when non-economic factors affect
the availability of foreign exchange either to the govern-
inent or to its residents, or the willingness of the
government to act quickly on its external obligations. It
is usually associated with political turmoil and revo-
lution.
When a new government takes over power in a country,
the incoming government may not recognize previous external
obligations or may enact laws that thwart the borrower from
meeting his external obligations, such as expropriation
laws or confiscatory taxation. However, experience of the
last several years shows that even when drastic changes in
government take place, new governments, in most instances,
recognize old external obligations. The new government
realizes that not paying existing debt has only short-term
benefit and opts for the long-term benefit of being able to
borrow internationally by maintaining a good payment
record.
The theoretical issues of country risk will be
discussed in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER III
THEORETICAL ISSUES
There have been few theoretical models created to de-
termine the risk levels of international lending, despite
its importance and its protracted history. Before the late
1970s, the topic did not even attract much academic atten-
tion. This omission is probably due to the complexity of
the international debt issue and the many disciplines
involved, e.g., economics, political science, sociology.
Despite the complexities of analytic structure, there
have been some contributions to the underlying theory of
international lending. For instance, in 1972, Donough C.
McDonald1 delved into the subject of developing-country
borrowings and endeavored to come up with the meaning of
the term "debt capacity." He proposed two approaches: (1)
the optimal level of debt and (2) the sustainability of
debt policies. The optimal level of debt is how much a
country should borrow; the sustainability of debt is the
continued ability of a country to make debt-service
payments. The optimizing approach has been more developed
theoretically, yet in practice, has been more difficult to
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apply. Most of the applied literature has concentrated on
the sustainability of debt policies.
The issues of sustainability of debt policies, optimal
amount of borrowing by countries, optimal bank foreign
lending, and credit rationing are further discussed here.
Sustainability of Debt Policy
Traditional analyses of developing countries' economic
problems have concentrated on lack of both physical and
human capital, in the form of domestic savings, foreign
exchange, and human skills. Any progress toward solving
their problems was impeded by a scarcity of domestic
savings and foreign exchange to finance internal
investment--the so-called "two-gap" model. External finan-
cing can be a solution to most of these problems by
providing an additional resource for investment. Foreign
borrowing thus bridges the "gap" between domestic savings
and the required level of investment.
Harrod (1939) and Domar (1946) provided the basis for
early attempts to put this investment function--external
financing--into a growth framework. Their model defines
the rate of growth as the product of the savings rate and
the capital output ratio. Under the assumptions that there
is no substitutability between capital and labor and that
labor is in surplus supply, capital becomes the overriding
constraint on LDC economic development.
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The Harrod-Dontar model is well known. Output is
produced according to fixed-coefficients technology. The
required investment ratio is determined by a target growth
rate, in conjunction with fixed capital/output ratio. The
rate of saving is a linear function of the output. The
residual between the required level of investment plus
service payments on the outstanding external debt and the
level of domestic saving thus forms the level of foreign
borrowing.
The debt-servicing capacity of the borrower is
analyzed on the basis of this framework. However, as
several authors have pointed out, problems can arise in the
various stages a country goes through from young debtor to
mature creditor--for example, when the transition to
creditor does not occur, and the country's external debt
continues to grow.
Solomon2 pointed out that the debt situation becomes
unsustainable if the real interest rate on the debt is
higher than the real growth rate, and that even if the
debt/output ratio has a finite limit, the debt burden may
not be sustainable. Such is the case if interest payments
exhaust output, thereby creating zero income to domestic
residents.
Though the foundation of the Harrod-Dontar model is
well known, its usefulness is limited because of the
rigidity of the basic assumptions. For example, it does
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not consider investment efficiency. However, if the target
rate of growth is less than the real interest rate, then
the debt is not sustainable, regardless of the marginal
product of investment, because of the specification of
consumption behavior inherent in the model.
Consumption (saving) behavior is specified as a
function of output, not of income. Thus, income accruing
to foreigners is treated, in effect, as if it were con-
sumable. The higher the propensity to consume and the
lower the ratio of domestic income to output, the more
likely it is that problems will arise. Specifying con-
sumption as a function of income rather than output,
however, generates a substantially different result.
The Harrod-Domar approach was later modified by R.
Solow (1956) and J. Meade (1963), who provided for sub-
stitution among factors rather than the fixed proportions
assigned by the original models, and by N. Kaldor (1957),
who explained it using a technical-progress function
related to investment.	 King3 and Feder4 adjusted the
models using new assumptions and showed that debt-
sustainability difficulties do not arise if the marginal
product of capital exceeds the marginal cost of borrowing.
Feder also sought to improve on the earlier studies
connecting the growth and debt model literatures with a
more realistic, empirically based concept of debt-servicing
capacity. The economies of two broad groups of LDC's were
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simulated in order to show the relation between debt-
servicing capacity and growth and to create situations in
which debt-service problems could be identified. His
method used income specification for consumption and a
target in terms of gross national product (GNP) rather than
output.
The Feder study suggested the exercise of caution with
regard to the applicability of accepted beliefs and the
rules of thumb related to external debt management. The
study also has some advice for economic planners: that
while fairly detailed development plans are designed for
the medium term (mostly five-year plans), the period of
indebtedness and the build-up of debt-service problems are
of a longer time span, which is not covered by the detailed
programs. It then went on to stress the need for more
quantitative work to improve on existing knowledge of the
relation between debt-servicing capacity and economic
variables, and thus to enable better planning. Development
planning which specifically concerns itself with
maintenance of a reasonable debt-servicing capacity is to
the benefit of borrowers and lenders alike.
Avramovic5 developed widely used models to clarify
debt-servicing capacity. His method divided the ability to
meet debt-service payments into two parts or potential
problems: long-term growth and balance of payments. A
shortage of foreign exchange initiated the external debt
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problem. Avramovic's conclusion was, then, that debt-
servicing problems could be prevented if the marginal
saving from the additional income generated was larger than
the interest on the debt.
	
His analysis brought two
essential factors to light in evaluating the long-run
outlook for a debtor country: (1) the efficiency of in-
vestment, and (2) the adequacy of domestic marginal saving.
Poor export performance in the short run, however,
could initiate a critical balance-of-payment problem.
Avramovic's resultant theory was that the debt-service
payments of a country versus its export value of goods and
services was a good indicator of potential short-term dif-
ficulties. As a result, the debt service ratio has become
one of the most frequently used indicators of country risk,
and a high debt service ratio may indicate potential
vulnerability to adverse short-term fluctuations in export
performance. In an overall, long-run view, however, the
debt service ratio alone may not be so reliable an
indicator of debt capacity as one would hope because a high
ratio may indicate countries that have invested heavily but
wisely, as well as those with an extremely poor long-term
outlook.
Another investment theorist who presented similar
models was Homi Kharas. 6 He also based his work on the
Harrod-Domar model but focused on foreign borrowing
situations as planned and carried out by a government to
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assist in financing domestic expenditure. He argued that
the government's taxing powers are constrained by
institutional and technical factors, and because it is
assumed that all government investment is infrastructural
in nature, all benefits of investment projects accrue to
the private sector. For a debt to be sustainable, the tax
base must expand quickly, allowing the government to
service the debt. However, inasmuch as the expansion of
the tax base is determined by private savings/ investment
behavior, low private savings/investment behavior could
produce debt problems as a result of a fiscal constraint.
Other models, though in the context of a more flexible
neoclassical production structure, follow a similar theme.
Takagi, 7 without disaggregating the government and private
sectors, deems consumption a function of income plus
capital inflow. In this model, the savings rate is low and
consumption may exceed income, creating debt problems
independent of the efficiency of the country's investments.
Yet, an unsustainable debt level may be the result of
extensive external borrowing to finance private con-
sumption. The result is much the same if a government's
expenditure is excessive relative to the revenue it gen-
erates through borrowing abroad (Katz8).
In the earlier models, total consumption behavior was
determined by output, creating the possibility that con-
sumption could consistently be greater than income. In the
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similar later models by Kharas, Takagi, and Katz, the
problem is more specific and stems from excessive govern-
ment expenditure over and above revenue. Debt problems,
then, frequently arise as a result of over-ambitious
government expenditure plans.
It should be noted, however, that these models are
based on behavioral and institutional assumptions that can
be construed as quite rigid. Therefore, interpretation
must be carefully considered--specifically, policyinakers
have more influence on fiscal parameters than allowed in
these models. Also, in general, it is policymakers--not
the exogenously imposed institutional constraints--that
must bear responsibility for debt problems.
The growth models that have been discussed have been
within non-optimizing frameworks. They have pointed to
possible sustainability problems, but they are not designed
to confront issues of how much a country should borrow.
The next section will deal with optimal amount of borrowing
by countries.
Optimal Level of Country Borrowing
The external debt level of a country and its optimal debt
level have been studied by many economists, because the
economic growth of developing countries is considered
heavily dependent on the inflow of foreign funds. Most of
these studies focus on a country's relative affluence, as
- 74 -
well as different capital return rates across countries.
It was theorized that these differences would give strong
incentives for capital movement from country to country,
e.g., from developed countries (with an abundance of
capital) to developing countries (those with capital
scarcity), and that this would equalize the rates of return
across countries (MacDougall) .
Early optimal level studies assumed that a developing
country might be able to borrow indefinitely with a rate of
interest exogenously determined. 10 In these studies, bond
export was treated just like any other good exported from a
small country. Theoretically, however, the risk in lending
to a foreign country was not the absolute size of the debt,
but rather the ratio of foreign debt to such variables as
the country's goods and services exports, its GNP, or its
foreign exchange stocks. The expected result then was that
there would eventually be a limit to foreign demand for
their bonds.
The studies of Bardhan 11 and Hamada 12 emphasize
deriving optimizing criteria in the context of
interteinporal optimizing models. Both maximize an inter-
temporal utility function using a one-sector growth model
framework. In this type of model, the optimal economic
path is derived for a specified external finance supply
function, and the marginal cost of foreign borrowing will
be equal to the marginal product of capital if the path is
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optimal and steady. This fixes the optimal quantity of
debt at each point in time. Further, if the supply of
external finance is not infinitely interest-elastic for
debt management, a tax on foreign borrowing may be
required. Atomistic borrowers do not consider that their
borrowing invariably has an effect on the costs of all
other borrowers, because it changes their position upward
on the supply schedule. The presumption here is that if
borrowing is to a large extent centralized with the
government, this externality will be internalized in the
government ' s strategy.
There are many variations of these models. The Hanson
variation13 emphasizes the ratio of debt to capital stock,
i.e., debt-equity considerations. The Feder and Regev14
model developed a relationship between the supply of
external finance forms: direct foreign investment and loans
to debt-equity and exposure considerations. The Feder and
Just 15 model studies borrower strategy as it affects the
"creditworthiness" of borrowing costs. "Creditworthiness
effect" means that the cost of external finance may well be
affected by the policies and internal structure of the
economies concerned.
Other studies focused on a negative relationship
between domestic saving and external finance (Grinols and
Bhagwati,' 6 Wasow' T). In these studies, it was determined
that external finance might make a country dependent on
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foreign savings. Kharas18 argues that relaxed domestic
taxation would be the result of the availability of
external finance. However, for both negative effects on
savings and for domestic taxation, the problem is not
inherently a result of the use of external finance.
The Eaton and Gersovitz study 19 considered LDC
borrowing and international reserves being held to be a
partial problem in general portfolio equilibrium. In this
study, the determinants of a country's demand for credit
were analyzed in terms of five motives for borrowing. The
first motive is based on pronounced consumption needs that
arise when a country's current income is low relative to
its anticipated future income, creating desire to separate
consumption from income. This is the basis of what their
model calls consumption smoothing--if a country is
experiencing a low level of income versus expected future
income, it may borrow to maintain the current level of
consumption. Hence, the more variable a country's income,
the more its government is likely to borrow.
The production and investment motive is based on the
premise that foreign borrowing is advantageous when the
difference between a country's marginal productivity
(domestic capital) and the rate of interest in world
markets is positive. The third motive--the adjustment mo-
tive--arises from consumption plus investment and the need
to avoid sudden changes in the level of absorption. The
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higher oil prices of the 1970s undoubtedly forced many LDC
oil importers to borrow simply to ease them through the
adjustment. The transaction motive is the fourth motive;
it evidences a country's desire to perform international
transactions and perhaps use a supplier's credit (debt can
be used as a means for undertaking transactions) to econ-
omize on transaction costs. The reserve motive--the
fifth--is where a country may decide it is desirable to
incur large debt and hold large international reserves if
there is a fear that the future market will be less
positive than the present one, i.e., that the cost of
external financing will increase. 	 In this case, foreign
borrowing becomes a substitute for international reserves.
Sachs' model 20 illustrated the effects of inter-
national lending with possible debt repudiation, lim-
itations on government taxing authority, and syndicated
lending on optimal level foreign debt. Debt repudiation
could cause the setting of credit ceilings for borrowing
countries in order to keep the benefits from repudiation
below the costs. This is the international equivalent of
credit rationing within domestic capital markets. Sachs
suggested that borrowing countries would need to institute
stricter penalties for debt repudiation (such as a formal
agreement). This would prevent access to any official or
private foreign finance by the repudiating country for a
specific amount of time and so reduce creditor concern,
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thereby leading to increased finance availability and
easier credit terms.
The Sachs' model suggested that there is a political
or economic ceiling to tax collection, though previous
studies implicitly assumed that government could service
foreign debt by claiming any necessary proportion of
national income. Such a constraint would make it necessary
for the country not to equate marginal product of capital
with the world market cost of capital but rather should be
kept higher, to reflect a lower shadow value of second-
period output.
Sachs' model also assumes syndicated lending by
creditors and emphasizes the free rider problem and the
possibility of panics. Sachs emphasized that on a typical
loan the creditor side tends to be composed of a large
number of financial intermediaries who join together as a
syndicate on an ad hoc basis. While the syndicate process
helps to diversify risk, it leads to several other
significant problems. However, substantial public benefits
result from many activities of this syndicate process. As
an example, an efficient loan package may require banks to
monitor a country's economic performance after a loan is
made, but the banks may have no way to share the cost of
monitoring. Even if the need for monitoring is clear, each
bank may try to be a free rider on the monitoring
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expenditures of other banks, leading to insufficient
supervision.
Also, Sachs stated that the most dramatic breakdown of
loan supply occurs in a panic, where a fundamentally sound
economy is forced into default by a shortage of credit.
This type of market can result from the rational behavior
of a large number of small lenders. Each bank rationally
bases its loan-supply decision on the actions of other
banks. In a panic, all banks stop lending because the
others have stopped lending, and even though a country is
financially sound, it can find itself forced to default.
Clearly, the international banks who join together as
a syndicate need to be well organized; also, cooperation
and mutual trust are essential. If they are able to act in
unison in crucial situations, the efficiency of the inter-
national loan markets will definitely be enhanced. Of
course, if banks are able to respond appropriately, a
financial panic can be minimized if not avoided. Another
important benefit of efficient organization and cooperation
in a syndicate is that creditors reach agreement on re-
scheduling the debts of the borrower at below market rates,
thereby avoiding a very painful default. Another important
advantage in a syndicate is the sharing of the experience
of personnel as well as relevant and important information
about particular countries, thereby pooling the individual
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strengths of the monitoring and assessing capability of
each bank.
When these syndicate strengths are implemented
properly, the country risk in international lending will be
seriously reduced and lending will again become beneficial
to both the creditors and the borrowing countries.
A central planner motivated to maximize national
welfare is central to the Cooper and Sachs21 study.
Choosing appropriate levels of consumption and investment
in each period, thereby creating the optimal amount of
external borrowing determined residually (capital inflow
added to domestic saving), makes an optimal level of in-
vestment possible. The model, however, ignores monetary or
macroeconomic considerations and concludes that marginal
return on investment should exceed the marginal cost of
funds in world capital markets before capital investment
should be undertaken. Cooper and Sachs assumed, perhaps
ideally, that optimum levels of saving, investment, and
external borrowing were possible in a free-market system if
interest rates adjust to world-wide demand and supply for
loanable funds. Their study stressed that a laissez-faire
attitude toward capital inflows and outflows creates
difficulties in achieving the optimal amount of borrowing.
Cooper and Sachs also analyzed repudiation, showing
that adding foreign exchange risk (called liquidity risk in
the Cooper-Sachs paper), capital risk (referred to as
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solvency risk), and repudiation risk to a model of optimal
foreign borrowing would complicate management of the
economy of borrowing countries. Such decentralized or
laisse- faire foreign borrowing would lead to optimal
results under restrictive conditions. First, the
probability of a foreign exchange crisis cannot be
construed as a function of the level of debt--an unlikely
assumption, inasmuch as large foreign debt (relative to
national income or capital) would bring with it large
debt-service payments and greater 	 rescheduling or
repudiation concerns.
The second assumed condition for a decentralized
system to be optimal requires that the private sector have
rational expectations regarding a foreign exchange crisis.
This is not always possible because households or firms may
incorrectly project future current exchange rates and
interest rates. Government may reinforce this problem if
they promise no exchange-rate changes.
The third requirement is that the government credibly
commit itself to refuse to bail out private entities, thus
cutting them off from external funds. When crisis occurs,
invariably governments are asked to assist those firms that
are having foreign debt-servicing problems. question of
moral hazard exists if private firms are allowed to believe
that the government might provide such assistance, a belief
often implicit in government guarantees to government-owned
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or regulated businesses. Finally, the social costs re-
sulting from private bankruptcies in foreign-exchange
crises would not make decentralized or laissez-faire bor-
rowing optimal.	 Such costs, not considered by private
borrowers, might also produce over-borrowing.
Optimal Bank Foreign Lending
Risk and Diversification Studies
Most risk and diversification studies use Knight
(1921), Tobin (1958), and Markowitz (1959) as a basis. The
fundamental concept of their approach assumes that the
probability of deviation from an expected return rate can
create a basis for an optimal risk/return portfolio when
definite outcomes are not known. The definitional basis
for the distinction between risk and uncertainty was clari-
fied substantially in F. H. Knight's pioneering work, Risk,
Uncertainty and Profit.
This portfolio theory was the basis for early studies
of optimal level of bank lending to foreign countries. To
maximize the corporate utility function, banks estimated
the return and the risk of total possible assets and used
this information to purchase a portfolio of those assets.
A seller would not want to offer a riskless asset with a
high return, and the bank would not want to purchase a
risky asset with a low return; thus, the average asset's
interest rate would be a part of its risk.
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Branson (1970) found the interest rate variables to be
insignificant in one of the first studies using a mean-
variance portfolio approach to analyze U.S. bank foreign
lending. This finding and later omissions of interest
rates as a key explanatory variable of bank foreign lending
were caused by the failure to include the supply of assets
by foreign countries. By this time, however, the attention
of economists in this area shifted to the question of
quantity rationing instead of price rationing in the supply
of bank credit.
Theory of Credit Rationing
Donald R. Hodginan, 22 Marshall Freimer and Myron J.
Gordon, 23 and Dwight M. Jaf fee and Franco Modigliani24
developed theoretical frameworks for credit rationing.
Their studies show that rationing is consistent with profit
maximization if there is rational economic behavior despite
uncertainty. Dwight N. Jaffee and Franco Modigliani
devised a theoretical model considering three elements: the
demand for loans, the supply of loans, and the determinants
of the commercial loan rate, and showed that equilibrium
rationing--credit rationing which occurs when the loan rate
is set at the long-run equilibrium level--is rational
economic behavior for commercial banks. Previous studies
had concentrated on the determinants of the quantity
supplied by lenders while neglecting the other two
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elements, the demand for loans and the determinants of the
commercial loan rate.
Hodgman asserted that within a risk-return context
that does not rely on oligopolistic market structure or
legal maxima to the interest rate and a given risk ratio
(expected value of loan payments relative to expected value
of probable losses including interest payment), banks will
set a limit for extending credit regardless of the interest
rate. There is a positive relationship, other things
equal, between the size of a loan and its risk, the
probability of the borrower's inability to repay the loan.
He showed that as the loan's amount increases by increasing
the interest rate, the risk ratio can be kept above a
predetermined figure. At some point, however, raising the
interest rate will not prevent a fall in the risk ratio.
Hodgman was concerned with "weak credit rationing"--the
amount a banker will lend a borrower varies with the
interest rate only up to a limit.	 Beyond this point,
credit will be refused regardless of the interest rate.
Freimer and Gordon extended Hodgman's position, saying
that the amount a profit-maximizing banker will lend to a
borrower is highly interest-elastic. They showed, based on
the supplier's loan offer curve, that the optimal amount of
a high-risk loan rises in a limited increasing amount with
interest rate. The optimal loan, however, is virtually
independent of the interest rate on low-risk loans.
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Corry F. Azzi and James C. Cox questioned using
rejected offers to pay market rates of interest as an
indicator of credit rationing. They noted that borrower
equity (collateral) created incentive for lenders to ration
credit through non-price means. In propositions which they
developed, Azzi and Cox show that a larger loan was
possible where there was greater borrower-provided col-
lateral. Therefore, the borrower's wants and demands for
credit depend not only on the rate of interest offered but
also on collateral and borrower's equity. Credit rationing
and nonsupplied effective demands for loans versus
unsatisfied wants will not solely involve lender response
to offers of interest rate but must include collateral and
equity.
Azzi and Cox asserted that optimal credit rationing is
possible only if there are effective institutional con-
straints on the collateral and equity terms of loan con-
tracts as well as on interest rates. They concluded that
the belief that credit rationing is rational for a
monopolistic lender, assuming a single interest rate con-
straint (Jaf fee and Modigliani), is false. Note that the
primary concern of the Jaffee and Modigliani study was
"equilibrium credit rationing" assuming that a lender can
act as a discriminating monopolist. Jaffee and Modigliani
also assumed that the lender would ration some borrowers if
lending was subject to an institutional constraint
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requiring the same interest rate charge for borrowers with
different credit demand curves.
Jaf fee and Modigliani26
 responded to the Azzi and Cox
criticism by arguing that the definition of credit
rationing was based on a misunderstanding of the role of
collateral in the Freixner-Gordon and Jaffee-Modigliani
models. The Azzi and Cox propositions relating collateral
to loan supply were correct, though more intuitive than
factual. Jaf fee and Modgigliani said the first two prop-
ositions were the stronger but had limited application
because the assumptions were highly restrictive. It was
agreed that providing sufficient borrower collateral meant
less risky investment for the lender, and within the limit,
could eliminate the default risk entirely; then no ra-
tioning would occur. On the other hand, they said, less
collateral meant a residual risk of default and thus credit
rationing was a possibility. However, even if lenders
cannot freely credit-ration between borrowers based on
their collateral provisions and even if the borrower
provides the optimal amount of collateral, credit rationing
can still occur.
In economics, a free market equilibrium requires
supply to equal demand. If demand should exceed supply,
prices will rise. Resultant decreased demand and/or in-
creased supply will exist until demand and supply are again
equal at a new price. With such an equilibrium, credit
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rationing does not occur. However, there is apparently a
need for credit rationing and it seems to indicate a great
demand for loanable funds.
Consider what might happen with this equilibrium
theory if the amount of available international funds were
decreased and the amount available was assigned in portions
to borrowers. In equilibrium, as the supply of funds
declined, the interest rate would rise, clearing the
market.	 This is not the case in the coniinercial lending
market, where interest rates rise but not indefinitely and
credit is rationed.	 Given what should happen in equi-
librium, this would imply that the market is unable to
clear.
The objective of the Joseph E. Stiglitz and Andrew
Weiss study27 was to show that credit rationing is a
characterization of a loan market equilibrium. Banks are
concerned about the interest rate they will receive on the
loan and the riskiness of the loan. They noted, however,
that the interest rate itself could affect the riskiness of
a pool of loans by (1) the adverse selection effect in
sorting potential borrowers or (2) the incentive effect,
influencing the actions of borrowers.
Their mode], used an interest rate that acts as a
screening device among borrowers. With rising capital
costs (interest rates), the return rate on investment
projects would decline. Higher interest rates, then, dis-
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courage certain borrowers. Other borrowers might be
willing to attempt projects with potentially lower success
as long as they had a higher return. Overall, then, higher
interest rate paying borrowers are also higher risk bor-
rowers for the lender. As the interest rate increases, the
average risk for the lender's portfolio also increases.
Note that in the Stiglitz and Weiss model, information is
asymmetric--lenders are not allowed to distinguish between
types of borrowers. Hence, imperfect methods of selection
and information gathering lead to credit rationing by
lenders.
The Stiglitz and Weiss model uses r* as the interest
rate maximizing the bank's expected return. As the
interest rate approaches r*, the amount of return to the
bank's portfolio increases. However, it increases at a
decreasing rate because the possibility of borrower default
increases with higher interest rates. At rates above the
optimal r* rate, borrower default becomes more likely, and
the bank's expected return decreases. Lowering the
interest rate to r* will create an increase in the bank's
expected return and lower the probability of default.
Stiglitz and Weiss use a four quadrant diagram to il-
lustrate the credit rationing process (Figure 3.1). The
lower right-hand quadrant illustrates the relationship
between the bank's expected rate of return on loans and the
interest rate. The concave function reaches a maximum at
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r* .
 The supply of loans resulting from the expected rate
of return on loans is presented in the lower left quadrant,
and the supply and demand curves are in the upper right
quadrant. The supply curve reaches a maximum at r*. The
demand curve is exogenous and decreasing. In this diagram,
the demand curve intersects the supply curve at r 1 . The
gap Z shows a greater demand for loans than there is a
supply of loans. Market clearance would actually occur at
interest rate r 1 , but the expected rate of return would be
less for the bank. A profit increase would occur with
credit rationing equilibrium by charging r* and lending L*.
If the intersection of the demand and supply curves is
below r* (loan supply increase or demand shift) there is no
credit rationing. 	 Equilibrium is the lending market
behavior.
Under conditions where there is no credit rationing, a
borrower is able to obtain funds at a competitive interest
rate. Figure 3.2 shows the intersection of the demand and
supply curve at interest rate r 1 . The supply curve
continues to rise after r1 , but declines after r*, as shown
in Figure 3.1. Since the intersection is below r*, there
is no credit rationing.
However, interest rate screening and adverse selection
do not appear to be the prime reason for credit rationing
in international lending. Unlike the case with a private
borrower within a country, lenders cannot assume assets in
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a foreign country and liquidate them to offset losses if
the borrowing country repudiates its loan. Hence it is im-
portant to determine beforehand the probability of a
country defaulting on its debts by assessing that govern-
ment's creditworthiness and by limiting the supply of loans
accordingly. Though Stiglitz and Weiss do not deal with
this problem, creditworthiness, asymmetrical information,
and credit rationing are a part of the Eaton and Gersovitz
model.
In the Eaton and Gersovitz model, a country borrows in
order to smooth the path of domestic consumption. Coun-
tries are not one-time borrowers; they borrow from the
international market during bad times and repay during good
times. Private lenders will place an embargo on future
lending to that country if the country defaults on its
loans. Creditors may also cut off aid to the country.
Hence, a country that defaults cannot borrow to smooth its
absorption over time. Their model does not contain the
option of rescheduling. Unlike the Stiglitz and Weiss
model, it assumes that lenders know the characteristics of
borrowers and under what conditions default may occur. It
also assumes that as the size of the outstanding debt in-
creases, the benefits of default for the borrower increase.
To counter this, lenders should impose a credit ceiling or
a maximum safe level of borrowing, such that the costs of
default just exceed the benefits of default.
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Given the need to limit the amount of country debt to
avoid giving debtor countries an incentive to gain from
default, Eaton and Gersovitz's analysis implies that an
international equivalent of the credit rationing discussed
by Stiglitz and Weiss should take place. The common link
between the two forms of credit rationing is that the cost
of funds will not adjust to achieve an unconstrained credit
market equilibrium. The determination of the optimum
amount of country debt thus involves more factors than
those considered in simple models of the operation of
credit markets.
Over time, many models have been developed to consider
the issue of debt capacity. The focus of this chapter has
been to present the principles of debt capacity learned
from analyzing these models, including theoretical rela-
tionships between a country's debt capacity, debt sustain-
ability policies, optimal level of debt, and other related
economic variables such as consumption, saving, investment,
inflation, taxes, and the country's balance of payments.
However, the development of a more comprehensive
theoretical framework for determining country risk entails
not only economic conditions, but also political and socio-
logical dimensions that do not lend themselves easily to
quantitative analysis. As a result, most researchers have
attempted only to empirically identify characteristics of
debtor countries. The major point of the theory of credit
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rationing remains--lenders must optimize return (subject to
a risk constraint) or optimize a joint function of return
and risk.
To conclude this chapter without discussing the extent
to which countries are credit rationed would not be appro-
priate.	 Eaton and Gersovitz 28 point out that most
developing countries were credit rationed in the early
seventies. However, if the developing countries were
credit constrained in the late seventies and early
eighties, how did the banks extend to them the huge amount
of loans? Of course, the large accumulation of debt was
the major cause of the massive debt reschedulings of the
early eighties. The explanations for the cause of the debt
reschedulings of the eighties would be much easier to
understand if the countries had not been credit constrained
in the seventies.
The studies also showed that the reluctance of banks
to increase their exposure in return for a higher spread
reflects the fact that the gain from such an action is more
than offset by the increase in the expected loss. The
studies also seem to indicate that lenders do take into
account the perceived riskiness of borrowers in making
their lending decisions. But this does not really tell us
whether enough weight has been given to these risks. What
is very important to remember is that banks will make
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profits provided that they do a thorough job to recognize
these risks and will fail to make profits if they do not.
But the key issue here is the externality problem
which arises when individual lenders fail to take into
account the possibility that their individual loan deci-
sions might place a country in the position where it can
benefit by defaulting on all its debt. Such large-scale
bank failure could arise when there is concurrent
repudiation by a number of countries. This gives rise to
questions about how systematic country risk is. Eaton and
Gersovitz 29 and Goodman30 , in analyses of conventional
country risk indicators, suggest that country risk is, to a
large extent, non-systematic and, therefore, that debt
difficulties are likely to arise independently.
Bacha and Diaz-Alejandro 31 countered that bank lending
to developing countries is heavily concentrated; some
individual countries account for large shares of
outstanding bank claims. Moreover, massive withdrawal of
funds by bank lenders or bank depositors is quite possible
if doubt about the stability of the international financial
markets escalates. Even if a large number of financial
institutions do not find themselves in a dangerous
position, a withdrawal from lending to countries whose
liabilities far outweigh their assets definitely will have
costs owing to effects on welfare in these countries;
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again, the countries in surplus will be hurt as a result of
the induced effects on the demand for their products.
Clearly, it is important for individual lenders to
pool information about the extent of their loans and loan
applications from foreign countries to ensure that the
whole amount of such lending does not exceed the optimum
level. A loan package that appears safe from a bankts
point of view may not appear so safe when combined with the
rest of external debt owed by a country.
The next chapter will deal with the regulatory issues
of risk management.
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CKAPTER IV
REGULATORY ASPECTS OF COUNTRY-RISK MANAGEHENT
Events That Caused the Debt Crisis
The wave of external debt problems in 1982-83 raised
some new doubts about the adequacy of the international
banking system. Many members of the United States Congress
objected to approving increased IMF quotas because raising
them was seen as a bailout for banks that had been ex-
cessive and irresponsible in lending abroad. 1 Such strong
criticism moved Congress to press for tighter bank
regulation and encouraged regulatory authorities to propose
stronger limits on external lending. At the same time,
many academic critics questioned whether the structure of
central bank responsibility around the "lender-of-last-
resort" mechanism was adequate for international lending.
Widespread criticism charged that in the 1970s bank
lending to developing countries was excessive, departing
from past standards of prudence. 2 In his 1984 study,
Sebastian Edwards said:
The recent foreign debt crisis faced by some less
developed countries (LDCs) (Mexico, Brazil,
Argentina, among others) has generated concern
among economists, bankers, and politicians. In
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particular, the ability of the international
banks to distinguish between "good" and "bad"
risks has been questioned. It has even been
suggested that the inability to restrict credit
to countries with low "creditworthiness" has
resulted in the overextension of some major banks
and that, as a consequence, this has increased
the probability of a global international finan-
cial collapse.3
The role of market forces in the massive rise in
international bank lending cannot be ignored. Interna-
tional agencies were very cognizant of the fact that both
the huge increase of deposits from oil exporter surpluses
and the depressive effects of the international recession
on competing demands for loans in industrial countries
brought about an expansion in bank lending to developing
countries. 4
 Henry C. Wallich of the Federal Reserve Board
of Governors also criticized the growth of such lending as
too swift to be maintained (an average pace of 25% from
1975 to l980).
As noted in Chapter I of this study, change in the
world economic environment, unforeseen by banks or involved
countries, played a major role in this problem. The impact
of such economic forces, not the irresponsibility of the
banks or the countries, was the primary cause of current
debt problems.
Nevertheless, in the late l970s, regional U.S. banks,
as well as Japanese and European banks, began to penetrate
into the international lending market more vigorously than
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ever, helping to bring about an increased lending supply at
low spreads above LIBOR just as new and traditional lenders
competed for shares of the market. 6 These supply factors,
plus the large funds made accessible from OPEC deposits,
led in some important cases to continued lending to coun-
tries that should have borrowed less and adopted adjustment
measures under IMF patronage. Instead, these countries
took advantage of the financing offered by the banks. This
situation occurred, for example, in Peru in 1976 and in
Mexico and Argentina from 1981 to early 1982. Thus between
December 1981 and June 1982, with Mexico in the final
stages of budgetary excess only two months before its
financial crisis, U.S. exposure to Mexico increased at an
annual rate of 34%. Moreover, between December 1979 and
December 1980, when Argentina pursued a policy of extreme
overvaluation, U.S. exposure increased there at an annual
rate of 42%.
Rudiger Dornbusch stresses that overvalued exchange
rates and large budget deficits in developing countries are
important causes of excessive external lending. 8 Dornbusch
uses a simple accounting framework and attributes gross
increases in a country's external debt to (a) current-
account deficits (i.e., net merchandise imports and
interest payments on existing foreign debt) minus any long-
term, non-debt-creating capital inflows, including direct
foreign investment; (b) gross private capital outflows; or
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(c) net accumulation of official foreign exchange reserves.
He then analyzes three countries (Argentina, Brazil, and
Chile) from 1978-82 to determine which factors contributed
most significantly to the growth of their external debts.
Dornbusch posits that a massive deterioration in its
current account was a major source of increase in Brazil's
external debt. This deterioration, in turn, was a conse-
quence of a loose fiscal policy and large increases in
interest payments to foreigners. In Dornbusch's words,
"The deterioration of Brazilian external indebtedness is
largely attributable to a failure to adjust the [govern-
ment's] budget to the combined external shocks of higher
world interest rates and increased real oil prices."
Dornbusch thinks that, in contrast to Brazil, Argen-
tina's external debt was in part a product of private
capital flight, facilitated by the absence of capital
account restrictions. The openness of the Argentinean
capital market allowed massive private outflows as the real
exchange rate grew increasingly overvalued. Misalignment
of the exchange rate affects not only capital flows but
also various components of domestic expenditure, including
private consumption and investment and the government
budget. Dornbusch also stresses the likely negative
effects of large fiscal deficits on private saving and
investment, and as a result, on the current account.
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To protect against the potential loan losses created
by the growth of U.S. bank lending overseas, government
regulatory agencies required diversified exposure between
countries and between government agencies within a country
through supervisory measures which would affect all banking
institutions. The U.S. Interagency Country Exposure Review
Committee (ICERC) which is composed of the three Federal
bank regulatory authorities--the Federal Reserve, the Comp-
troller of the Currency, and the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation--established these guidelines in a statement
made in l983.
In 1978, the three agencies adopted a uniform ex-
amination procedure for evaluating and commenting on
country-risk factors in international lending by United
States banks. Under this system, examiners for the three
agencies separate the evaluation of country-risk factors
from that of other lending risks. This information then
becomes a separate part of their examination reports.
Beyond that, banks' international portfolios continue to be
assessed for commercial credit risks on a loan-by-loan
basis. These assessments are based on traditional credit
analysis standards, thereby diversifying exposure to indi-
vidual countries and moderating country risk in inter-
national portfolios.
The premise behind this diversification of loan port-
folios is that it provides the best protection for U.S.
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banks during a period of economic or political change in a
country or group of countries. The adequacy of this diver-
sification within a bank's portfolio is itself based on
comparing the bank's individual country-risk exposures to
its capital funds. Where numerous components of a similar
kind are found, examiners analyze a bank's loans in a
particular country by the type of credit, borrower, and
loan maturities. Risk involvement is assessed based on
these concentrations and on the effect of internal and
external factors in the debt-service volumes (public and
private) within the country.
A designated section of the examination report deals
with country exposure and consists of the following four
parts:
1. Large country exposures are shown as a list (rel-
ative to capital or other lenders). This makes it easier
for management to review them for their significance to the
overall picture.
2. Specific comments about large exposures to in-
dividual countries (divided into three wide-range groups
based on cross-classification of country-risk factors and
the degree of exposure by the bank).
3. Classification of exposure when necessary.
4. Presentation of the bank's management procedures
and controls for country risk.
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The main objectives of the country exposure ex-
amination are to encourage effective diversification in the
U.S. international lending portfolios and to make an
attempt to identify risk situations and, as necessary, make
correction possible. To do this, examiners classify a
bank's aggregate credits to a country in categories: "sub-
standard," "value impaired," or "loss," when this has been
interpreted either to exist or to be inuminent in debt ser-
vicing (see Appendix A).
The examiners also assess the bank management's
ability in (and methods for) analyzing and monitoring
country risk in its international lending. This includes a
report of a bank's procedures for monitoring and con-
trolling exposure to country risk, that is, the bank's
system of limiting lending in a country. The control, as-
sessing, and examination system for major components of
country risk is handled by the Interagency Country Exposure
Review Committee, consisting of nine bank examiners--three
from each of the three U.S. bank supervisory agencies.
This committee reviews the information on a specific
country; its creditworthiness is then determined. Week-
long meetings are held three times a year for this purpose.
Each meeting consists of discussions about a routine
list of countries, or specific countries, as is appro-
priate. All discussions, statistics, and decisions made by
the committee are confidential.	 Economists from the
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Federal Reserve system attend these meetings as ex-officio
members and present their evidence and recommendations
based on their own periodic country screening procedures on
specific countries. It is also at this time that the
committee asks for additional information and testimony
from others.
Interagency Examination of International Loans
The three government regulatory agencies enacted the
International Lending Supervision Act of 1983 (ILSA) in
November 1983 to establish procedures that regulators and
banks must use in international lending practices. It also
described changes in the examination categories which iden-
tified adversely affected "transfer" risks (i.e., problems
created by borrowers that might not be able to maintain
debt servicing in the denominated currency because foreign
exchange is not available).
In April of 1983, the agencies announced plans for
uniform examination categories, with certain refinements,
to establish methods for identifying credits that have been
adversely affected by transfer risk problems. These plans
included new definitions for transfer risk classifications
(see Appendix A). In addition, a new category was created
called "Other Transfer Risk Problems." This was used to
identify and categorize credits which do not warrant
classification. It includes all or part of credits to a
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country that is unable to comply with its external debt-
service obligations but is taking positive steps to restore
debt service using economic adjustment measures, generally
as part of an International Monetary Fund (IMF) program.
This new category was also used to acknowledge situations
that have improved in recent debt-service performance, such
as when the country credits no longer warrant transfer risk
classification but still require special attention by bank
management.
As in the past, "other transfer risk" classified
credits are combined with commercial loan classifications
to evaluate a bank's assets and financial soundness. These
credits, however, are not regarded as classified assets.
They are considered to be a judgmental factor in the
general assessment of a bank's asset quality and its
reserves and capital adequacy.
The International Lending Supervision Act was im-
plemented in 1983 in recognition of the need for stability
in the international banking system and in the world
economy. Its essential importance was in creating methods
to better provide continued international bank credit
flows, particularly in countries utilizing IMF-approved
economic adjustment programs to correct economic dif -
ficulties.	 The purpose of such new flows (under ap-
propriate circumstances) was to strengthen the adjustment
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process and help to improve the quality of outstanding
credit.
This is the latest international banking legislation.
It developed gradually from a need to expand U.S. funding
for the International Monetary Fund to help with the
growing financial problems of many developing countries,
especially those in Latin Imerica, there D.S. banTks were
heavily exposed. The law strengthened and clarified the
role of the Federal banking agencies in supervising the
foreign lending of U.S. banks. It required additional re-
porting and disclosures of U.S. bank lending to foreign
countries and directed the Federal banking agencies to
ensure that U.S. banks maintain adequate reserves against
country risks. It also strengthened the authority of these
agencies to establish and enforce formal standards of
capital adequacy for all U.S. banking.
Reserving Requirements
The banking agencies have established a responsibility
to assure that a bank's management and auditors are
following reasonable and prudent policies for recognizing
and accounting for deterioration in the value of a bank's
assets, including a deterioration due to transfer risk
problems. Management and auditors are also responsible for
seeing that any necessary adjustments are made in a
reliable fashion.
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To assure that this is done (pursuant to the In-
ternational Lending Supervision Act), U.S. banks are
required to establish "Allocated Transfer Risk Reserves"
(ATRR) to be held against certain assets whose value has
been significantly impaired by transfer risk problems. The
ATRR (after regular joint reviews of country credits by the
agencies) would then be applied to those international
assets that had been classified for transfer risk reasons
as "value impaired." The minimum ATRR amounts are to be
determined jointly and regularly by the agencies.
The reserving provisions, the agencies emphasized, in
no way lessened the responsibility of bank managements and
their auditors to recognize and provide adequately for any
significant deterioration in the value of their assets,
including international loans. The aim, then, is to en-
courage banks to continue to strengthen their general
reserve and capital positions against the risks involved in
international lending.
Loans rated as "value impaired" demonstrate sig-
nificant transfer risk and should not be carried at their
original book values. For developing countries categorized
as "value impaired," the U.S. banking agencies established
the percentage of outstanding loans that must be either
written off or for which an ATRR must be established. An
ATRR is not part of general reserve and is not counted as
bank capital.	 ATRR increases resulted in reductions in
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exposure during 1989 for the nine money center U.S. banks
and for twelve other large banks.
Risk-Based Capital Adequacy Proposal
Capital adequacy is a critical part of any analysis by
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve system in
order to take action on applications for mergers and acqui-
sitions by bank holding companies. It is also an important
factor in the implementation of the Board's various
supervisory activities related to the safety and soundness
of individual banks, bank holding companies, and the
banking system.
In order to do this more effectively, the Board an-
nounced revised guidelines in April 1985 for minimum and
appropriate levels of capital for bank holding companies
and state chartered banks that are members of the Federal
Reserve system. These guidelines (based on ratios of
primary and total capital versus total assets) were es-
tablished in conjunction with other Federal bank regulatory
agencies. They set uniform capital standards for all Fed-
erally regulated agencies and banking organizations,
regardless of size.
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The Proposed Supplemental Adjusted Capital Measure
The Federal Reserve Board first issued its sup-
plemental adjusted capital measure proposal in January
1986. The Board asserted that adoption of this measure
(based on an assessment of distinct but necessarily broad
risk categories) would provide a valuable additional means
of assessing the finanáial strength and stability of
individual organizations as well as the banking system as a
whole. Even a limited risk-adjusted measure of capital
adequacy would provide assessment of whether or not an
individual bank's or bank holding company's capital level
was sufficient to serve the key functions of capital: to
provide a buffer against losses, to promote the safety of
depositors' funds, to maintain the public's confidence in
banking organizations, and to encourage the reasonable
growth of such organizations. Realistically, then, it is
essential that an organization's capital base bear a rea-
sonable relationship to the risk profile of that organ-
ization in order to achieve these purposes.
Not only another tool for assessing capital adequacy,
the proposed supplemental adjusted capital measure fur-
thered certain policy objectives and (by including as-
sessment of off-balance-sheet risk as part of the sup-
plemental adjusted capital ratio) permitted the board to
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address off-balance-sheet exposures, a factor that has
expanded greatly in the last several years. The proposed
measure would also control to some degree the inherent neg-
atives in the existing guidelines (holding low-risk, rela-
tively liquid assets). It would also put capital adequacy
policies in the United States more closely in line with
those of other major industrial countries.
This measure was used as a formulation process. It
was a working mechanism that ultimately became the inter-
national convergence of capital measures and capital
standards.
The supplemental adjusted capital measure proposal
involved a supplemental risk-sensitive capital measure to
the Board's existing capital guidelines. The measure is
based on the ratio between primary capital and total assets
adjusted for risk. These factors are considered in tandem
with, rather than in place of, the minimum primary and
total capital ratios as defined in the Board's guidelines.
However, while the proposal's aim is to better bring
to view an organization's capital needs versus its overall
risk profile, it does not claim to be able to account for
the many different kinds of risks to which banking or-
ganizations can be exposed.
For example, the proposal does not take explicit
account of the risks associated with significant asset con-
centrations, nor with exposure to interest rate changes.
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The measure, therefore, is not a substitute for examiner
judgment in the assessment of an organization's capital
adequacy.
The Supplemental Adjusted Capital Ratio
Risk considerations play an essential part in the
relationship between the proposed supplemental adjusted
capital measure and primary capital. The asset portion of
the supplemental adjusted capital ratio is determined by
assets and certain off-balance-sheet items from four broad
risk categories which are weighted according to the level
of risk assigned to each category. Credit risk
considerations are the main determinants of asset groupings
and the assignment of weights, though some attention is
given to liquidity concerns. The components of each risk
category, the weight assigned to that category, the types
of assets and off-balance-sheet items in each category, and
the rationale for assigning assets to a certain category
are as follows.
Category I: Cash and Equivalents
This category includes what are often referred to as
riskiess assets, such as vault cash, balances due from
Federal Reserve Banks, balances due from foreign central
banks in immediately available funds. It also includes
"near cash" assets, such as cash items in the process of
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collection and transaction accounts due from U.S. de-
pository institutions. 10
 United States Treasury securities
held in the investment account with original or remaining
maturities of one year or less are also included in this
category. These items are assigned a zero weight.
Category II: Money Market Risk
The high-liquidity assets in this category generally
have little or no risk of default: all holdings of long-
term (remaining maturity of over one year) United States
Treasury securities, all United States government agency
securities, those portions of loans that are fully guar-
anteed by the United States government, as well as short-
term (90 days or less) claims on U.S. depository in-
stitutions. Other types of money market instruments make
up the larger portion of the rest of this category, in-
cluding acceptances of other U.S. banks, all federal funds
sold, loans to brokers/dealers secured by United States
Treasury or agency securities, and securities purchased
under agreements to resell. All trading account assets,
which are typically marked to market on a regular basis are
included, along with all legally binding loan commitments,
including note issuance facilities. 11 These items are
assigned a 30 percent risk weight.
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Category III: Moderate Risk
This category contains assets with more credit and
liquidity risk than those in Category II, but significantly
less risk than those of the standard commercial bank loan
portfolio. Included are: all state, county, and municipal
securities (not including industrial development bonds);
longer-term claims (over 90 days) on U.S. depository in-
stitutions; all claims on governments and banks in in-
dustrial countries; holdings of acceptances of banks in
industrial countries; and local currency claims on govern-
ments and banks of non-industrial countries to the extent
funded by local currency liabilities. 12 Also included are
loans to brokers/dealers collateralized by other marketable
securities, commercial letters of credit, and standby
letters of credit which are performance-related, issued on
a secured basis to support brokers/dealers, or issued in
support of SCM securities (excluding those supporting in-
dustrial development bonds). This risk category is
assigned a 60 percent weight.
Category IV: Standard Risk
This category generally comprises those assets found
in a typical bank loan portfolio and not included in the
foregoing categories, including commercial and industrial
loans and leases, loans to individuals, loans secured by
real estate, farm-related loans, and all other claims on
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foreign borrowers. Loans to nondepository financial
institutions--insurance companies, mortgage companies,
finance companies, and bank holding companies--are also
included. So are all corporate securities and commercial
paper, industrial development bonds, and all other standby
letters of credit (including those backing industrial
development bonds) that are not included in previous cate-
gories. Loans sold with recourse, including those that, in
the case of bank holding companies, may not, under
generally accepted accounting principles, be retained as
assets on the balance sheet, are a part of this category as
well. (Under bank call report instructions, loans sold
with recourse are not removed from the balance sheet.) The
major content of this risk group is banking assets, in-
cluding those with strongly dissimilar risk char-
acteristics. This category is assigned a 100 percent risk
weight.
To obtain the weighted risk asset and off-balance-
sheet total against which actual primary capital would be
compared, the collective dollar value of the assets listed
in each category would be multiplied by the weight assigned
to that category. The ratio derived by dividing primary
capital by the sum of these weighted values would equal the
supplemental adjusted capital ratio. Table 4.1 provides an
example of how this supplemental adjusted capital ratio
would be calculated.
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TabLe 4.1: ILLUSTRATION OF CALCULATION OF SUPPLEMENTAL ADJUSTED CAPITAL MEASURE
Dollar Amount of	 Weighted Risk Assets and
Risk Category	 Items in Category Risk Weight 	 Off-Balance Sheet Items
Cash and equivalents	 5,000	 x	 0	 0
Money market risk	 35,000	 x	 .30	 10,500
Moderate risk	 30,000	 x	 .60	 18,000
Standard risk	 80,000	 x	 1.00	 80,000
TOTAL (including $100,000 in
aggregate assets and $50,000
in off-balance-sheet items) 	 150,000	 108,500
Aggregate primary capitaL 	 7,000
Primary capital to total assets
ratio (as defined under
existing guidelines)	 7,000/100,000 = 7.0%
Supplemental adjusted capital
ratio (as proposed)	 7,000/108,500 = 6.5%
NOTE: This exanç,le assuies a bank with total assets (before deducting the loan toss reserve) 01
$100,000, off-balance-sheet items of $50,000, and primary capital of $7,000.
SOURCE: U.S. Federal Reserve Board, 1986.
The Federal Reserve Board's choice to avoid un-
neccessary complexity in the grouping of assets and off-
balance-sheet items reflects an effort to reasonably
delineate risk categories. Risk asset systems abroad were
closely studied by the Board, in particular for their
methods of treatment of affected assets and off-balance-
sheet items. Decisions were made about where certain items
should be categorized and where to set risk weights,
relative to a desire to avoid artificial pricing
distortions which might lead to awkward or undesirable
changes in credit flows or financing practices. Decisions
were also made to temper the gradation of implied capital
costs among items in the various risk categories.
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The decisions were difficult and involved the treat-
rnent of country risk and off-balance-sheet items. This
required the distinction between claims on governments and
banks in industrial countries versus claims on governments
and banks in all other countries, a view that the Board
felt represents the most acceptable alternative among a
variety of possible groupings. Groupings were, then,
intended to distinguish, in general, among differences in
transfer risk, i.e., the possibility that an asset cannot
be serviced in the currency of payment because of lack of
foreign exchange needed for payment in the country of the
obligor. This is a more workable view than an approach
requiring a country-by-country evaluation of transfer risk
that would require frequent updating and revision.
Claims on banks and governments in industrial coun-
tries would be included in the Moderate Risk category
because this would tend to minimize possible distortions in
international interbank money market credit flows (re-
sulting from different capital requirements for claims on
domestic and foreign banks which compete alongside one
another in the market). Just about all countries with sig-
nificant international banks are on the list of industrial
countries, excluding countries viewed as having an
accountable degree of transfer risk.
Bank and government claims involving transfer risk in
non-industrial countries, and all claims on private nonbank
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borrowers in foreign countries, are included in the
Standard Risk category. Industrial countries for risk
asset purposes comprise those nations designated by the IMF
and World Bank, 13 but developutents and modifications of
this designation for risk asset purposes may not coincide
with the IMF and World Bank lists.
This treatment of claims on foreign banks differed
from the typical approach in risk-based capital measures
used in other industrial countries. Generally speaking,
those measures assigned a very low (often zero) risk weight
to claims on their own government. They assigned claims on
all other governments to the equivalent of a standard risk
category.	 In terms of interbank claims, however, the
typical approach was to combine claims on all foreign and
domestic banks and place both of these types of assets in
the same relatively low risk category. This approach was
developed prior to the realization of strong concern over
country or transfer risk, and does not recognize the way
claims on banks in different countries are affected by
transfer risk, including those claims on banks in the less
developed countries which are involved in extensive debt
restructurings. Ironically, this placed claims on foreign
banks in a lower risk category than claims on the govern-
ments that generally acted as the safety net for these
banks. Also, assigning a lower risk treatment to claims on
foreign banks than to those on their own governments might
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create unintended incentives to substitute claims on banks
for claims on other parties that may be involved in debt
restructurings. Hence, the Board decided to depart from
the more or less typical approach to the treatment of
interbank claims.
Critical decisions involving the treatment of various
types of off-balance-sheet items were made by the Board.
For instance, standby letters of credit were divided into
two broad components. The first, included in the Moderate
Risk category, consisted of performance bonds, secured
letters of credit supporting brokers/dealers, and standbys
supporting state and local government securities (excluding
those supporting industrial development bonds). The second
component, assigned to the Standard Risk category, con-
sisted of all other standbys, including those backing com-
mercial paper, industrial development bonds, and other
financial instruments and loans included in the Standard
Risk category. This division, though broad, is generally
consistent with the way in which comparable off-balance-
sheet items are treated in risk asset frameworks abroad and
is based on the nature of the underlying credit risk--how
that risk would be treated if it were on the balance sheet.
Two other off-balance-sheet items, legally binding
commitments and note issuance facilities, were placed in
the Money Market Risk category rather than in a higher risk
category. This placement was influenced by the fact that
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these commitments often retain a conditional as well as
contingent character because of "adverse material change"
clauses and other covenants which may help banks avoid
losses by avoiding or curtailing drawdowns; and because,
unlike standby letters of credit, when drawings on com-
mitments do occur there is a greater possibility that the
resulting assets will be higher quality; and because super-
visors should be evaluating the volume of these commitments
in terms of the overall funding capacity of a bank, not
just its capital adequacy; and, perhaps most importantly,
because the Board felt that a relatively low capital charge
was more appropriate in order to give banks time to adjust
their commitment policies to any amendment to the
guidelines that includes off-balance-sheet risk.
Securities, foreign exchange trading activities, and
managing interest rate risk, including interest rate swaps,
make up another area that is affected by off-balance-sheet
risk. Therefore, the Board felt that any supplemental
capital measure would have to take into account these types
of risks and would need a more involved supervisory tech-
nique to measure such risks at those banking organizations
which are heavily involved in such activities. It was also
important to effectively supervise interest rate exposure
that resulted from the rate sensitivity of assets, liabil-
ities, and off-balance-sheet activities.
- 123 -
International Convergence of Capital Measurement and
Capital Standards
The financial concerns and crises of the inid-1970s
brought about an awareness of the need for cooperation
between the banking supervisories of many nations. The
resulting expansion of international lending by private
banks was considered to be innovative, but it created a
supervisory vacuum within and between various national au-
thorities.
To counteract these rising difficulties, major in-
dustrialized nations joined forces to discuss cooperative
initiatives and to exchange information. A forum of gover-
nors from the world's largest banks (a group of ten of the
most advanced industrial countries) was convened in 1974.
This new standing committee, called the Committee on
Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices, has met reg-
ularly at the headquarters of the Bank for International
Settlements (BIS) in Basel, Switzerland, since its in-
ception, and has been chaired mainly by Peter Cooke of the
Bank of England.
The first objective of the committee, based on the
continuing growth of banking internationalization, was to
determine an appropriate division of responsibility between
national authorities for the supervision of a bank's
- 124 -
foreign establishments, in order to ensure that no foreign
banking establishment was omitted from supervision. The
committee's views on jurisdiction were issued and endorsed
by the BIS governors in a December 1975 general statement
called the Concordat. This statement defined guidelines
that determine which authorities were to be responsible for
ongoing supervision of banks operating in more than one
national jurisdiction. It did not provide for agreement
about the responsibilities of lender-of-last-resort
facilities in the international banking system.
A recent paper prepared by the Basel committee on
banking regulations 14 and one on supervisory practices
prepared by the Cooke committee 15 established the framework
to be used for international convergence of bank capital
adequacy standards. This framework is to be implemented by
the banking supervisory authorities in the Group of Ten
countries (Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and
the United States). The framework establishes minimum
levels of capital for international banks, still allowing
for supervisory authorities in any individual country to
establish higher standards.
This report presented the outcome of the committee's
work over several years to bring about international con-
vergence of supervisory regulations governing the capital
adequacy of international banks. The committee's proposals
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were circulated to supervisory authorities worldwide in
December 1987, and a consultative process was created in
the Group of Ten (G-1O) countries. Some changes were made
to the original proposals after those consultations. The
present paper is now a statement agreed upon by all the
committee's members. It details the agreed-upon framework
for measuring capital adequacy and the minimum standard to
be achieved by each committee member's respective country.
The framework and standard were endorsed by the G-1O
central-bank governors.
There are three fundamental objectives to the com-
mittee's regulatory convergence work: that the new frame-
work should serve to strengthen the soundness and stability
of the international banking system, and that it should be
fair, and that it should have a high degree of consistency
in its application to banks in different countries (to
diminish existing sources of competitive inequality among
international banks). The response received by the com-
mittee on its original proposals indicated from the outset
that the proposed framework was welcomed in its general
shape and rationale. Many respondees supported the view
that it should be applied as uniformly as possible at the
national level.
In development of the framework, the committee sought
to create sound principles that would respect individual
features in a country's existing supervisory and accounting
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systems. It believes that this objective has been achieved
and made sure that the framework provided for a transi-
tional period that allowed time for flexibility and
adjustment so that the existing circumstances in different
countries were reflected.
The framework allows (in a very limited way) for the
country to use a certain degree of discretion in the way in
which the framework is applied. (The impact of such dis-
crepancies on the overall ratios is likely to be negligible
and it was not considered that they would compromise the
basic objectives.) The committee intent was to later
monitor and review the application of the framework to
analyze and perhaps improve its consistency.
It should be noted that the capital adequacy that is
measured by the framework, though important, is only one of
a number of factors taken into account when assessing the
strength of banks. The framework particularly assesses
capital in relation to credit risk, but other risks,
notably interest rate risk and the investment risk on se-
curities, must be taken into account by supervisors in
assessing overall capital adequacy. The committee con-
sidered various approaches in relation to these risks. It
also took into consideration that capital ratios judged
alone could be misleading guides to relative strength
because so much also depends on the quality of a bank's
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assets and the value of provisions a bank may be holding
outside its capital against assets of doubtful value.
This close relationship between capital and provi-
sions, among other things, created the need for the
committee to establish monitoring of provision policies
made by banks in member countries and to work to establish
convergence policies in this field as in other related
fields. The committee would continue to assess progress by
banks in member countries •toward meeting the agreed capital
standards and to scrutinize carefully differences in
existing policies and procedures for setting the level of
provisions among countries' banks, and in the form such
provisions would take.
The committee was aware that differences between coun-
tries in the fiscal treatment and accounting presentation
(for tax purposes) of certain classes of provisions (for
losses and capital reserves derived from retained earnings)
may tend to distort the comparability of the real or
apparent capital positions of international banks.
However, convergence in tax regimes, though desirable, were
not considered. Tax and accounting matters were kept under
review to the extent that they could affect the
comparability of the capital adequacy of different coun-
tries' banking systems.
The measurement and standards agreement was intended
to be applied to banks on a consolidated basis. This also
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includes subsidiaries undertaking banking and financial
business. The committee recognized that ownership struc-
tures and the position of banks within financial con-
glomerate groups were changing and was concerned that
ownership structures should not weaken the capital position
of the bank or expose it to risks from other parts of the
group. Developments were reviewed, based on the reg-
ulations of the member country, in order to ensure mainte-
nance of the integrity of the capital banks.
There are four sections to the document: the con-
stituents of capital, the risk weights, a target standard
ratio, and transitional implementing arrangements.
The Constituents of Capita].
Core Capital (Basic Equity)
Core capital elements (tier 1) of an institution's
qualifying capital must represent at least 50 percent of
qualifying total capital and may consist of the following
items that are defined as core capital elements: common
stockholders equity, qualifying cumulative and non-
cumulative perpetual preferred stock, and minority interest
in equity accounts of consolidated subsidiaries.
The committee considered that the main emphasis should
be placed on equity capital and disclosed reserves because
it is the only element common to all countries' banking
systems. It is wholly visible in the published accounts
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and is the basis on which most market judgments of capital
adequacy are made. It also has a crucial bearing on profit
margins and a bank's ability to compete. This emphasis on
equity capital and disclosed reserves reflects the im-
portance the committee places on progressive enhancement in
the quality, as well as the level, of the total capital
resources maintained by major banks.
Supplementary Capital
Supplementary capital elements (tier 2) of an in-
stitution's qualifying total capital may consist of the
following items that are defined as supplementary capital
elements: allowance for loan and lease losses; perpetual
preferred stock and related surplus; hybrid capital in-
struments, perpetual debt, and mandatory convertible
securities; subordinated debt and intermediate-term pre-
ferred stock (original weighted average maturity of 5 years
or more); and revaluation reserves (equity and building).
Undisclosed reserves. Many countries do not recognize
undisclosed reserves as an accepted accounting concept or
as a legitimate element of capital. They argue for ex-
cluding them from the core equity capital element because
though they may have the same intrinsic quality as pub-
lished retained earnings, their lack of transparency is
difficult to fit within the context of an internationally
agreed minimum standard. Yet, unpublished reserves exist
in different ways, depending on differing legal and ac-
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counting regimes in member countries. Under this heading
are included only reserves which, though unpublished, have
been passed through the profit and loss account and which
are accepted by the bank's supervisory authorities.
Revaluation reserves. Some national regulatory or
accounting systems allow certain assets to be revalued to
reflect (or be close to) their current value, rather than
their historic cost. The resultant revaluation reserves
are then included in the capital base. Such revaluations
can be made in two basic ways: (a) from a formal re-
valuation, carried through to the balance sheets of a
bank's own premises; or (b) from a notational addition to
capital of hidden values which arise from the practice of
holding securities in the balance sheet valued at historic
cost. Such reserves are included within supplementary
capital, provided that the assets are considered by the su-
pervisory authority to be realistically and wisely valued,
and that they reflect the possibility of price fluctuations
and forced sale.
General provisions/general loan loss reserves.
General provisions or general loan loss reserves are
created to protect against future losses. If they are not
ascribed to particular assets and do not reflect a re-
duction in the valuation of particular assets, they can be
included in capital. Where, however, provisions have been
created against identified losses or in respect to a
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specific deterioration in the value of particular assets,
they may not be able to meet unspecified losses which
subsequently arise elsewhere in the portfolio. These,
therefore, do not possess an essential characteristic of
capital.	 Such specific or earmarked provisions should
therefore not be included in the capital base.
Hybrid debt capital instruments. Capital instruments
in this category reflect characteristics of equity and debt
which affect their quality as capital. If these in-
struments (close to equity) are able to support losses on
an on-going basis without triggering liquidation, they are
included in supplementary capital. These instruments
include: perpetual preference shares carrying a cumulative
fixed charge, long-term preferred shares in Canada, titres
participatifs and titres subordonnes a duree indeterminee
in France, Genusscheine in Germany, perpetual debt in-
struments in the United Kingdom, and mandatory convertible
debt instruments in the United States.
Subordinated term debt. Subordinated term debt in-
struments have significant deficiencies as constituents of
capital despite their fixed maturity. They also have an
inability to absorb losses except in a liquidation. Thus
additional restriction was placed on the amount of such
debt capital which is eligible for inclusion within the
capital base. Subordinated term debt instruments with a
minimum original term to maturity of over five years,
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however, may be included within the supplementary elements
of capital, but only to a maximum of 50 percent of the core
capital element, and subject to adequate amortization ar-
rangements.
Deductions from Capital
The deductions from the capital base for the purpose
of calculating the risk-weighted capital ratio consist of:
1. Goodwill, as a deduction from tier 1 capital
elements.
2. Investments in subsidiaries engaged in banking and
financial activities which are not consolidated in national
systems. (The normal practice was to consolidate sub-
sidiaries for the purpose of assessing the capital adequacy
of banking groups. If this is not done, deduction is
essential to prevent the multiple use of the same capital
resources in different parts of the group.) The deduction
for such investments is made against the total capital
base. The deducted assets would not be included in total
assets used to compute the ratio.
The Risk Weights
A weighted risk ratio in which capital is related to
different categories of asset or off-balance-sheet exposure
was the preferred method for assessing a bank's capital
adequacy. Other capital measurements were also useful, but
they were considered by the committee to be supplementary
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to the risk weight approach because the risk ratio has
advantages over the simpler method. These advantages
include:
1. The risk ratio provides a fairer basis for making
international comparisons between banking systems whose
structures may differ.
2. It allows off-balance-sheet exposures to be in-
corporated more easily into the measure.
3. It does not deter banks from holding liquid or
other assets which carry low risk.
The framework of weights was kept as simple as
possible. Only five weights are to be used--0, 10, 20, 50,
and 100 percent--despite the inevitable grey-area judgments
necessary in deciding which weight should apply to dif-
ferent types of asset. Weightings are noted not to be sub-
stitutes for commercial judgment for purposes of market
pricing of the different instruments.
Categories of Risk Captured in the Framework
A bank's management needs to guard against different
kinds of risks, especially credit risk, i.e., the risk of
counterparty failure. Other kinds of risk to watch for
are: investment risk, interest rate risk, exchange rate
risk, concentration risk. However, the central focus is
credit risk and a further aspect of it--country transfer
risk. Some countries, however, would prefer to retain a
weighting for open foreign exchange positions or for some
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aspects of investment risk. No standardization was added
in the framework for these other kinds of risks. There-
fore, the framework allows individual supervisory au-
thorities to have discretion to build in certain other
types of risk.
The committee considered the desirability of in-
corporating additional weightings to reflect the investment
risk in holdings of fixed rate domestic government
securities (an indication of interest rate risk present in
the complete range of a bank's activities, on or off the
balance sheet). Individual supervisory authorities were
allowed to apply either a zero or a low weight to claims on
the domestic government (e.g., 10 percent for all
securities, or 10 percent for those maturing in under one
year and 20 percent for one year and over). It was agreed,
however, that interest rate risk needed further study and
that it might be possible to develop a satisfactory method
of measurement for this aspect of risk.
Country transfer risk. The difficulty of devising a
satisfactory method for incorporating country transfer risk
into the framework of measurement resulted in the con-
sideration of two alternative approaches. The first was a
simple differentiation between claims on domestic in-
stitutions (central government, official sector, and banks)
and claims on all foreign countries. The second was to
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establish comparisons on the basis of a defined grouping of
countries considered to be of high credit standing.
The second alternative was overwhelmingly favored,
based on four specific arguments. First, a simple
domestic/foreign split ignored the fact that transfer risk
varies greatly between different countries. It also
ignored the necessity of ensuring that broad distinctions
in the credit standing of industrialized and non-
industrialized countries would have to be made and captured
in the system of measurement, particularly one designed for
international banks. It also does not reflect the global
integration of financial markets or the absence of some
further refinement that would discourage international
banks from holding securities issued by central governments
of major foreign countries as liquid cover against their
Euro-currency liabilities. Such an approach would run
counter to encouraging prudent liquidity management, an
important objective of the risk weighting framework.
Finally, and most importantly, the member states of the
European community felt that whatever approach was used, it
should cause all claims on banks, central governments and
the official sector within European community countries to
be treated in the same way, preventing an undesirable asym-
metrical treatment of members of the community (the seven
European G-lO countries) as compared with the treatment of
non-community countries.
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It was concluded that a defined group of countries
should be adopted as the basis for applying differential
weighting coefficients, and that the countries in this
group should be full members of the OECD or countries which
have concluded special lending arrangements with the IMF
associated with the fund's General Arrangements to Borrow.
This group of countries is referred to as the OECD.
This decision caused consequences for the weighting
structure. Claims on central OECD governments would
receive a zero weight (or a low weight if the national su-
pervisory authority elected to incorporate interest rate
risk), and claims on OECD non-central-government public-
sector entities would receive a low weight (see next
section). Claims on central governments and central banks
outside the OECD would receive a zero weight (or a low
weight if the national supervisory authority elected to
incorporate investment risk), provided such claims were
denominated in the national currency and funded by liabil-
ities in the same currency. This reflected the absence of
risks relating to the availability and transfer of foreign
exchange on such claims.
To preserve the efficiency and liquidity of the in-
ternational interbank market concerning interbank claims,
there was no differentiation made between short-term claims
on banks incorporated within or outside the OECD. There
was however a distinction drawn between short-term place-
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ments with other banks (an accepted method of managing
liquidity in the interbank market which is seen as low
risk) and longer-term cross-border loans to banks (often
associated with particular transactions and which carry
greater transfer and/or credit risks). A 20 percent weight
would be applied to claims on all banks, wherever incor-
porated, that had residual maturity of up to and including
one year; longer-term claims on OECD incorporated banks
were weighted at 20 perOent; and longer-term claims on
banks incorporated outside the OECD, at 100 percent.
Claims on Non-Central-Government, Public-Sector Entities
A single common weight that could be applied to all
claims on domestic public-sector entities (PSEs) below the
level of central government (e.g., states, local
authorities, etc.) was considered not possible because of
the special character and varying creditworthiness of these
entities in different member countries. As a result, each
national supervisory authority was allowed to determine the
appropriate weighting factors for the PSE5 within that
country. In order to preserve a degree of convergence in
the application of such discretion, the weights would be 0,
10, 20, or 50 percent for domestic PSEs, but foreign PSEs
within the OECD would attract a standard 20 percent weight.
These weightings were subject to review by the committee in
pursuit of further convergence towards common weights and
consistent definitions in member countries. 	 Decisions
- 138 -
within the European community on the specification of a
common solvency ratio for credit institutions also had an
effect. Commercial companies (owned by the public sector)
would obtain a uniform weight or 100 percent inter alia in
order to avoid unequal competition with similar private-
sector commercial enterprises.
Collateral and Guarantees
To a limited extent, the framework recognized the
importance of collateral in reducing credit risk. The
varying collateral practices in banks in different
countries and the different physical and financial
collateral value/actions made it impossible to develop a
basis for recognizing collateral within the weighting
system. This applied only to loans secured against cost or
against securities issued by OECD central governments
and/or specified multilateral development banks.
	
Such
loans would receive the weight given to the collateral
(i.e., a zero or a low weight). Loans partially
collateralized by these assets would also attract the
equivalent low weights on that part of the loan which is
fully collateralized.
OECD central-government-guaranteed loans, OECD
public-sector entities, or OECD incorporated banks would
receive weights allocated to a direct claim on the
guarantor (e.g., 20 percent in the case of banks). Loans
guaranteed by non-OECD incorporated banks would receive a
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20 percent weight but only if the underlying transaction
had a residual maturity of less than one year. Monitoring
this latter arrangement was done to ensure that it does not
give rise to inappropriate weighting of commercial loans.
In loans covered by partial guarantees, only that part of
the loan which is covered by the guarantee would receive
reduced weight. A credit conversion factor of 100 percent
would be given to the contingent liability assumed by
banks.
Loans Secured on Residential Property
Residential property loans (secured by mortgage, and
borrower occupied and/or rented) are assigned a 50 percent
weight because they are known to have a very low record of
loss in most countries. This concessionary weight is
applied restrictively for residential purposes and in
accordance with strict prudential criteria. For example,
the 50 percent weight in some countries would only apply to
first mortgages, creating a first charge on the property.
In other member countries, it would be applied only where
strict, legally based, valuation rules ensure a substantial
margin of additional security over the amount of the loan.
The 50 percent weight was specifically not applied to loans
to companies engaged in speculative residential building or
property development. Other collaterals would not be used
to justify reduction of the weightings.14
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A Target Standard Ratio
In the light of consultations and preliminary testing,
a minimum standard was set which international banks were
generally expected to achieve by the end of the tran-
sitional period. This standard was set at a level con-
sistent with the objective of securing (over time) soundly
based and consistent capital ratios for all international
banks. The target standard ratio of capital to weighted
risk assets would be set at 8 percent (of which the core
capital element would be at least 4 percent). This is ex-
pressed as a common minimum standard which international
banks in member countries would be expected to observe by
the end of 1992, thus allowing a transitional period of
some four-and-a-half years for any necessary adjustment by
banks who need time to build up to those levels. The
transition from existing, sometimes long-established, defi-
nitions of capital and methods of measurement toward a new
internationally agreed-upon standard was acknowledged as
not easily or quickly achievable. The period to 1992
ensured progressive steps towards adjustment and did not
require banks whose ratios are presently below the 8
percent standard to take immediate action.
Transitional and Implementing Arrangements
Certain transitional arrangements were agreed upon to
ensure that there would be sustained effort during the
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transitional period to build the individual banks' ratios
up to the highest target standard, and to create smooth
adjustments and phasing in of the new arrangements within a
wide variety of existing supervisory systems.
The transitional period would be from July 1988 to the
end of 1992, by which latter date all banks undertaking
significant cross-border business would be expected to meet
the standard in full.
Initially no formal standard or minimum level would be
set. However, those banks whose capital levels were at the
low end of the range would be encouraged to build up their
capital as quickly as possible. No erosion of existing
capital standards in individual member countries' banks was
expected. Thus, during the transitional period, all banks
needing to improve capital levels up to the interim and
final standards would not diminish (even temporarily) their
current capital levels (subject to the fluctuations which
can occur around the time new capital is raised). A
reasonable yardstick for the lower capitalized banks to
seek to achieve in the short term by application of the
framework and transitional arrangements would be 5 percent.
Individual member countries would be free to set, and
announce, at the outset of the transitional period, the
level they would expect all their banks to move toward and
their final target standard.
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Assessment and comparison of progress takes into
account existing supervisory systems, and the new ar-
rangements would initially apply the basis of measurement
as follows. The capital position of banks would be
measured at the start of the transitional period, when
supplementary elements may constitute up to a maximum of 25
percent of core capital elements, reducing to 10 percent by
end-l990. At that point, there would be an interim minimum
standard of 7.25 percent, of which at least half should be
core capital. Between end-1990 and end-1992, up to 10
percent of the required core elements may be made up of
supplementary elements. This means, in round figures, that
a minimum core capital element of 3.6 percent, of which
tier 1 elements should total at least 3.25 percent, must be
achieved by the end of 1990. In addition, from end-1990,
general loan loss reserves or general provisions which
include amounts reflecting lower valuations of assets or
latent but unidentified losses present in the balance sheet
would be limited to 1.5 percentage points, or as an excep-
tion, up to 2.0 percentage points of risk assets within
supplementary elements. These limits would apply only in
the event that no agreement is reached on a consistent
basis for including unencumbered provisions or reserves in
capital.
Throughout the transitional period up to end-l992
(subject to restrictive policies individual authorities may
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wish to apply), term subordinated debt may be included
without limit as a supplementary constituent. Also, the
deduction from tier 1 capital elements with respect to
goodwill may be waived.
At the end of the transitional period, the minimum
standard would be 8 percent, of which core capital (tier 1
equity and reserves) would be at least 4 percent, with sup-
plementary elements to be no more than core capital, and
term subordinated debt wIthin supplementary elements no
more than 50 percent of tier 1. In addition, general loan
loss reserves or general provisions would be limited at
end-1992 to 1.25 percentage points, or as an exception and
temporarily, up to 2.0 percentage points, within sup-
plementary elements.
The arrangements described in this section were
implemented at a national level at the earliest possible
opportunity. Each country decided the way in which the
supervisory authorities introduced and applied these
recommendations, based on their different legal structures
and existing supervisory arrangements. Changes in the
capital regime were introduced in some countries, after
consultation, without the need for legislation. 	 Other
countries employed more lengthy procedures, which in some
cases required legislation. In due course, the member
states of the European community also needed to ensure that
their own domestic regulations were compatible with the
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community's legislative proposals, none of which affected
the timing of implementation among member countries.
Hence, some countries applied the framework, formally or
informally, in parallel with their existing system,
certainly during the initial period of transition. In this
way, banks were assisted in starting the necessary process
of adjustment in good time before substantive changes in
national systems were formally introduced.
Summary
The effective management of risk by U.S. banks in
developing countries is an important priority of the U.S.
bank regulatory agencies. The amount of loans granted to
countries with debt-servicing problems by the U.S. banks
has declined. However, the exposure levels of some of the
largest U.S. banks are still very high in terms of absolute
exposure and exposure relative to capital. Lately, the
regulatory agencies have embarked on a number of procedures
to strengthen the supervisory framework that applies to the
international lending operations of U.S. banks. These
procedures, along with amendments to regulatory policies
that strengthen examination procedures, have resulted in
decreased exposure to countries with
	 debt-servicing
problems and increased capital in the U.S. banking system.
There are two major reasons why the U.S. banking
system is now better able to deal with the effects of the
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debt-servicing problems of developing countries. First,
international bank lending has been strengthened through
bank policies and procedures on lending that make sure that
risk in the loan portfolio is properly appraised and
reserves against future loan losses are well established.
Throughout 1989, the 21 largest internationally active U.S.
banks increased their loan loss provisions for developing
country debt by $9.3 billion. The average reserve levels
involved with exposure to medium- and long-term debt of
developing countries is 49 percent for the nine money
center banks and 60 percent for the twelve other large
banks. These reserves brought about a more flexible
environment for international loan portfolio management by
these banks.
The other reason is that bank capital has been
strengthened relative to overall bank lending activity as
banking supervisors and bank personnel have stressed the
need to maintain sufficient capital to withstand potential
loss. From December 1982 to December 1989, primary capital
for the 21 largest internationally active U.S. banks in-
creased from $40 billion to $76 billion. As a percentage
of total banking assets, capital levels have increased from
4.7 percent to 8.2 percent during this period. Throughout
1989, primary capital levels increased by $2 billion for
these banks.
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It is estimated that U.S. banks own about 30 percent
of developing country debt. This means that non-U.S.
creditor banks hold most commercial bank claims on devel-
oping countries. Japan and the European countries have
banking systems which are highly concentrated within a few
large banks. This could subject these banking systems to
greater vulnerability to debts of developing countries than
the U.S. banking system. However, the major non-U.S. banks
are not subjected to the stringent disclosure requirements
that apply to U.S. banks, and thus data for individual
banks on the exposure to developing countries are more
restricted. Exposure data for the main Canadian and
British banks have been fairly well publicized, but the
developing-country portfolios of German, French, and
Japanese banks are still unpublished.
The tax authorities in many countries efficiently
reduced the cost of loan loss provisioning by allowing
banks to deduct increases in provisions from taxable
income. These provisions are largely tax deductible in
most of the industrial countries, with the exception of
Japan and the U.S. In Japan, loan loss reserves are tax
deductible up to 1 percent of the banks' exposure to devel-
oping countries. In the U.S., only specific reserves
mandated by the federal regulatory agencies and actual
charge-of fs are tax deductible. In the United Kingdom, tax
deductibility is permitted on a case-by-case basis, using
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provisioning levels mandated by regulatory authorities
through a matrix system of country classification. To make
up for the cost of loan loss provisions through tax deduc-
tions would encourage enough earnings to make use of the
tax deduction.
It is evident that banking regulation has helped the
present debt crises. 	 Effective enactment of responsible
regulation by U.S. banks will improve the current debt
situation and make the present and future loans of U.S.
banks to developing countries more manageable. Of course,
if the present regulatory guidelines had been in place
about ten years ago, the current debt crises would not have
reached this proportion. It is also important for the
international regulatory agencies to establish guidelines,
procedures, and capital ratios for all major international
banks that are comparable and thus less likely to give the
banks in one country a competitive edge.
The next chapter will discuss the management of
country risk and address previous work on empirical
investigation of factors leading to the need for
rescheduling debt of less-developed countries, applying
logit and discriminant models.
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CHAPTER V
MANAGING COUNTRY RISK
Fundamental to managing country risk is the notion
that the additional risk associated with international
lending, whether by private banks or by any private
investor, cannot be eliminated. Banking, whether domestic
or international, is a risk-taking business; nevertheless,
risk can be managed so as to make private banks that do
undertake such actions less vulunerable. Most importantly,
banks must anticipate change in order to function
proactively, not reactively. They must work quickly,
thereby avoiding excessive losses which could have been
anticipated.
The importance of management of international risks is
the	 direct	 result	 of	 increased	 international
banking/investment activity over the past two decades.
During that time, international transactions expanded more
than domestic transactions in almost every country. Growth
and profit opportunities became dependent on effective
management. Ironically, however, even as international
risk management has become more important, the ability of
banks to anticipate risks has not improved.
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To better understand the nature of the risk, and,
therefore, what it is that will be managed, it is necessary
to clarify the measuring, controlling, and reporting of
such exposure, because accurate and current information is
essential for effective management.
Managing country risk requires two separate under-
takings: first, assessing the degree of risk incurred by
increasing involvement with a particular country; and
second, transforming those assessments into a set of con-
straints on a bank's asset portfolio.
Techniques for Assessing Country Risk
The shift in the movement of international capital
flow from official sources to commercial banks, in conjunc-
tion with increased borrowings of the LDCs, brought about
the need for country-risk assessment. Commercial banks,
as profit-maximizing entities, are more concerned with the
risks of lending than are foreign official sources, which
provide "soft loans." Commercial banks lend on commercial
terms, the hardest available, and the people and countries
that borrow from such sources do not expect concessions
such as lower interest rates or longer grace periods and
maturities than those in private markets. As a result,
countries that borrow commercially accumulate larger
external debt and debt-servicing obligations than they
would in borrowing from concessional sources.
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Before recent efforts by United States bank regulatory
authorities to monitor overseas lending activities more
closely, the larger U.S. commercial banks used their own
criteria for assessing the risk and debt-repayment capabil-
ity of developing countries. Even the smaller banks, which
previously had relied on the decisions of larger banks when
participating in loan syndication, began to develop their
own evaluation systems.
However, rarely did any two banks involved in inter-
national lending act in the same way; rather, they behaved
according to their own needs and capabilities. Some
decided to participate in loan syndications, which limited
their international exposure and enabled them to rely on
the knowledge of other syndicate participants. Others
decided to act on their own. Each responded differently
because of varying portfolio sizes, earnings, and
geographic location. 	 Too often, though, satisfied with
prevailing views, banks neglected to build their own capa-
bilities.	 As a result, evaluating country credit risk
became more and more important.
The procedures that banks followed, however, were not
generally known, prompting Eximbank1 to conduct a survey of
37 U.s. commercial banks. It began the survey without any
strong preconceived notions of these procedures. Four of
the 37 banks that participated in the survey (11%) indi-
cated that they had no systematic procedure for assessing
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creditworthiness; they simply reviewed the political and
economic conditions of a particular country in connection
with the processing of an individual loan request. These
four banks had comparatively small international loan port-
folios and were relatively new to overseas lending, but
they seem representative of a large number of other U.S.
commercial banks. The remaining 33 banks used procedures
that ranged from strictly qualitative to quite quan-
titative. Overall, four types of country evaluation could
be distinguished: fully qualitative, structured
qualitative, checklist, and quantitative econometrics.
Some banks used more than one system.
The fully qualitative system is structured around a
report which details a country's economic, political, and
social conditions and prospects; the report's format,
detail, and extent vary from country to country. Five of
the 37 banks surveyed follow this approach in evaluating a
country's creditworthiness. There were indications that
these banks have only recently implemented these pro-
cedures, though three were experienced foreign lenders.
The qualitative system has both advantages and dis-
advantages; it is able to adapt easily to the unique
strengths and problems of the country undergoing eval-
uation, but such reports tend to be retrospective, severely
limiting their utility.
- 154 -
In comparison, the structured qualitative system uses
a standard format across countries and is augmented by
economic statistics which can vary across countries and
over time. The inclusion of the economic data serves as a
foundation for deriving a concise set of statistics, which
in turn facilitates the prediction of future trends and
thus lessens, to some extent, retrospective prejudice.
Nearly 75% of the banks surveyed used this system.
The checklist system compresses a country's overall
performance into some type of rating. The rating is either
quantitative (in which the scoring requires no personal
judgment or first-hand knowledge of the country) or qual-
itative (in which the scoring is determined subjectively).
The influence of each component variable in the final
score can be adjusted by assigning a weight to each
indicator, in a method known as the weighted checklist
approach. In the unweighted checklist approach, component
variables are weighted equally. Fourteen percent (five of
37) of the banks surveyed used a weighted checklist, but
only to supplement another evaluation system. In four of
the banks, the checklist is used with the structured qual-
itative system; in the fifth, with more advanced exper-
imental qualitative techniques.
Because the checklist produces a concise evaluation,
it can be correlated statistically with the actual re-
payment experience that the bank has had with the country.
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Such comparisons can shed valuable light on the checklist's
accuracy in evaluating country risk. Only one bank,
however, used such testing--the only one out of 37 to
validate the results of its country evaluation system
against its repayment experiences.
The quantitative econometric approach requires evalua-
tion techniques that are statistically more sophisticated
than the others. These techniques include discriminant,
logit, and probit analyses, principal components, and
linear probability models. The quantitative approach
attempts to overcome the shortcomings of the checklist
system, which necessarily involves subjectivity in
selecting the most significant variables. Here, standard
statistical tests of predictive ability are used to select
the most relevant explanatory variables and to predict po-
tential debt-servicing difficulties.
Significantly, 26 of the 37 surveyed banks used their
country evaluation results in setting overall country
exposure limits, as well as other important factors, such
as marketing strategy. Several of these banks also used
their results to set limits for specific loan maturities
and categories. Nine of the 37 banks used their results to
help analyze portfolio quality; and six of these nine banks
decided country limits on the basis of their evaluations.
The eight other banks in the survey either did not have any
systematic approach to evaluating countries, or used the
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system's results very generally. Finally, the survey mdi-
cated that banks did not use the results from their country
evaluations to determine interest rates or fees.
The fact that private banks use various methods to
assess country risk is not surprising, considering that
each bank's involvement in providing loans differs accord-
ing to changes in the world economy and the accompanying
variability in demand for international banking services.
Some banks have very limited international activities;
others are somewhat more involved; and the rest devote a
great deal of time to building a portfolio of high-quality
international loans.
Differences also exist among operating and lending
policies. Some banks offer credits with time constraints
to overseas entities only when such exposure is completely
guaranteed by the central bank in the debtor's country.
Others offer only short-term, trade-related credits, while
still others allow meaningful exposure which specifies the
time allowed for discharge.
The current state of country assessment has been des-
cribed concisely by Ingo Walter:
The conflicting demands of country assessment--
ranging from high levels of usability,
auditability and comparability and the need to
capture exceedingly complex and country-specific
qualitative judgments over extended periods of
time, to the need to avoid abuse of the results
in decision-making--probably means that there is
no	 such	 thing	 as	 the	 "ideal"	 system.
"Appropriate" systems will certainly differ for
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different banks. The key may reside as much on
the "human resources" side as on the "technology"
side.2
Traditional Approaches to Assessing Country Risk
The traditional approach to a.5sessing country risk has
involved the selection of both risk indicators (with either
an implicit or explicit weighting scheme) and a formula to
rank potential country exposure. This section will address
the quantitative and qualitative components generally
thought necessary in making comparisons among countries.
Any assessment of country risk must concentrate on the
economic, commercial, political, and social conditions of a
particular nation. Information on economic conditions
alone is not sufficient to determine a country's ability to
service its external debt.
A carefully formed structure for risk approval can
provide a time series of evaluations from which one can
make a thoughtful appraisal of a country's strengths and
weaknesses.	 By highlighting the improvement, deteriora-
tion, or turning point in a country's status, this process
can shed some light on emerging economic, social, and
political developments which may mandate early corrective
measures to reduce exposure risks.
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Economic Indicators
Economic indicators normally measure the ability of a
country to pay its debts. There are many, some more mean -
ingful than others. For example, important data and ratios
may be scored so as to measure the relative stability and
growth of an economy. The economic indicators to be dis-
cussed below are connected to a country's balance of pay-
ments, its debt structure, , and its international liquidity.
The outlook of a country's balance of payments is
crucial because key components of it control the future
ability of the country to pay its external debt on time.
Most significant are the trends, both historical and pro-
jected, in exports, imports, the trade deficit, and the
current-account deficit. Until a few years ago, many
developing countries had borrowed to finance balance-of-
payments deficits which were clearly larger (in relation to
the GNP and exports) than could be sustained. The critical
question thus was whether or not these countries were
making the necessary adjustments to reduce their trade
deficits, and as a result their current-account balance-
of-payments deficits, to levels which could be sustained
over the long run. The existence of a deficit is not the
indication of a problem; a continued capital flow (which is
what the deficit indicates) benefits both the lender and
the borrower when the resources are well used and the
returns on investments comparatively high.
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When evaluating country risk and monitoring a coun-
try's economic development, it is crucial to have informa-
tion on the current-account balance of payments, along with
some indication of its causes and likely development (such
as the government's budget deficit, domestic savings and
investment, and the economy's supply potential). When a
country undergoes continuous balance-of-payments deficits
and an unfavorable drift in, for example, its trade
account, there exists the possibility of a basic disequili-
brium, overvalued currency, and capital flight caused by
speculation that the currency will weaken. Serious
deficits can lead to either a shortfall in available
foreign exchange or difficulty in converting local currency
into hard currency.
A current account consists of imports and exports of
goods and services, and transfer payments. A surplus is a
positive indicator because a stagnant economy or poor coun-
try management will not attract foreign capital, whereas a
sound, growing economy is more likely to receive private
capital from direct foreign investment and lending, and
from official capital inflows as a result of active devel-
opment efforts.
External financial instability is often a result of
internal financial instability which "spills over" into the
balance of payments via lagging exports and a rapid growth
in demand for imports. Consequently, one can often anti-
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cipate external financial problems by examining the finan-
cial management of the public sector. The World Bank most
often uses as an indicator the public-sector deficit as a
percentage of the gross domestic product (GDP). Related
significant indicators are public-sector savings in
relation to the GDP and to investment expenditures.
One of the most fundamental yet elusive issues in
country-risk analysis is whether or not a level of debt is
sustainable. A large number of indicators have been sug-
gested for analyzing debt levels, but until recently,
obtaining data on foreign debt and debt structure (which
have been historically either partially or wholly unavail-
able) has been difficult. Governments have published
statistics covering only the medium-term, public-sector
debt which, in excluding short-term and private-sector
debt, has forced analysts to turn to a shortened version of
the debt service ratio to assess country risk.
In analyzing liquidity problems, the most popular
indicator is the total of reserves. In general, reserves
act as cushions for cyclical variations in a country's
external revenues and for emergencies. They do not repre-
sent money set aside to pay external debts; rather, they
are used to pay all external expenditures. The size of the
reserves indicates the extent of a country's international
cash flow and, indirectly, the extent of the international
credit that the country can carry. For example, all else
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being equal, the repayment potential of a country with
reserves in the $7 to $9 billion range should be higher
than that of a country whose reserves are at the $700 to
$900 million level.
Reserves are used only after compensating all foreign
exchange transactions through normal international clearing
arrangements and after using the regular credit facilities.
Thus increases or decreases of the reserves represent net
imbalances of all payments affecting a country's inter-
national liquidity. Variations will indicate disequi-
librium between foreign exchange inflow and outflow. In
the IMF Balance of Payments Manual under "Reserves---
Explanation of Concept," reserves is defined as follows:
"Reserves" is singled out as a category
because the kind of capital that it is designed
to comprise can perform a distinctive and
important function in the context of an economy's
international transactions. The category may be
described as the monetary gold, special drawing
rights (SDRs) in the Fund, reserve positions in
the Fund, use of Fund credit, and existing claims
on nonresidents that are available to the central
authorities either to finance payments imbalances
directly or to manage the size of such imbalances
by intervening to influence the exchange rate for
the national currency.3
International reserves consists of monetary authori-
ties' reserve positions in the fund, holdings of special
drawing rights (SDRs), foreign exchange, and gold. The sum
of the first three items, "total reserves minus gold" or
"non-gold reserves," is normally used as a measure of
- 162 -
international reserves in the International Financial
Statistics (IFS).
There is some opposition to the use of reserves as a
performance indicator in assessing country risk. For
instance, it is possible for a country accumulating exten-
sive foreign debt to show very acceptable reserve trends.
Mexico is the best example. It had run deficits in its
current account for 20 consecutive years before the 1976
devaluation, yet its reserves were remarkably stable, in-
creasing gradually from $400 to $500 million in the mid-
l950s to $1.5 billion by 1975. Furthermore, in the second
half of the 1970s, developing countries that did not export
oil began to accumulate reserves while their current
accounts showed a deficit.
Commercial Indicators
Commercial. indicators are best derived from first-hand
experience and in-depth knowledge of a country. They are
also divisible into four types, all of which are necessar-
ily somewhat subjective and dynamic: business confidence
and activity, financing purpose, climatic conditions, and
access to energy resources. In some countries, both
private and overall commercial activity can be adversely
affected by varying but pervasive government intervention
into basic and other industries, burdensome and changing
regulations and taxes, and official discrimination. On the
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other hand, in centrally planned economies (where private
investment, foreign or domestic, may or may not be sanc-
tioned), this factor, at least in its narrowest sense, can-
not be included as heavily negative in risk assessments.
There, official judgments can affect attitudes toward
foreign business, the negotiating and operating climate,
and the stability of economic, commercial, and political
policies. Business confidence can also be assessed by
examining the stability of the indigenous labor supply, the
tax structure, the cost of capital, government incentives
to promote commerce and industry, and government organiza-
tions and agencies established to assist foreign business
and finance.
Loan purpose is the most important of these indica-
tors, not only from the microeconomic viewpoint of judi-
cious lending practices, but as an explicit element in both
the future economic growth of the country and (especially
in the U.S.) the regulatory procedures covering bank lend-
ing to governments and government-owned entities. Credit
risk is minimized if the loan involves an efficient export-
oriented industry (a foreign exchange earner) or, secondar-
ily, an import-substitution industry (a foreign exchange
saver).	 These industries may have the tacit or formal
support of the government and, more fundamentally, tend to
have a direct impact on the country's capacity to service
its foreign debt.
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Many less developed countries suffer from periodic
geophysical catastrophes: tornados, earthquakes, floods,
drought, and so on. Such natural calamities particularly
affect agricultural export, either generally, with specific
crops, or with products from specific geographical areas.
Because of this potential, a country's ability to meet debt
obligations may be erratic. Such considerations are sub-
sumed by the rubric "conunercial" rather than "economic"
because they are judged only by the likelihood of their
occurrence. When such potential dangers become real and
course through a culture, they are reclassified as
"economic"
Less developed countries also lack the domestic energy
resources to sustain growing industrial and agricultural
production. Again, this fact is not explicitly obvious in
national income data but can reflect indigenous attempts to
overcome such deficiencies. The first OPEC price hike in
1974 made the importance of energy resources abundantly
clear. Oil is a prime, non-indigenous source of energy in
many LDC5, and price fluctuations have taken their toll on
a number of these countries. Whatever the form, energy
resources--their adequacy, conservation, development, and
financing--have assumed increasing importance in recent
years, both within a country's domestic economy and in its
balance of payments.
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Political and Social Indicators
While economic indicators are used primarily to deter-
mine a country's ability to service its external debt,
political and social indicators are used to determine a
country's willingness to service it. Since the political
elements of country risk are less quantifiable than the
economic elements, there is more disagreement about how to
assess it. Political risk factors can be either inherent
in, evolving out of, or wholly discrete from a particular
country.
When evaluating political risk factors inherent in a
country's legal framework, one must focus on that country's
constitutional environment, watching closely the attitudes
toward foreign investment and international transfer pay-
ments. If the attitude is vague, it will lead to insecur-
ity about, and indicate a decline in, cross-border transac-
tions.
It is also important to identify and forecast key
developments in domestic and external politics. Inter-
nally, one must examine the structure of the government and
its main political institutions and their evolution for
indications of power struggles and salient issues for the
various political players. One must also assess the groups
that could conceivably replace the existing authorities
during the forecast period and take seriously their
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policies and doctrines, as well as those of outlawed
groups.
Another major factor in assessing political risk is
the quality of the government--whether it can act indepen-
dently or is impeded by the influence of pressure groups.
The quality of a country's administration is crucial
because it is often more important than the government
itself, especially in day-to-day affairs. In general, the
bulk of the government does not change; only the top
echelon, the politically appointed, come and go. Four-year
election cycles in many countries prevent drastic
alterations in an administration. Nevertheless, a change
in the government always has some influence on political
risk assessment.
A country's adherence to a major block, or to a group
of neutral or non-aligned countries, is another important
factor in evaluating the political risk of its foreign
policy. Any change usually results from a change in the
government and can therefore be anticipated if one knows
the positions of the other major political parties. For
example, the Communist takeover of Czechoslovakia in 1948,
Egypt's turn to the West under President Sadat, and
France's departure from NATO all altered the nature of the
political risk associated with those countries.
Apart from identified political groups, legal or
otherwise, many other groups with potential or realized
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power are important factors (e.g., distinct religious and
ethnic-tribal groups, students, etc.). Such groups are
sources of potential organized unrest and are subject to
manipulation either by powerful local political figures or
by foreign influences. The more homogeneous a country is,
the less important this factor becomes, though such a pre-
cept is not universal (for example, Switzerland, which has
four languages and cultures and two religious divisions).
Thus it is necessary to evaluate ethnic and religious
structures to determine whether the differences compound or
compensate each other. Such differences can become explo-
sive if one superimposes wealth and population disparities.
Both Lebanon and many African countries exemplify the
problem of tensions created by ethnic and religious
differences.
Social strains and conflicts among economic classes,
religions, and ethnic groups can lead to profound political
instability if not properly handled. The core of a politi -
cal analysis is thus the assessment of power shifts among
these groups, either peacefully or violently. Often, his-
tory can indicate the type of likely transition. It must
be noted, though, that political stability is neither a
sufficient nor, indeed, a necessary condition for a low
degree of country risk. Italy, for example, is noted for
its political instability, but Italy is far less risky than
it appears at first glance. Although cabinets in Rome have
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changed constantly, and new governments have formed almost
annually for the past 40 years, their strong central bank,
with a governor not subject to direct political control,
eliminates country risk. Paradoxically, this underlying
stability has counteracted constant changes in govern-
ment--the factor of most concern to banks.
Social factors such as the homogeneity of the popula-
tion, religious beliefs, wealth and income distribution,
unemployment, degree of urbanization, educational opportun-
ities, and the literacy rate can also significantly affect
the political stability of the country, because major
discontent in any of these areas can lead to disruption,
both political and economic. Cultural polarization is the
basis of conflict. Countries with a high literacy rate
have populations with access to a wide spectrum of
information, which in general leads to more stability
because political leaders find it more difficult to
influence such a population.
External factors are as important as domestic factors
to a country's political and economic stability. Obvious-
ly, a country threatened by foreign invasion is likely to
concentrate its resources on military defense and leave
little for economic development (e.g., Thailand, on the
border of Viet Nam, in the late 1970s). In examining this
factor, one should consider whether, during the period of
review, the country is likely to be involved in some kind
- 169 -
of external conflict which might entail outright armed
warfare or simply trade embargoes and hostile restrictions.
For example, the real possibility of armed conflict between
Chile and Argentina in the Beagle Channel dispute loomed
large in late 1978, with both sides in a state of readiness
and Buenos Aires in nightly blackout.
Occasionally, unpopular governments may initiate mili-
tary ventures against traditional external enemies in order
to detract from internal problems; and sometimes such
actions can bring down the government. An example of this
was the Greek junta in 1974. The South Atlantic dispute
mentioned above between Chile and Argentina and Buenos
Aires' dispute with England over the Malvinas (Falkiands)
both have long histories. While few analysts were shocked
by a short Chile-Argentina war, most were taken by surprise
when Argentina occupied the Malvinas and England responded
with a sizable portion of the Royal Navy. Too little
attention had been paid to Argentina's global rela-
tionships, too much to its local dispute with Chile. Not
only were the political and economic costs of the South
Atlantic disputes hard to bear, the inherent economic
instability of the military government (that should have
been noticed earlier) was revealed as well, and the effect
on Argentina's risk rating was profound.
The primary question of probable political stability
and continuity in country-risk assessment is important to
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external debt management because it provides insight into a
country's willingness to meet its foreign obligations--the
key element in understanding default. In time of crisis,
when local administrators are confronted with the dilemma
of either domestic belt-tightening in order to continue
servicing its external debt or defaulting in order to avoid
instituting politically unpopular corrective measures,
questions of political stability and governmental
tendencies become crucial.
Statistical Approaches to Assessing Country Risk
Increased interest in country-risk analysis, coupled
with the apparent weaknesses in the assessment approaches
used by conunercial banks, generated efforts to develop more
objective methods of assessing a country's debt servicing
capacity with the aid of statistical methods. These
methods generally involve the specification of a statis-
tical model which expresses a country's degree of risk (the
dependent variable) as a function of several economic
factors (independent variables) which might be used to
predict this risk. The model is developed using a sample
of countries, some of which have known debt-servicing
difficulties and others which do not, for which information
on the set of economic variables of interest is available.
A discussion of the variables generally used is presented
below.
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Dependent Variable
Several forms of dependent variable have been used.
The most common is a binary variable which categorizes
countries into need to reschedule vs. no need to re-
schedule.	 Some variants of this categorization include:
(a) involuntary reschedulings vs. voluntary reschedulings
or no need to reschedule and (b) involuntary reschedulings
or balance-of-payment support loans vs. no need to re-
schedule, with voluntary reschedulings eliminated.
A second type of dependent variable is the probability
(or odds) of rescheduling, contingent upon the country's
status with respect to a combination of economic variables.
Independent Variables
The explanatory variables that have generally been
used in the development of the statistical models varied
from one study to another. The following are those most
commonly used.
1. The Debt Service Ratio
This indicator, the most widely used, is defined as
the ratio of annual interest and principal (amortization)
payments on external debt to the annual earnings from
exports of goods and services. It indicates the size of
foreign exchange earnings absorbed by the country's exter-
nal debt-servicing payments. This ratio usually covers a
one-year period, which is then compared with two years of
development, and is used to forecast future periods. While
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the necessary payments of external debt are easily com-
piled, the income side of the ratio involves making many
assumptions and is thus difficult to project. Lower ratios
are better: a ratio of 10% or lower is very good, while a
25% or higher ratio creates a greater danger of country
risk.
This ratio's development depends on each of the two
sides of the equation. The development of principal and
foreign exchange income is quite volatile, while interest
payments are more stable.
As a performance indicator, the ratio has a fundamen-
tal weakness, pointed out by Avramovic: 4 "The debt-service
ratio is a cash flow concept rather than a profitability or
productivity concept." Another weakness exhibited by this
ratio is that the components of the numerator are not in
unison. Debt interest is an expenditure, a net drain on
resources, whereas amortization is a financial
transaction--payment reduces both the external assets and
the external liabilities of the country.
The ratio's major weakness, however, is that it
assumes that the country in question can repay its debt
from its own resources. Such repayment is normally not
possible, since a continuous import of capital goods is
necessary to maintain a current export performance. Thus a
10% debt service ratio is good because it leaves ample room
for the required expenditure on imports. One should not
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assume that country risk is minimal simply because of a 10%
ratio, though, as this ratio provides no indication that a
country may be running a positive current account; thus it
measures solvency more than liquidity. No critical number
exists to tell an analyst the initial point at which a
country could run into trouble. For example, during the
1930s, Canada and Australia had DSRs of 30% and 40%,
respectively, while Latin American nations (Brazil, Peru,
Columbia, Uruguay, etc.) •had DSRs considerably lower; yet
the latter defaulted on their bond payments, while the
former did not.
The debt service ratio also neglects the extent to
which imports have been or can be compressed to compensate
for foreign exchange shortage. While obviously true, it is
difficult to assess the possibility of such a development.
Furthermore, the traditional debt service ratio omits the
income from currency reserves and foreign investments,
though this income is of minor importance for many LDCs.
The debt service ratio is widely held to be an indica-
tor of a country's short-term liquidity; but its two- or
three-year time lag in making information available is too
long to make it a useful warning signal. By the time it
becomes available, it is largely redundant.
Exports of goods and services (the denominator in the
ratio) are the main source of foreign exchange, and it is
crucial to determine the pattern, stability, and growth of
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a country's exports.	 One should collect figures for
perhaps a five-year period, distinguishing real growth from
possibly transitory price effects. A country must have a
good track record on export growth to reduce its country
risk, and the percentage of manufactured goods to total
exports is a solid indicator of a country's level of devel-
opinent and its diversity in export earnings. A high share
of manufactured goods tends to assure greater stability and
a sustained growth in export revenues, unless international
economic conditions become unfavorable.
2. Total External Debt/Exports of Goods and Services
The denominator of this indicator is the same as that
in the debt service ratio, but the numerator is total
external debt. The main difference between this and the
DSR is that this ratio is of a longer-term nature. Unlike
the DSR, an indicator of immediate problems, this ratio
signals a country's long-term external commitments, measur-
ing its total external debt in a given year (as opposed to
what must be serviced in the next year). The crisis of
1982-83 revealed the problems of countries with a ratio of
over 200%:	 when the market grew cautious during this
period, the countries ran into some problems. Signif-
icantly, if a large proportion of debts (the numerator) is
from the government on concessional terms (as is usually
the case with poorer LDCs), then the real burden (measured
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by interest payments to exports of goods and services) is
obviously smaller.
The main problem with this ratio, from an economic
point of view, is that it relates a stock concept (debt) to
a flow concept (exports). Countries are in much better
shape if the ratio is low.
3. The Ratio of Total External Debt to GNP
This ratio measures total external debt outstanding at
the end of a year to the total output of an economy during
the same year. Gross national product (GNP) is the total
output of goods and services of a given country.
The higher this ratio is, the more risk involved;
below 15% is acceptable, while above 30% is troublesome.
Again, this generalization must be qualified. A highly
export-oriented country has a different potential for
incurring external debts from that of a country that
internally creates its GNP, because the export-oriented
economy earns relatively more foreign exchange to service
its level of debt. A substantial public sector certainly
offers better control over the inflow and outflow of
foreign exchange but hinders the flexibility of the
economy. The size of the GNP, however, can also be impor-
tant because the larger it is, the more lenders it will
attract. This ratio is not very suitable as a tool to
detect liquidity problems; it is more useful in assessing a
country's overall risk in international financial markets.
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4. The Growth Rate of Exports
This indicator's name makes its meaning self-evident.
Since country risk bears a direct relationship to the
availability of foreign exchange, one must consider the
growth rate of exports, normally the most important factor
in such availability. A country whose exports of goods and
services are rapidly growing is more likely to earn the
revenues required to service its debt. Its economy will be
competitive if it is able to generate continuous growth in
its export volume. This ratio should be averaged by
including growth rates over several years.
Countries whose ratio is over 5% perform well in
international markets. However, a country's export perfor-
mance must always be qualified by its export structure;
diversified structures that grow are better than those
relying on a few commodities.
5. The Ratio of International Reserves to Imports
This ratio is sometimes referred to as the "liquidity
ratio," relating a country's currency reserves to its
imports. It also indicates short-term liquidity problems,
and as such, measures the country's ability to pay for its
imports with current liquid assets. Normally, this figure
is expressed as one month's coverage, though some re-
searchers express it as the number of months for which
reserves are available, given the value of a country's
import bill.	 Generally, the availability of less than
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three months reserves is risky, but reserves sufficient to
cover three months of imports is satisfactory. A country's
total international reserves includes its gold holdings,
special drawing rights, reserve position in the IMF, and
foreign exchange holdings. Imports must be estimated with
an average of at least the past six months, unless the
country shows extreme seasonal volatility.
This ratio clearly focuses on the short end of a coun-
try's external liabilities. On the other hand, it omits
the interest and principal payments needed to service its
external debt. The ratio is not very effective for smaller
countries because they do not have typical export/import
foundations.
6. The Ratio of Imports to GNP
Imports are the principal cause of foreign exchange
expenditure. Thus it is essential to determine their
volume, their trends, and their constitution. The use of
this ratio reflects an attempt to indicate the degree to
which national income growth will be affected should a
country have to reduce its import bill in response to debt-
servicing difficulties. The higher this ratio is, the
greater the likelihood of rescheduling because the country
is more likely to be dependent on imports to sustain
production and thus economic growth.
Since in many LDCs, capital and intermediate goods
comprise a large proportion of imports, this ratio tends to
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reflect a degree of rigidity because import reductions
imply lower real growth and high unemployment.
7. Per Capita GNP
Per capita GNP is an indicator of a country's living
standards. The higher it is, the greater the consumption
of non-essential items, which allows greater flexibility in
adjusting consumption patterns to any debt-servicing dif-
ficulties. Countries with low per capita incomes do not
have such flexibility and are thus more likely to re-
schedule their debts.
One important shortcoming with this measure is that it
gives no indication of a country's distribution of income.
Often, countries with high per capita income may have a
narrow distribution of wealth and are more subject to class
tensions and potential conflict, while those with lower but
more evenly distributed incomes possess a more stable
social environment.
8. The Ratio of Debt Amortization to External Debt
This indicator was first introduced by Frank and
dine, 5 who argued that the inverse of this ratio repre-
sented the average maturity of a country's external debt.
A low value of this ratio suggests a predominance of long-
term liabilities, which may indicate that there is little
short-run flexibility in reducing debt commitments by
reducing temporarily any overseas borrowing. The ratio is
helpful in identifying potential difficulties associated
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with the bunching of maturities. Such a phenomenon may not
cause debt-servicing problems if the country is able to
earn relatively substantial amounts of foreign exchange
from the import of goods and services, attract large
amounts of capital through direct investment or new loans,
or rely on its large foreign exchange reserves. Moreover,
the absence of short-term liabilities may suggest that a
country does not have access to short-term capital markets,
and is not deemed "creditworthy."
Finally, this ratio and the debt service ratio are not
independent of each other because amortization enters the
numerators of both. dine6 argued that the ratio
represents the rate of amortization and is inversely
related to the probability of rescheduling, because for any
given debt service ratio, a high rate of amortization will
reduce the probability of rescheduling.
9. Compressibility of Imports Ratio
This ratio assumes that imports can always be com-
pressed to a certain extent in order to save foreign
exchange. One can thus analyze and divide the import side
into basic needs such as energy, raw materials, investment
goods, and luxury goods. Luxury goods can be easily elim-
inated when a country has financial problems, but basic
needs cannot. Someone not from a particular country will
have difficulty measuring the compressibility ratio; but
one can generally assume that a country experiencing some
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difficulties can usually compress its imports by about 25%
without serious trouble. Such compression cannot be of
long duration because of counterproductive shortages in
some sectors.
Review of Some Empirical Studies
Frank & dine
The first major study of a quantitative approach to
country-risk assessment was that of Frank and dine.7
Frank and dine used discriminant analysis to explore the
ability of eight economic indicators to identify potential
debt-servicing difficulties. Discriminant analysis is a
statistical method of developing a linear combination of
explanatory variables which optimally discriminates between
two (or more) groups. Based on a country's discrixninant
score (its value for this optimal linear combination of
explanatory variables), the country may be assigned to one
of the groups--in this case, either to the debt-servicing-
difficulties group or to the no-difficulties group.
Using the earlier work of Avrainovic, 8 Frank and dine
selected the following variables: (1) debt service ratio,
(2) index of export fluctuations, (3) non-compressible
imports/total imports, (4) imports/GNP, (5) imports/
reserves, (6) amortization/debt, (7) per capita income, and
(8) growth rate of exports.
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These indicators were tested on a binary-valued de-
pendent variable defined as rescheduling vs. non-
rescheduling cases. The sample contained 145 observations,
including 13 rescheduling cases and 132 non-rescheduling
cases, covering the period 1960-1968.
Frank and dine's first step consisted of a discrim-
inant analysis using all eight indicators to attempt to
select those which were most significantly related to
debt-servicing difficulties. Though they realized that the
standard linear regression test of the coefficients was not
strictly appropriate because of distributional problems,
they used it as a gross measure "to obtain some notion of
the relative importance of the variables." Applying this
test to each of the eight coefficients, they found that
three (debt service ratio, imports/reserves, and
amortization/debt) were significant at the .05 level.
Frank and dine then used iterated linear discriininant
functions to test whether these three variables were
capable of predicting debt rescheduling. In the first step
of their analysis, they assumed a linear discriminant
function with equal covariance matrices. They discovered
that through the first iteration, the model committed a
Type I error (when a rescheduling country is predicted to
be non-rescheduling) in 23% of the cases, and a Type II
error (when a non-rescheduling country is predicted to be
rescheduling) in 11% of the cases, for a total error rate
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TabLe 5.1: FRANK AND CLINE: PREDICTION ERRORS BASED OW DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS
Type I
	
Type II	 Total
Errors	 Errors	 Errors
N/13	 %	 N/132	 %	 N/145	 Z
3-VariabLe Case.Lineara
Iteration 1
	 3	 23.1	 14	 10.6	 17	 11.7
Iteration 10	 1	 7.7	 25	 19.9	 26	 17.9
2-Variable Case.Linearb
Iteration 1
	 1	 7.7	 17	 12.8	 18	 12.4
Iteration 10	 0	 0.0	 26	 19.7	 26	 17.9
3-VariabLe Case.Quadratica	 1	 7.7	 21	 15.8	 22	 15.2
2-Variable Case.Ouadraticb	 0	 0.0	 12	 9.0	 12	 8.3
Note. Iteration 1 assunes equal covariances for the two groups;
Iteration 10 allows for unequal covariance structure.
(a) Significant variables (p < .05; 2-tailed t-test):
debt service ratio
imports/reserves
amortization/debt
(b) Significant variables (p < .05; 2-tailed t-test):
debt service ratio,
amortization/debt
of 12%. By the tenth iteration, where the assumption of
unequal covariance structure is incorporated in the linear
function, these error rates became 8%, 20%, and 18%,
respectively (see Table 5.1).
They then re-estimated the linear discriminant
function excluding the imports/reserves ratio. For this
2-variable case at the first iteration, the Type I error
rate was 8%, the Type II error rate, 13%, and the total
error rate, 12%. By the tenth iteration these rates had
changed to 0%, 20%, and 18%, respectively.
Frank and dine then repeated the entire process using
quadratic functions, which for the 3-variable case,
produced 8% Type I errors, 16% Type II errors, and a total
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error rate of 15%. The 2-variable case was better, produc-
ing no Type I errors and 9% Type II errors, for a total
error rate of 8%. This case had the lowest error rate of
all those tested.
Although Frank and dine had some success with their
discriminant model, they did no out-of-sample test of its
predictive power.
Feder & Just
In 1977, Gerson Feder and Richard E. Just9 attempted
to improve upon the methods used by previous studies in
analyzing debt-servicing difficulties. Instead of discrim-
inant analysis, they chose another technique developed for
dealing with the binary-valued dependent variable case,
called logit analysis. 1 ° According to Feder and Just,
discriininant analysis assumes two completely different
populations and thus implies that a country suddenly
becomes a member of the other group when it reschedules.
They argue, however, that rescheduling takes place after
the combined effect of certain economic variables reaches
some critical threshold level. Based on this argument,
Feder and Just believe that discriminant analysis lacks
behavioral support and logit analysis is more appropriate
for determining when a country will reach this threshold.
The logit approach is especially suitable when several
observations (for both default and non-default years) for a
given country are included.
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Logit analysis assumes that the probability that a
country will reschedule its external debt is related logis-
tically to a set of economic variables. This logistic
model is converted to a linear regression model by a log
transformation. Thus, the new linearized model can
determine which of the economic variables and their
interactions are significantly related to the dependent
variable, degree of debt-servicing difficulty. In fact,
logit analysis may be considered an analog of the analysis
of variance for a qualitative dependent variable.
Logit analysis provides both an indication of which
variables contribute significantly to the explanation of
the dependent variable and a means of generating an
implicit probability'of rescheduling. However, in order to
predict future performance, it is necessary to decide upon
a cutoff probability point. If a country's probability of
rescheduling is above the cutoff, rescheduling is
predicted; if below, then nonrescheduling is predicted.
How one determines this cutoff is based on the relative
cost of each of the two kinds of error. Clearly, if the
cutoff is set too low, there will be a relatively large
number of Type II errors; if it is set too high, there will
be a relatively large number of Type I errors.
Donogh C. McDonald11 stated that "By a cut-off rate
is meant that probability of rescheduling which is chosen
as a critical value above which countries will be taken to
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be rescheduling candidates. In the literature, the choice
of cut-off values is based on analysis of the errors using
different values. Presumably, in real world applications,
this choice would be made in light of costs of type I and
type II errors and their likely frequency. Of course, the
fact that one rule performed well in sample does not mean
it will be the best out of sample."
Feder and Just analyzed 21 cases of debt rescheduling
in 11 countries and 217 non-rescheduling cases for a total
of 238 observations from 41 countries, from 1965 to 1972.
They examined nine economic indicators of debt servicing
capacity. Seven were the same as those used by Frank and
dine: debt service ratio, export fluctuations index,
imports/GNP, imports/reserves, amortization/debt, per
capita income, growth rate of exports. The measure of non-
compressible imports was not used. The two additional
indicators were capital inflows/debt-service payments and
growth of per capita domestic product.
Of the nine economic indicators tested, six were
significantly (p < .05; 1-sided t-test) related to debt
servicing capacity: imports/reserves, amortization/debt,
debt service ratio (also found significant by Frank and
dine), as well as export growth rate, per capita income,
and capital inflows/debt service. The authors argued that,
because these variables include indicators of short- as
well as long-term capacity, "the probability of default
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thus appears to depend not only on the circumstances
prevailing immediately before the year on which a forecast
is being made, but also on trends based on a relatively
long period of time preceding the forecast."12
Feder and Just used the regression coefficients gener-
ated by the model to calculate the implied probabilities of
default and adopted a rule of thumb for extending credit
which uses a critical probability value, P. Thus, all
countries with probability greater than P are denied
credit because they are expected to default, while those
with probability less that ? are granted loans because
they are not expected to default.
For any critical probability P, there are two
possible types of error: a Type I error occurs when a coun-
try's predicted probability of default is lower than P,
(default is not predicted), but it does default; a Type II
error occurs when a country's predicted probability of
default is greater than ? (default is predicted), but it
does not default.
For the nine values of P tested, there were never
more than 1]. predictive errors (4.6%) made out of a total
of 238 observations. In addition, when P = .4, only six
errors (2.5%) were produced in the five-predictors case and
nine errors (3.8%), in the six-predictors case (see Table
5.2).
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TabLe 5.2: FEDER & JUST: PREDCT!ON ERRORS BASED ON 1.0011 AALYS1S
Five Variable Casea	 Six Variable caseb
	
Type 1	 Type 11	 Total	 Type I	 Type II	 Total
	
Errors	 Errors	 Errors	 Errors	 Errors	 Errors
	
N121	 X	 /217	 %	 N/238	 %	 N/21	 %	 N/217	 %	 N/238	 %
	
.1	 0	 0.0	 10	 4.6	 10	 4.2	 0	 0.0	 11	 5.1	 11	 4.6
	
.2	 0	 0.0	 6	 2.8	 6	 2.5	 1	 4.8	 8	 3.7	 9	 3.8
	
.3	 1	 4.8	 6	 2.8	 7	 2.9	 2	 9.5	 7	 3.2	 9	 3.8
	
.4	 1	 4.8	 5	 2.3	 6	 2.5	 3	 14.3	 6	 2.8	 9	 3.8
	
.5	 2	 9.5	 4	 1.8	 6	 2.5	 4	 19.0	 6	 2.8	 10	 4.2
	
.6	 3	 14.3	 4	 1.8	 7	 2.9	 4	 19.0	 2	 .9	 6	 2.5
	
.7	 5	 23.8	 1	 .5	 6	 2.5	 5	 23.8	 1	 .5	 6	 2.5
	
.8	 5	 23.8	 1	 .5	 6	 2.5	 6	 28.6	 .5	 7	 2.9
	.9	 7	 33.3	 1	 .5	 8	 3.4	 8	 38.1.	 1.	 3
(a) Significant variables (p < .075; 1-taiLed t-test):
debt service ratio
i npor t s/reserves
per capita income
capital inflow/debt service
export growth rate
(b) Significant variables (p < .05; 1-taiLed t-test):
debt service ratio
imports/reserves
per capita income
capital inflows/debt service
export growth rate
amortization/debt
Feder, Just, & Ross
In 1981, Feder, Just, and Ross 13 extended their
previous logit analysis study. They expanded the database
to cover the years 1965 to 1976 and to include 56 coun-
tries. Of their 580 total observations, rescheduling
occurred in 40. Countries that "voluntarily" rescheduled
were not included in the sample. Six variables (debt
service ratio, GNP/US GNP, reserves/imports, exports/GNP,
commercial foreign exchange inflows/debt service, non-
commercial foreign exchange inflows/debt service) were used
in the study. All were found to be significant. Feder,
Just, and Ross also tried a quadratic version of their
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model.	 In this version, three of the squared variables
(debt	 service	 ratio,	 reserves/imports,	 commercial
inflows/debt service) were also found to be significant.
The error rates for this study are presented in Table
5.3. With a cut-off probability of .1, the rate for both
Type I and Type II errors for the linear model was about
8%. With P = .2, the error rates were 20% and 6%,
respectively. The performance of the quadratic model was
somewhat better, with Type I and Type II error rates of
about 8% for P = .1, and 15% and 5%, respectively, for P
= .2.
It would appear that the discriminatory performance of
the Feder and Just logit approach is quite good; the
highest total error rate for the original study was 4.6%
and for the later study, 8.8%. In the later study, where
an out-of-sample validation test was used, the predictive
power of the model was also demonstrated to be quite high.
Table 5.3 also presents the error rates for the out-of-
sample predictions.
Mayo & Barrett
Mayo and Barrett 14 did an extensive study for
Exiinbank, designing an early warning system built on the
earlier work of both Frank and dine and Feder and Just.
Their model extended the application of logit analysis by
enlarging the sample to include more countries and a longer
time period. The database included 50 basic variables for
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TabLe 5.3: FEDER, JUST, & ROSS: PREDICTION ERRORS BASED ON 10611 ANALYSIS
Devetopsent SanLe (1965-76)
ModeL 1 (Linear)a	 ModeL 2 (Quadratic)b
*	 Type I	 Type II	 Total	 Type I	 Type II	 TotaL
P	 Errors	 Errors	 Errors	 Errors	 Errors	 Errors
P1/40	 %	 P1/540	 %	 N/580	 %	 P1/40	 %	 P1/540	 %	 P1/580	 %
	
.1	 3	 7.5	 48	 8.9	 51	 8.8	 3	 7.5	 43	 7.9	 46	 7.9
	
.2	 8	 20.0	 32	 5.9	 40	 6.9	 6	 15.0	 27	 5.0	 33	 5.7
	
.3	 12	 30.0	 16	 3.0	 28	 4.8	 10	 25.0	 16	 3.0	 26	 4.5
	
.4	 15	 37.5	 11	 2.0	 26	 4.5	 13	 32.5	 11	 2.0	 24	 4.1
	
.5	 18	 45.0	 6	 1.1	 24	 4.1	 13	 32.5	 6	 1.1	 18	 3.1
	
.6	 21	 52.5	 6	 1.1	 27	 4.7	 13	 32.5	 6	 1.1	 18	 3.1
Validation SanLe (1977-79)
Model 1 (Linear)a	 ModeL 2 (Quadratic)b
*	
Type I
	 Type II	 TotaL	 Type I	 Type II	 TotaL
P	 Errors	 Errors	 Errors	 Errors	 Errors	 Errors
P1/10	 %	 N/125	 %	 N/135	 %	 N/1O	 %	 P1/125	 %	 P1/135	 %
	
.1	 0	 0.0	 18	 14.4	 18	 13.3	 1	 10.0	 14	 11.2	 15	 11.1
	
.2	 1	 10.0	 15	 12.0	 16	 11.9	 1	 10.0	 11	 8.8	 12	 8.9
	
.3	 1	 10.0	 13	 10.4	 14	 10.4	 2	 20.0	 10	 8.0	 12	 8.9
	
.4	 2	 20.0	 11	 8.8	 13	 9.6	 3	 30.0	 6	 4.8	 9	 6.7
	
.5	 2	 20.0	 10	 8.0	 12	 8.9	 3	 30.0	 6	 4.8	 9	 6.7
	
.6	 5	 50.0	 10	 8.0	 15	 11.1	 4	 40.0	 5	 4.0	 9	 6.7
(a) Significant Variables (p < .10; 1-tailed t-test)
Debt service ratio
GNP/US GNP
Reserves/ ilT,orts
Exports/GNP
ComerciaL foreign exchange inflows/debt service
Non-coninerciat foreign exchange inflows/debt service
(b) Additional Significant VriabLes (p < .10; 1-taiLed t-test)
(Debt service ratt)
(Reserves/inorts)
(Comercia( inflows/debt service>
48 countries and covered the years from 1960-1975.
Twenty-eight reschedulings were included among the total
571 cases. The number of variables is substantially higher
than that for the other two studies. Mayo and Barrett
examined alternative measures of debt-servicing difficulty,
in addition to formal multilateral reschedulings (such as
Eximbank reschedulings and claims), and made the model
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prospective. Thus the model was intended to predict dif-
ferent types of debt-servicing difficulty five years into
the future, making unnecessary the need to project or lag
the explanatory variables (as was the case in the previous
two studies).
Mayo and Barrett used six variables in the final re-
estimated logit model: disbursed debt outstanding/exports,
international reserves/imports, gross fixed capital
formation/GDP, imports/GDP, reserve position in the
IMF/imports, and rate of increase in consumer prices. This
model produced a 25% Type I error rate and a 13% Type II
error rate.
dine
William dine, 15 in a study which utilized the idea of
a disequilibrium in the market for international credit,
explained external debt rescheduling with a theory of
credit rationing, dine says:
It is useful to interpret debt reschedul-
ing . . . as the consequence of a disequilibrium
that occurs in the international credit market
when the amount the country seeks to borrow .
exceeds the amount that foreign banks are
prepared to supply at the upper ceiling interest
rate. The international credit market thus fails
to clear. A non-market solution must be
established, and is arrived at in a bargaining
process: debt rescheduling.
He continues:
in the bargaining context of rescheduling,
the borrowers will reach an agreement . . . if
the borrower's leverage is high the full
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amount . . . will tend to be covered by the
extension of new, involuntary lending and
postponement of maturities otherwise due. If the
lender's leverage is stronger, a smaller
portion . . . will be covered and the country
will be forced to take additional painful
measures.
dine notes the importance of whether rescheduling
will be demanded, supplied, or both. Any force that shifts
the demand-for-capital curve outward to the right will tend
to increase the probability that rescheduling will be
required. On the other hand, factors tending to shift the
supply curve of international credit to the left raise the
probability that disequilibrium will occur between the
amount of international capital demanded and supplied,
leading to a rescheduling (see the diagram in Figure 3.1).
To summarize, dine's study divided rescheduling indi-
cators into either demand- or supply-related, although some
were considered both. His logit model used data from 58
countries for the period between 1967-82. During that time
there were 22 cases of debt rescheduling. Of the variables
tested, the debt service ratio, reserves to imports, and
LDC borrowings to imports were the most significant.
Errors ranged from 9% to 13% (see Table 5.4).
Sargen
Nicholas Sargen 16 made use of two conceptual
approaches to analyze past debt reschedulings in his dis-
criminant analysis study. The first is the debt service
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TabLe 5.4: CLINE: PREDICTION ERRORS BASED ON LOGIT ANALYSIS
Model A	 Model B	 ModeL C	 Model D	 ModeL E
Nuiter of Observations	 640	 640	 670	 670	 574
Nuier of RescheduLings	 22	 22	 22	 22	 20
Errors
Type 1	 2	 9.1%	 4 18.2%	 2	 9.1%	 3 13.6%	 2 10.0%
Type II	 84 13.6% 90 14.6% 84 13.0%	 104 16.1% 69 12.5%
TotaL	 86 13.4% 94 14.7%	 86 12.8%	 107 16.0%	 71 12.4%
Demand Side Variables
Reserves/inports	 *	 *	 *	 *	 *
Growth rate (income)	 *	 *	 *	 *	 *
Squared CAX	 *	 ns	 *	 *
Debt service ratio	 *	 -	 *	 -	 *
GDP	 ns	 ns	 -	 .	 -
Supply Side Variables
Amortization/debt	 *	 .	 *	 *
LDC borrowing/inorts	 *	 *	 *	 *	 *
Net debt/exports	 -	 *	 -	 *	 -
Inflation index	 *	 *	 -	 -	 -
Savings/GNP	 *	 ns	 -	 -
Export growth rate	 -	 -	 -
* = Significant at p < .05 using a 2-tailed t-test; ns = not significant; - = not used.
approach, similar to that of other studies, which assumes
that reschedulings arise from fluctuations in export
earnings that lead to a rapid accumulation of external
debt. For this approach, Sargen used variables identified
in previous empirical studies: debt service ratio, export
growth rate (in U.S. dollars), and the growth rate of real
GNP.
Sargen's second approach treated rescheduling as a
monetary phenomenon; it assumed that inflation and an over-
valued exchange rate increase the demand for imports and
cause export stagnation, which in turn leads to a rapid
build-up of external debt. Here he used the above three
variables, as well as the (consumer price) inflation rate,
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the growth rate of the Ml money supply, and a measure of
relative purchasing-power parity (the difference between
the domestic and U.S. inflation rates on a wholesale price
basis, less the rate of domestic currency depreciation
vis-a-vis the U.S. dollar). All these explanatory
variables were expressed as three-year annual averages,
using data from 1960-1975 for 44 countries, totaling 466
observations. Twenty-four debt rescheduling cases and 442
non-rescheduling cases were included. Depending on the
cut-off value selected for the discriminant function, the
percentage of cases incorrectly classified ranged from 3%
to 11%. The Type I error rate varied from 15% to 54%, and
the Type II error rate ranged from 1% to 11%. At a cut-off
of 0, Sargen found a 33% Type I error rate, an 8% Type II
error rate, and a 9% total error rate.
Saini and Bates
Krishan Saini and Philip Bates, 17 in their study of
the statistical techniques used to determine debt servicing
capacity, attempted to test the validity of some of the
previous test results. Their work differed from that of
the others in four major respects. First, they tested a
modified dependent variable, in addition to the traditional
binary-valued dependent variable of rescheduling and non-
rescheduling cases. Second, they also tested several non-
debt variables which serve as proxies for the debt-related
indicators prevalent in earlier studies. 	 Third, results
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from discriminant and logit analysis were compared with
theirs, to examine their relative merits as explanations of
past balance-of-payments difficulties. Fourth, their
sample period was divided into two intervals in order to
test for structural shifts in the parameters of the func-
tions evaluated.
Saini and Bates conducted tests on two types of bi-
nary-valued dependent variables which can be used to rep-
resent a country's difficulties in servicing its external
debt.	 The first variation examined official debt re-
scheduling vs. non-rescheduling cases. This dependent
variable has been used in all the major statistical studies
of country-risk evaluation and contains 22 rescheduling
observations for 12 countries over the 1960-1977 period.
The second variation consists of 23 cases of involuntary
debt reschedulings or balance-of-payment support loans
(without which rescheduling would have been necessary) vs.
voluntary reschedulings and countries without apparent
balance-of-payment problems.
Saini and Bates used 11 explanatory variables:
1) Imports/reserves
2) Per capita GDP
3) Consumer Price Index
4) Iinports/GDP
5) Money supply growth rate
6) Export growth rate, averaged over three years
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7) Debt service ratio
8) Current-account balance minus (plus) increase
(decrease) in reserves/exports
9) 5-year cumulative current-account balance minus
(plus) increase (decrease) in reserves/exports-
in-the-latest-year
10) Net foreign assets of banking system/money supply
11) Growth rate of international reserves
The first seven variables were also significant in earlier
studies.	 The last four variables were included because
they provide information on external debt.
The authors conducted both discriminant and logit
analyses for three time intervals (1960-77, 1960-70,
1971-77) and came to several conclusions.	 (a) No
significant differences were observed in the error rates
and coefficient values generated by the discriminant and
logit functions.	 (b) The modified dependent variable
appears to be more useful in identiyfing countries with
debt-servicing problems than the traditional dependent
variable. (c) The consumer price index, money supply
growth, cumulative current-account balance to exports
ratio, and international reserve growth consistently
exhibited the greatest explanatory ability. (d) The debt
service ratio, without adjustment, is virtually useless in
isolating debt-servicing problems.	 (e) The explanatory
variables seem to be more effective in isolating debt-
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servicing problems during the 1971-77 sub-period than
during the 1960-70 sub-period. The 1971-77 sub-period
included most of the modifications in the dependent
variable. (f) Although error rates obtained in this study
were higher than those of other studies, this difference
was attributable to methodological differences in the
selection of data entries.
Table 5.5 presents a summary of the Saini and Bates
results. The total error rates for the modified dependent
variable for the period 1960-77 were 15.4% for the
discriminant model and 19.1% for the logit model, compared
with 18.5% and 19.2%, respectively, for the traditional
dependent variable. For the period 1971-77, the error
rates for the modified dependent variable were 9.7% for
both the discriminant and logit models, while those for the
traditional dependent variable were 5.8% for the
discriminant model and 7.5% for the logit model.
Saini and Bates believe that logit analysis is
generally superior to discriininant analysis for
investigating binary-valued dependent variable cases.
Morgan
In 1985, John B. Morgan 8 conducted both logit and
discriminant analyses of debt rescheduling. Nine economic
indicators were used in the models. New short-term debt
data were included to give a better indication of the in-
debtedness of the developing countries, and variables
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TabLe 5.5: SAINI & BATES: PREDICTION ERRORS BASED ON DISCRIMINANT AND LOGIT ANALYSES
Discriminant	 Logit
AnaLysis	 Analysis
Type I Type II TotaL
	 Type I Type II Total
Errors Errors Errors
	 Errors Errors Errors
Time Period 1960-1977
Dependent Variable 1
NuTer of Errors	 4/22 50/270 54/292 7/22 49/270 56/292
Error Rate	 18.1% 18.5%
	 18.5%	 31.8% 18.1%	 19.2%
Dependent Variable 2
Nurer of Errors
	 4/23 42/275 46/298 4/23 53/275 57/298
Error Rate
	 17.4% 15.3% 15.4%	 17.4% 19.3%	 19.1%
Modified Procedure
Nuig,er of Errors	 3/23 10/136 13/159	 2/23	 14/136 16/159
Error Rate
	 13.0%	 7.4%	 8.2%	 8.7% 10.3%	 10.1%
Time Period 1971-1977
Dependent VariabLe 1
Nunber of Errors	 5/11 5/162	 10/173	 5/11	 8/162 13/173
Error Rate	 45.5%	 3.1%	 5.8%	 45.5%	 4.9% 7.5%
Dependent VariabLe 2
Nuiter of Errors	 2/12 10/112 12/124
	 1/12	 11/112 12/124
Error Rate	 167% 8.9%
	 9.7%	 8.3% 9.8%	 9.7%
Dependent Variable 1: rescheduLing vs. non-rescheduling
Dependent Variable 2: balance-of-payments support loans and involuntary reschedulings
vs. voluntary rescheduling and nonrescheduling cases.
The modified procedure replicates the procedure used by Feder arid Iust.
representing economic shocks were used to capture changes
in the world economy since the first oil price change in
1974. All indicators were lagged one year.
The 30-country database, accounting for 88% of the
debt of the developing countries, covered the period from
1975-1982. The total sample contained 240 observations, 40
of which were debt rescheduling cases. Thus, this study
had a larger number of debt rescheduling cases than any
previous study.
Two logit models were developed to estimate the proba-
bility of a country's rescheduling. Model A included two
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of the shock variables (real GDP growth and bank lending),
the exports to imports ratio, and two debt measures
(current debt service ratio and amortization rate). Model
B contained three of the shock variables (real GDP growth,
bank lending, and interest rate sensitivity indicator), the
reserves to imports ratio, and two debt indicators (total
debt to exports ratio and short-term debt to imports
ratio).
All variables in Model A were significant at the .05
level, except for the exports to imports ratio, which was
siqaificant at the .20 level. The current debt service
ratio was the most significant variable in this model.
Amortization rate was negatively related to debt re-
scheduling, as was the case in the Feder and Just study.
Four of the indicators in Model B (reserves to imports
ratio, total debt to exports ratio, bank lending, and real
GDP growth) were significant at the .05 level. The
interest rate sensitivity indicator was significant at the
.10 level, and the short-term debt to imports ratio was
insignificant. Total debt to exports ratio was the most
significant variable in Model B.
A discriminant analysis was carried out for the vari-
ables in Model B. Total debt to exports ratio and real GDP
growth rate were the most significant variables in the
discriminant model, followed by bank lending and reserves
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TabLe 5.6: MORGAN: COMPARISON OF DISCRIMINANT AND LOCh MELS
Model A	 Model B
Logit	 Logit	 Discriminant
Type I Errors	 6/40	 15.0%	 6/60	 15.0%	 6/40	 15.0%
Type II Errors	 30/200	 15.0%	 26/200	 13.0% 27/200	 13.5%
Total Errors	 36/240	 15.0%	 32/240	 13.3% 33/240	 13.8%
Cutoff Point	 .16	 .16	 -.
NOTE: Cutoff point chosen to equalize Type I and Type II error rates
Variables Used
Model A:
	
current debt service ratio
amortization rate
real GOP growth rate
bank lending
exports/iorts
Model B: total debt/exports
real GOP growth rate
bank lending
reserves/irTportS
interest rate sensitivity indicator
short-term debt/inorts
to imports ratio. Thus, the results of the discriminant
analysis confirmed those of the logit analysis for Model B.
The predictive performance of the two functions for
the Model B variables was also very similar. Both the
logit and discriminant functions committed six Type I
errors, and the same six rescheduling countries were erro-
neously predicted to be non-rescheduling by both models.
The discriminant model produced 27 Type II errors, while
the logit model produced 26, and 22 of the countries for
which these errors were made overlapped for the two models.
The predictive performance of the Model A logit function
and both Model B functions is shown in Table 5.6.
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In general, the differences between the discriminant
and logit models were slight. They identified the same
important variables and had essentially the same discrim-
inatory power.
Dhonte
Pierre Dhonte19 used yet another approach, the
principal components technique, to analyze the ability of
countries to service their external debt. This technique
condenses the information contained in a large set of
variables by constructing a new set of variables that
contains, in the aggregate, all of the information in the
original set. The reason for so doing is that the new
variables (components), each of which is a linear
combination of the original variables, can be ordered in
terms of the amount of information they contain. Thus, the
first few components will contain most of the information
in the larger original set of variables. The remaining
components can be ignored because they add little to the
information captured by the first few components.2°
Dhonte analyzed 12 cases of debt rescheduling between
1959 and 1971, comparing them with a sample of 69 non-
rescheduling countries. The indicators for the re-
scheduling countries were lagged one year; those for the
non-rescheduling countries were taken as of 1969. On
examining ten indicators which, with one exception, contain
debt information, Dhonte found that four (net trans-
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fers/imports, debt disbursement/imports, external
debt/exports, and external debt/GNP) were the most signif-
icant for the first principal component, explaining
approximately 35% of the variation in the sample data. In
the second principal component, explaining another 18% of
the variation, he found that two other indicators (debt-
service payments/debt disbursement and debt-service
payments/external debt ratios) were the most significant.
Overall, he succeeded in summarizing 77% of the variation
in the sample data with only 4 principal components.
Dhonte has proposed the existence of two equilibrium
conditions. The first is a trade-off between a country's
"involvement" in external debt and the terms of the debt
itself. In other words, a country with a very high
external debt suddenly faced with a rapid increase in
interest rates or a sudden decline in export earnings is
likely to experience a debt management crisis. The second
is that increases in external debt should be kept in line
with the growth of exports. The first equilibrium con-
dition was given some support by the results of his study.
The second equilibrium condition could not be tested.
Most of the criticism of Dhonte's study has revolved
around reducing the dimensionality of the data set because
such a reduction is not very useful unless some meaning can
be given to the constructed variables. Dhonte attempted to
assign meaning to the first two principal components by
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using them as coordinates to plot his sample rescheduling
observations. According to the first equilibrium con-
dition, the first quadrant of this graph represents the
critical region in which heavy external debt is made worse
with unfavorable borrowing terms (i.e., the double con-
dition in which debt rescheduling is expected to occur).
Eight of the 12 renegotiating countries fell in this
critical quadrant, with an additional one on the border,
for a 25% Type I error rate. Moreover, only 9 of the 69
non-renegotiating countries fell in this quadrant (13% Type
II error rate), whereas about twice that many would be
expected by chance.	 This represents modest support for
Dhonte's first equilibrium hypothesis. Nonetheless,
Dhonte's results are less convincing than those of either
the discriminant or the logit approaches.
Dhonte points out that his analysis does not provide
any indication of how to express quantitatively a
hypothesis relating a level of debt to its terms. More-
over, the method of attaching meaning to the components
sacrifices a good deal of information, in addition to that
lost by constructing the components. Thus, while this
technique provides useful qualitative evidence, it does not
provide a quantitative means of assessing risk.
Taff].er and Abassi
Taffler and Abassi 21 used a combination of principal
components and discritninant analyses to develop a model to
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predict whether or not a country will have serious problems
in repaying external debts to international banks and
financial agencies. The focus of the study was three-fold:
first, to develop an operational discriminant model of
country risk; next, to assess the performance of the model
when applied outside the time frame in which it was devel-
oped; arid finally, to compare the predictions of the model
with those of banker judgment, a commonly used criterion
for evaluating country loan applications.
A total of 715 observations for 72 developing coun-
tries over the period from 1967 to 1977 were used to fit
the model. They included 55 debt-rescheduling cases from
14 countries. The model was then tested by using later
data for these same countries to predict rescheduling in
1979 through 1983.
A set of 42 variables, selected either because they
were used in earlier studies or for theoretical reasons,
provided the starting point for the study. These variables
were transformed to approximate normality and subjected to
a principal components analysis. The first ten principal
components from this analysis accounted for 84 percent of
the total variation of the initial set of 42 variables. A
set of eight relatively uncorrelated variables was then
selected, representing seven of the first ten principal
components.
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TabLe 5.7: TAFFLER AND ABASSI: PREDICTIVE PERFORMANCE OF DISCRIMINANT MODEL
	
Nuiter of	 Errors
	
TotaL	 Rescheduling
Sanle	 Cases	 Type I	 Type II
	
Total
Development
San I e
1967-1977	 681	 50	 5	 10.0% 56	 8.9%	 61	 9.0%
Vat idation
SaWIe
1979	 78	 7	 3	 42.9%	 16	 22.5%	 19 24.4%
1980	 78	 7	 2 28.6% 17 23.9%	 19 24.4%
1981	 78	 12	 5	 41.7%	 15	 22.7%	 20	 25.6%
1982	 78	 24	 7 29.2% 15 27.8%	 22 28.2%
1983	 78	 23	 6 26.1% 20 36.4%	 26 33.3%
TotaL	 390	 73	 23	 31.5% 83	 26.2%	 106 27.2%
These eight variables were used to develop a discrini-
inant model of debt rescheduling. Four of the eight were
very highly	 significant	 (commitments per capita,
debt/exports, average rate of inflation, domestic
credit/gross domestic product). The principal components
represented by these four variables were wealth, external
indebtedness, external trade, and monetary policy,
respectively. The error rates from this four-variable
model were under 10% (see Table 5.7), indicating
performance on the development sample about as good as that
for prior studies.
The real test of the model, however, is its ability to
predict ex ante. For this test, the model was used to
predict the rescheduling status of a set of 78 LDCs over a
period of five years from 1979 through 1983. The total
number of observations was 390, of which 73 were re-
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scheduling cases during this period. The results of this
test are presented in Table 5.7. For all five years
combined, the Type I error rate was 31.5%, ranging from a
low of 26.1% to a high of 42.9%. The overall Type II error
rate was 26.2%, ranging from 22.5% to 36.4%. The overall
total error rate was 27.2%, ranging from 24.4% to 33.3%.
These results, of course, are not so good as those for the
development sample, but they are significantly better than
chance. Thus, the model does hold some promise as a means
of forecasting debt-service difficulties.
Finally, the model was tested vs. the judgment of
bankers, as represented by the Institutional Investor (II)
country credit index. Over the four years tested,
1980-1983, the discriminant model showed a correct classi-
fication rate of 71 percent, compared with 64 percent for
cr&ãit inäex. Thus, the dIscriininant model slightly
outperforms the II index overall and for Type I errors (29%
for the model vs. 36% for the II index). 	 The two
approaches are about the same for Type II errors (56% for
the model vs. 54% for the II index).
Taffler and Abassi believe that their model showed
true ex ante predictive ability and was quite robust to
major structural changes in the economic environment.
Nonetheless, they caution against the use of the model as a
substitute for the skills and experience of the bank loan
officer, and feel that the real benefits of such an eval-
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uative tool come as additional input to the complex
judgmental task of loan approval.
Summary
Tables 5.8 and 5.9 present summaries of the
discriminant and logit analyses discussed here. The
results of these studies all indicate some improvement in
predictability of debt-servicing difficulties using a
statistical model. There is, however, no conclusive
evidence that any one model is better than another, or that
any particular statistical approach to the problem leads to
a better model. The performance of both the discriminant-
and logit-based models was very similar. In the cases
where they were both used for the same population,
especially in Morgan's study, they generally selected the
same economic predictors and made virtually the same
predictions.
Because of the generally low predictive power of these
models, it would appear that the basic problem is in iden-
tifying economic indicators more significantly related to
debt-servicing difficulties. This problem is compounded by
the fact that the impact of these variables on whether or
not a country defaults may change with time and with shifts
in the general economic climate.
Table 5.10 presents a comparison of the performance of
discriminant and logit models in both the development and
the validation samples. 	 In both cases, the development
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TabLe 5.8: SUMMARY OF DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS STUDIES
Frank	 Saini	 Taffler
& Clinea	sargenb & BatesC	Morgand & Abassie
Period Tested	 1960-68	 1960-75	 1960-77	 1975-82	 1967-77
Nuter of
Observations	 145	 466	 159	 240	 681
Nuther of
RescheduLings	 13	 24	 22	 40	 50
Error Rates
Type 1
	 23.1%	 33.3%	 13.6%	 15.0%	 10.0%
Type 11
	
10.6%	 7.9%	 73%	 13.5%	 8.9%
Total	 11.7%	 9.2%	 8.2%	 13.8%	 9.0%
(a) 3-variable case, linear, iteration 1 (equaL covariance structure).
(b) Cut-off value of discriminant function = 0.
(c) Replicates procedure usedby Feder and Just, with modified dependent
variable.
(d) Model B.
(e) DeveLopient sample.
Significant Variables
Frank & CLine:	 Morgan:
Debt service ratio	 Total debt/exports
Amortization/debt	 Real GOP growth rate
Imports/reserves	 Bank Lending
Reserves/imports
Sargen:	 Taffler & Abassi:
Debt service ratio	 Coimiitments per capita
Inflation rate	 Debt/exports
Growth rate of exports 	 Average inflation rate
Real GNP growth rate	 Domestic credit/GOP
Purchasing-power parity
Ml growth rate
Saini & Bates:
Consuner price index
Money suppLy growth rate
Growth rate of internationaL reserves
5-yr CA - increase in reserves/exports-in-Latest-year
sample error rate is lower than that for the validation
sample, as expected, although for the logit model, the
difference is not very great. Because the discriminant and
logit models used different predictor variables (no
variables were common to the two models), their performance
cannot be directly compared.
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Table 5.9: SUMMARY OF LOGIT ANALYSIS STUDIES
Feder & Feder, Jest Mayo &
	 Sainijta	 & Ross	 Barrett	 CLineC	 & Ba tesd Morgane
Period Tested	 1965-72	 1965-76	 1960-75	 1967-82	 1960-77	 1975-82
Wuiter of
Observations	 238	 580	 571	 670	 159	 240
1uiter of
Reschedutings	 21	 40	 28	 22	 22	 40
Errors Rates
Type l
	 4.8%	 20.0%	 25.0%	 9.1%	 31.8%	 15.0%
Type ii	 2.3%	 5.9%	 13.1%	 12.9%	 18.1%	 13.0%
TotaL	 2.5%	 6.9%	 13.7%	 2.8%	 19.2%	 13.3%
p* Cutoff	 .40	 .20	 ---	 .041	 ---	 .16
(a) 5-variable case.
(b) ModeL 1 (Linear)
(C) ModeL C.
(d) Dependent Variable 1 (rescheduling vs. non-rescheduling).
(e) Model B.
Significant Variables
Feder & Just: 	 dine:
Debt service ratio	 Debt service ratio
lffports/reserves	 Reserves/iirports
Export growth rate	 Amortization/debt
Per capita income	 LDC borrowings/iirports
Capital inflows/debt service	 Per capita income growth rate
Feder, Just, & Ross:
Debt service ratio
Reserves/i Irports
Exports/GNP
GNP/US GNP
Comierciat inflows/debt service
Non-comerciat inflows/debt service
Squared (CA/exports)
Saini & Bates:
Money supply growth rate
5-yr CA - reserves increase/
exports- in- latest-year
Growth rate of international
reserves
Mayo & Barrett:	 Morgan:
Rate of consuner price increase	 Total debt/exports
International reserves/inçorts	 Real GOP growth rate
lirports/GOP	 Sank Lending
IMF reserves/ieçorts	 Reserves/irrports
Disbursed debt outstanding/exports 	 Interest rate sensitivity
Gross fixed capital formation/GOP
Perhaps the most insightful critique of statistical
models of sovereign risk analysis is that of Shelagh A.
Ref fernan. 22
 Ref fernan raises several points, the first of
which relates to the use of rescheduling as a proxy for
default on external debt by a sovereign borrower.
- 209 -
TabLe 5.10: PERFORMANCE OF DEVELOPMENT AND VALIDATION SAMPLES
Taffter & Abassi	 Feder, Just, & ROSSa
AnaLytic Method
	
Discriminant	 Logit
DeveLopment	 Validation DeveLopment	 VaLidation
Period Tested	 1967-77	 1979-83	 1965-76	 1977-79
NuTter of
Observations	 681	 390	 580	 135
Number of
Reschedutings	 50	 73	 40	 10
Error Rates
Type I
	
10.0%	 31.5%	 20.0%	 10.0%
Type II
	
8.9%	 26.2%	 5.9%	 12.0%
Total	 9.0%	 27.2%	 6.9%	 11.9%
(a) ModeL 1 (linear); P* = .2.
Heffernan disagrees with the implicit assumption that
rescheduling is bad for the lender. His preliminary
research in 1985 convinced him that many of the
reschedulings that took place in the 1980s may have
benefited both lender and borrower.
Second, Heffernan disagrees with the implied direction
of causality in the models, which runs from the explanatory
variables to the probability of rescheduling. He believes
that causality is highly likely to run in both directions.
Third, Heffernan suspects that the models suffer from
serious problems of multicollinearity. He questions
whether many of the explanatory variables found to be
statistically significant in a given study are in fact
independent of each other. Lack of independence means that
it is not possible to identify the relative importance of
the different explanatory variables.
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More seriously, the variables seem to be highly
sensitive to particular sets of sample data, which may
explain the wide variety of variables that have been found
to be significant over past studies.
The fundamental problem of all of these models is that
they provide no underlying supply-and-demand framework for
sovereign loans. Heffernan believes that estimating the
probability of default or rescheduling based on a number of
economic variables is putting the cart before the horse.
Without the underlying framework, there is no fundamental
understanding of why there is international sovereign
borrowing and lending, and consequently of why rescheduling
or outright repudiation occurs. Once the key determinants
of supply and demand for sovereign loans are identified, it
will be possible to pinpoint the factors contributing to
their riskiness.
Management of Country Exposure
One of the principal reasons that international banks
should analyze country risk is to establish exposure limits
for individual countries. For such an analysis to be
useful, its scope and content must be framed with an eye on
the specific (actual or contemplated) foreign assets (or
liabilities) at risk and the bank's other business
activities. The volume and maturity of such assets must be
measured often and reported efficiently, so that the
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officers responsible for the portfolio can respond to new
information.
Nevertheless, the total volume of assets must be dili-
gently monitored and aggregated. This total provides the
single most important piece of information on the risk a
bank is taking with a given country. The bank's total
exposure level is needed to evaluate the significance of
trends and anticipated difficulties; its figures must be
accurate and available virtually instantaneously. Further-
more, highly efficient exposure measurement and reporting
schemes and interbank communication are necessary to this
larger aggregate picture in order to make it operationally
useful. Using such country exposure limits, the bank can
apply its results to advance specific business goals.
Country exposure applies to the risks associated with
the geographical location of a bank's business activities.
Depending on the scope and magnitude of its overseas port-
folio, the bank's balance sheet and the portfolio's quality
can be vulnerable to losses caused by adverse political or
economic events. This exposure is often of a cross-border
(or foreign currency) nature, which can increase
difficulties in loan repayment.
The bank's size and the extent to which it is involved
in international activities have a considerable impact on
the number and types of factors which create country
exposure. Generally, the larger the bank and the greater
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the scope of its international operations, the more likely
it is to have a wide variety of balance-sheet and off-
balance-sheet components. Conversely, the smaller the bank
and the narrower the scope of its international activities,
the more likely it is to limit its exposure to traditional
balance-sheet items.
In 1977, the Association of Reserve City Bankers
(ARCB) conducted a study involving two questionnaires.23
The first inquired about the size and scope of each bank's
international operations and their general reporting pro-
cedures, the second sought to define, for exposure measure-
ment purposes, treatment of the various types of asset-
acquIsitIon and off-balance-sheet transactions.
According to the ARCB survey, the determination of
what is included as country exposure and how this exposure
is disaggregated are a function of two principal factors:
(1) the materiality in volume terms of particular types of
assets and off-balance-sheet transactions to a given bank's
operation, and (2) the information requests from regulatory
authorities, boards of directors, internal auditors, etc.
One of the study's findings was that if a bank had
larger total assets, comparatively speaking, it would have
a larger percentage of assets in international activities.
This finding is particularly significant because most of
the money center banks were not large, particularly when
compared with the truly large banks. While only 9% of the
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banks had total assets in excess of $10 billion in 1975,
66% of the respondents had assets of less than $2.5
billion. Moreover, only 15% of the 119 responding banks
had more than 25% of their total assets in foreign opera-
tions, and only 3% had more than 45% tied up inter-
nationally. On the other hand, 38% of the responding banks
had tied less than 5% of their assets to international
activities, while 37% had between 5% and 15% of their
assets involved in such operations. A substantial majority
of the responding banks used formal country exposure
reporting procedures. Only 12 banks with foreign exposure
did not prepare reports on a regular basis. These banks
had international assets which were less than 5% of their
total.
The use of adequate precautions in managing inter-
national lending exposure is ultimately the responsibility
of bank officials. Their effectiveness and commitment make
up the most important element of any country-risk
management process. To assist them in effectively
maintaining the systems, the bank should create ceilings
and subceilings for each country's foreign currency
exposure. The following guidelines for making decisions on
exposure ceilings are provided by Irving S. Friedman:26
1. What are the potential in-country business oppor-
tunities?
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2. What are the risk variables inherent in the
patterns of exposure in the country?
3. What are the possible effects of anticipated
national and international events, including governmental
policies, changes, and measures which could affect
exposure?
4. What quantitative and qualitative techniques can be
applied to information potentially available to banks?
The concept of country sublimits derives from the
principle that country risk is not homogeneous within any
economy. Different borrowers are affected in different
ways by both the domestic and international events included
in the definition of country risk. A bank can better rec-
ognize these factors by the use of subceilings for dif-
ferent maturities and types of transactions. Borrowers can
then be managed individually, according to anticipated or
actual changes in country conditions.
Irving S. Friedman's step-by-step proposal for
managing such exposure is generally designed for a private
bank with branch networks or other business presence in
foreign countries. He suggested:
1. Establishment of cross-border ceilings and sub-
ceilings at the beginning of the year for each country in
which the bank books business. Where appropriate, proce-
dures may include (a) recommendation by the senior officer
in the field or at the head office responsible for
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preparing the country business budget; (b) review of
proposed ceilings by senior management at the head office;
(c) approval by executive authority within the bank
ultimately responsible for establishing ceilings or
subceilings.
2. The establishment of procedures for allocating and
re-allocating exposure ceilings and subceilings among
different lending units within the bank at home and abroad.
3. Creation of procedures to ensure that total out-
standings of the bank worldwide do not surpass established
ceilings.
4. The development of a reporting system of actual
worldwide exposure on a periodic basis.
5. Allowance for procedures to deal with changes in
ceilings and subceilings during the course of the year as
the country's conditions and outlook warrant.
6. Ongoing assessment and monitoring of country con-
ditions and outlook from the viewpoint of bank activities
in the country.
7. Identification of potential country risks--a by-
product of ongoing assessment and monitoring of country
conditions and outlook. Where appropriate, this is a
combined activity of the field and the head office.
The country officer in the field, the bank marketing
officer, or the bank's executive officers in charge of
country risk must make change proposals in country judg-
- 216 -
inents whenever the country's circumstances change enough to
warrant adjustments of country limits or sublimits. These
written proposals for recommended action regarding the
setting or changing of exposure ceilings and subceilings
include an analysis of economic, financial, social, and
political conditions; judgments on country outlook; and
recommendations on exposure.
The above proposed steps by Friedman are essential to
the success of country-risk management systems. Effective
guidelines have to be established to give the process the
opportunity to succeed. Friedman's proposals should be
seriously considered, even though they are somewhat
general. If the above proposals are implemented, the flow
of international lending will be much improved and the
bank's	 concern	 over	 repayment	 failures will	 be
substantially diminished.
One of the major problems faced by banks in assessing
country risk is deciding where the exposure lies. A. Bruce
Brackenridge, 25 in his brief outline of the procedures used
by Morgan Guaranty to establish country exposure limits,
gives the following example:
If our Paris office grants a line of credit to
the French subsidiary of a U.S. company under the
guarantee of the parent, most people would agree
that it is U.S. exposure. But what if there is
only a keepwell letter? If our Brussels office
places a redeposit with the Milan office of
Citibank, do we place the exposure in Italy or
the United States?
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The	 shipping	 industry	 is	 particularly
difficult. We have a client who is the sole
owner of a Liberian company which has one asset--
a Very Large Cargo Carrier (VLCC) carrying oil
between Iran and Japan. How are the locally
funded assets of a foreign branch to be treated?
What about forward and spot foreign exchange? Or
Federal Fund lines to the U.S. branch of a
British bank? The questions are endless.
He specifies that banks have answered the above questions
differently, as was confirmed by the ARCB study.
According to Brackenridge, maximum country exposure
limits were first established at Morgan Guaranty in the
late 1960s. They calculated their exposure on what they
called the "credit-risk basis." In this scheme, each
credit facility and risk asset is placed in the country
which best reflects the location of the entity that has the
ultimate legal responsibility for repayment. Specifically,
this means that the loan from their Paris office to the
French subsidiary of a U.S. company under the parent's
guarantee is U.S. exposure; but if the French subsidiary
receives a keepwell letter that is not legally binding, the
exposure is French.
Morgan reviewed every credit facility throughout the
bank, including overseas branches and consolidated
affiliates, and each credit facility was assigned to a
specific country. In addition, they were able to calculate
total exposure maturing beyond one year in each country.
They established limits by country for "maximum country
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exposure" and "exposure over one year."
	 According to
Brackenridge, the second category is more difficult; he
wanted Morgan to concentrate on those figures. Recent
events prove that banks can reduce their short-term
exposure when a country becomes troubled.
These limits are reviewed at least annually, and more
frequently for those countries experiencing rapid political
or economic change. Thus, countries such as Brazil and
Mexico are under continual review. Requests for increases
or decreases in limits normally originate with the lending
officers of the International Banking Division, and re-
quests for countries with significant exposure are accom-
panied by the latest country evaluation report prepared by
Morgan' s international economists.
The Robert Morris Associates (RMA) Survey of the
Management of International Loan Portfolio Diversification,
completed in June 1980, covered 70 banks. 26
 This survey
differed in several ways from the ARCB survey because it
included fewer banks with assets of less than $1 billion.
Consequently, more banks had 15-25% of total assets from
international operations and fewer (3% versus 24% for ARCB)
had no foreign branches. Even with these differences, the
RMA survey showed little change in the definition of
exposure from that of the ARCB.
Most surveyed banks included foreign currency loans
(for example, u.s. dollar), money market transactions, and
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local currency transactions (for example, non-U.S. dollar)
as part of their exposure. A smaller segment of banks
included money market (except placements) and local
currency transactions. Items most often excluded were
foreign exchange transactions, capital at risk, and federal
funds transactions.
Relating exposure to international risk, the RMA
survey found that two-thirds of banks that responded placed
no set limit (maximum percentage) on international assets
versus total assets. Most banks that did set limits were
smaller in size, with total assets of less than $7.5
billion. About 30% of both large and small banks that set
maximum limit levels relied on international credit market
conditions as the determining factor. One-fifth (mostly
smaller banks) used a specific percentage of total assets
as the criterion for maximum international exposure;
approximately 15% of the group used a percent of capital.
Just about one-third of the large banks also used a percent
of capital to determine their limit on international
assets.	 Some surveyed banks indicated that they used
several additional factors in their decision-making
process.
Approximately 30% of the survey respondees said that
they did not set limits on most transactions included in
their definition of exposure. Banks with less than $7.5
billion in assets were less likely to set limits in their
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elements of exposure than were the larger banks (probably a
direct result of the bank's volume of such items in their
operations).
Limits were set by 70% of all the banks surveyed,
particularly on foreign currency transactions. A smaller
percentage set limits on short-term transactions. Limits
were most often not set for foreign exchange or federal
funds transactions. More of the larger banks did not
impose limits on local currency transactions, while more of
the smaller banks did not include capital at risk. Most
assigned guaranteed loans to the country of the guarantor;
although, at some smaller banks, they were assigned to the
borrower.
The R1'IA survey also showed that 80% of participating
banks were diversifying their portfolios, in order to dis-
tribute risk. Over 90% had set maximum levels of country
exposure for most individual countries (there was usually
more than one committee, department, and/or officer that
set and was responsible for individual country exposure
limits). Less than one-fifth (primarily in large banks)
had a country exposure committee that had this function.
In 10%, chief executive officers were involved in the
process.
A combination of internal and external factors affect-
ing the country were the most important criteria used by
banks to manage risk diversification. Large banks focused
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on an analysis of country risk, economic conditions, and
political stability, while smaller banks were more inter-
ested in political risk. All banks placed importance on
business opportunities and profitability.
The RMA survey also found that multiple criteria were
used to guide portfolio diversification among countries
which were considered to be of equal creditworthiness or
risk. Business opportunities were most often cited as
important (40% of all the banks surveyed), followed by loan
profitability (30%). Special relationships of bank
officers and special lending skills were important to 25%
of the group (both small and large banks).
The RMA survey revealed an increasing concern, versus
that shown in earlier studies, with diversification of risk
among countries. Formal country risk evaluation systems
were being more commonly used than were fixed ratios in
making decisions. Business opportunities and loan prof-
itability became important criteria in guiding the port-
folio only after the basic country risk or creditworthiness
of the borrower had been established.
The responsibility for the management of international
exposure included recommendations from the international
banking department and from the bank's chief executive
officers. The international department was most often the
holder of primary responsibility for international expo-
sure--particularly in the smaller banks. 	 Next came the
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responsibilities of chief executive officers, and then the
credit policy committee (chosen frequently in smaller
banks). Only 10% of respondees used an asset and liability
committee.
Translation of Country Risk Assessments into a Country Risk
Management System
The procedures that banks use to manage country risk
are less varied than are the techniques used in assessing
that risk. Banks generally manage risk by setting individ-
ual country limits, the highest acceptable levels of claims
against entities whose debt-service capabilities are tied
to a given country. The limits are set by a Country Risk
Committee, which usually consists of individuals interested
in growth and others interested in maintaining quality.
Economists and political analysts responsible for individ-
ual country risk assessments generally serve as the
committee ' s secretariat.
Three important elements form the country limit
system. First, the distribution of the bank's portfolio by
country is determined directly by administrative decision,
rather than through a centrally determined set of risk
adjustments or discounts to the nominal return on loans to
different countries (price guidelines). In other words, no
explicit attempt is made to ensure that risk-adjusted rates
of return are equated at the margin for all countries.
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While many banks use country pricing guidelines (certainly
influenced by risk assessments), the fact that country-risk
control procedures focus on maximum exposure limits rather
than minimum returns over the cost of funds implies that
these pricing guidelines are also heavily influenced by
other factors, such as the degree of competitive pressure
from other lenders.
Second, banks focus on individual country limits
rather than the overall structure of the loan portfolio.
Despite the fact that this focus is changing, current port-
folios reflect lending decisions made essentially on a
country-by-country basis. Attention has thus been focused
on assets at risk in only one country, rather than in two
countries or the entire portfolio. There has been rela-
tively little systematic analysis of how much a given asset
contributes to the riskiness of the overall portfolio.
Third, risk management systems take on many of the
characteristics of adversary proceedings, an inevitable
result of the judgmental nature of country risk assess-
ments. Because of its limited information base, such an
adversarial system cannot be accepted as a meaningful,
permanent element in a bank's decision-making process
unless each of the bank's major interest groups--in partic-
ular, the loan producers and credit analysts--is directly
involved. These parties may not have the same amount of
power, however; and while many banks have striven to
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balance power among the groups, in some cases the design of
the country limit decision process favors the parties
interested in growth, rather than those interested in port-
folio composition.
The next chapter will focus on the methods and
procedures used by eight tJ.S. banks in managing country
risk.
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CHAPTER VI
COUNTRY-RISK MANAGEMENT BY EIGHT U.S. BANKS
The assessment of country risk by U.S. commercial
banks has little meaning unless it is integrated into a
bank's business operation. Whatever the methods used,
country-risk assessments are a necessary part of business
decision making. This chapter examines how commercial
banks use these fundamentals and other factors to manage
their international loan portfolios. The examples will draw
on the experiences of actual institutions, specifically,
Citibank, Bank of America, Chase Manhattan Bank, Chemical
Bank, Continental Illinois Corporation, First National Bank
of Chicago, American Security Bank, and Morgan Guaranty.
Citibank
Citicorp is a multifaceted financial services organ-
ization whose principal subsidiary is Citibank, N.A. Its
services include general banking, asset-based financing,
merchant banking, consumer businesses, investment man-
agement, and trust services. It has more than 2,000
offices, including its subsidiaries and affiliates, in 103
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countries around the world. 1	The organizationts 1975
international earnings were about 70% of total earnings.
Country-exposure management, i.e., country-risk evalu-
ation, is an integral part of the decision-making process
at Citicorp and has essentially a control function. Deci-
sions on cross-border exposure are made in a separate and
independent fashion from marketing decisions because the
profit motive conflicts with country-risk considerations.
The inevitable tensions between risk taking and profit
making are resolved by providing the best possible
information base and by utilizing the best management
judgment available.
The key instrument for managing a bank's exposure in
a particular country is to place ceilings on the amount of
country exposure that is acceptable. Ceilings require the
abilty to measure and report exposure, as well as the
opportunity to be reviewed and changed when conditions
warrant. Citicorp is one of a few U.S banks that are large
enough and have sufficient international interests to
warrant the elaborate system required to do that. Citicorp
is represented by approximately 75 large banks situated
around the world.
These large banks account for an estimated 90% of all
international bank business and thus represent the dominant
mode of international banking practice. They are large-
scale, internationally oriented companies with substantial
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overseas business, either through overseas branches with
local currency deposit business, overseas offices
established for other business reasons, or overseas
affiliates or subsidiaries that represent the more impor-
tant prototypes for international lending. Through these
prototype systems, several guiding principles have been
identified that facilitate usage of the country-risk
function as it was designed, that is, as an early-warning
system.
One of the guiding principles was that an adequate
network of intrabank communication must be established to
monitor and report country exposures on a continual and
consistent basis. It was also necessary to set up guide-
lines to guarantee the use of country-risk judgments in
setting ceilings (and subceilings) that determine the total
amount of exposure that the bank was willing to undertake
in a particular foreign country. In this way, setting
specific ceilings for various countries not only serves as
a management mechanism for achieving greater variance in
the bank's loan portfolio, but, equally important, gives
comparison data for acting on information about changing
country-risk developments that might require altering
particular country ceilings during the course of the
business period for which the ceiling is set, which at
Citicorp is one year.
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Another guiding principle was never to permit a
country ceiling to be raised without careful deliberation.
A system that too easily raises a country ceiling can also
bring about a temptation to lower the bank's credit stand-
ards and the quality of its loan portfolio. How fast a
country ceiling should be increased is often related to the
overall growth of the bankts total assets. Therefore, flex-
ibility had to be built into the Citicorp management system
because to be effective; it had to be a responsive
behavioral system, rather than a preconceived mechanistic
system.
At Citibank, country-risk decisions were made at its
world headquarters, where frequent exchanges of ideas and
information with the field offices were seen as important
and were encouraged. As time went on and experience was
gained, this process became more and more field driven and
resistance to the burden of country assessment and
reporting declined as the system enabled the field to
expand business and earnings profitably, and with minimal
risk.
Citicorp acts as both a national and international
intermediary. It makes loans in national currencies
financed by deposits or money market sources in the same
currency. It also makes loans in foreign currency. Local
currency lending, however, is not seen as involving
exposure across country borders and, therefore, is not con-
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sidered to involve country risk; lending in currency
foreign to the borrower was typically seen as involving
country risk. Over fifty percent of Citicorp's foreign
loans involve lending to a borrower in local currency.
In 1975, Citicorp put its country-risk management
system in place. Management of country and cross-border
risk was made an important function for two key groups:
1. Field officers of Citicorp (managing the business
in their respective countries) would have to provide infor-
mation about their areas' local conditions by being
actively involved there professionally and socially. They
would then be better able to anticipate and respond to
changes in local conditions.
2. Top and senior management were then to add both
perspective and experience to the judgment and recom -
mendations made by the field.
Citicorp's systematic process established limits on
country exposure and monitored outstandings under its
limits. Its reporting system aimed to give information to
management quickly and accurately about outstanding cross-
border exposure by a country. The objective was to be able
to anticipate national and international developments
within or outside the control of the country's government
that could adversely or favorably affect each country in
which Citicorp did business.
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The management process also provided for ceilings to
be established for cross-border exposure (subject to
country risk in any given country) and for subceilings (of
different maturities) because overall exposure needed to be
broken down to cover varying trends, indebtedness, and
other factors. Quarterly reports were required for cross-
border exposure; however, additional statistical and
qualitative information was required monthly for countries
experiencing rapidly changing conditions. To ensure that
the system achieved its purposes, a checks-and-balance
system was set up that required Citicorp outside the
country of the prospective borrower to get credit approval
from a senior officer in the field who was responsible for
the borrowing country.
According to Irving S. Friedman, 2 four principal
factors form the basis for the critical judgments needed to
establish cross-border ceilings:
1. Evaluation of the needs and capabilities of Citi-
corp's client base in each country;
2. Analysis of business characteristics, such as
classes of business, investments, guarantees, transactions,
and accompanying tenor, in any one country;
3. Anticipation or analysis of national and inter-
national events which might affect Citicorp in any one
Country;
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4. Application of quantitative and qualitative tech-
niques to the information available to Citicorp world wide.
According to Friedman, Citicorp monitored country con-
ditions and other elements needed for country assessments
and judgments and then compiled a variety of statistical
indicators of that nation's creditworthiness. To do this,
it analyzed the country's economic conditions, its
political-economic outlook and policies, balance of
payments and the country's management thereof, other inter-
national economic and financial aspects, the country's
principal trends and prospects, flow of funds, and finan-
cial intermediation--actual and potential. Other factors
included social conditions and international positions and
relations and how world events--economic, political and
military--affect them. All these factors became a single,
comprehensive risk assessment for that country.
It was felt at Citicorp that sole reliance on debt-
service ratios was inadequate and could be misleading in
country-risk analysis. Therefore, while debt service
ratios, such as changes in debt service to changes in gross
national product were examined, other statistical rela-
tionships needed to be examined, such as compressibility of
imports, consumption and investment goods, variability in
export earnings, and foreign investment in relationship to
total investment. Citicorp created its own databank,
specifically on developing countries, and constantly added
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and examined new statistical or functional information
which might give better insight into a country's conditions
and policies.
Citicorp's System of Measuring Exposure
The Citicorp system began with its own definitions of
exposure since no legal definitions existed, but as regu-
latory authorities have gained experience, uniform proce-
dures have been encouraged for reporting to these author-
ities. Internal procedures within banks tend to conform to
these general banking procedures, with attention to
detailed country exposure reports, and instructions for
preparing such reports are now required by U.S. banking
regulations.
A few years ago, country exposure was defined as in-
cluding both foreign currency and local currency exposure
to residents of each foreign country. This currency
exposure was defined as all cross-border direct and
indirect claims on residents, including Citicorp-related
residents of a foreign country, irrespective of currency.
This definition also included all intracountry foreign
currency direct and indirect claims on residents, minus all
Citicorp offshore to Citicorp resident intercorporate flows
in foreign currency, backing up the intracountry foreign
currency exposure.
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In Citicorp's original system, foreign currency
exposure to residents of each foreign country was broken
down, identified, and reported separately as cross-border
or intracountry foreign currency exposure. In the later
system, foreign currency exposure was consolidated.
Citibank requires this information from the field in their
reports of country exposure.
The reporting system requires the breakdown into four
categories of maturity, as required by the regulatory
authorities. All continue to be controlled by cross-border
exposure ceilings (one global, and for most countries, two
maturity subceilings) which govern the total permissible
exposure at any given time in a country. International
financial centers and offshore banking units must make
special reports which are used to govern the maximum
permissible level of exposure flowing into the country in
support of the offshore bank. This country exposure report-
ing distinguishes between maturities and types of entities,
and also between differing categories of borrower (monetary
authorities, bank, nonbank, and multilateral organizations)
and ownership (private sector, public sector, and
Citicorp-owned).
Assets and contingent liabilities are included in
cross-border exposure subject to country risk. They are
tallied and reported by the branch in the country of the
borrowing entity.	 For assets, most equity investments,
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loans, discounts, leases, and placements are included, but
excluded are transactions involving U.S. borrowers,
shipping transactions, local currency assets, or externally
guaranteed assets. For contingent liabilities, formal,
unused loan commitments as well as opened, confirmed com-
mercial credits are included as cross-border exposure.
It is important to note that cross-border country
exposure ceilings are typically much greater than the sum
of those items which actually appear on the balance sheet.
For instance, two items, intrabank cross-border and con-
tingent liabilities, are also included as country exposure,
although these do not appear on the balance sheet. Though
not shown, these off-balance-sheet items could well be as
important as the balance-sheet items themselves.3
Functions of Field and Head Office in Exposure Management
Field offices assist greatly in determining country
risk and ceilings because they have better access to on-
the-spot and often enlightening information. It is the
role of the senior country officer in each country to
maintain a timely and critically expert opinion on that
country and its outlook from the viewpoint of Citicorp's
country risk.
In addition, a staff was developed at the head office
capable of following, reviewing, and independently judging
country situations.	 These were experienced Citicorp
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people, and they were instructed to acquire knowledge which
was not readily accessible to the field. In this way, the
opinions from field staff could be checked against other
expert judgments based on other sources of knowledge. Dif -
ferences would then point clearly to the need for further
thought, while the independently achieved agreement of the
two would establish mutual reinforcement and reassurance.
The purpose of such activity, however, was not to sub-
stitute or second guess the field but rather to augment it
with independent information, and in the process, to link
the thinking in the field with the general experience,
policies, and objectives of Citicorp. In this way, the
inevitable risks involved in a large-scale operation in
over 100 countries could, it was believed, be reduced to
acceptable levels.
The methods of management and capability were created
in a number of mutually reinforcing ways:
1. Use of memoranda to give recommendations and sug-
gested changes in guidelines;
2. Close work between individual country desk officers
and top headquarters staff;
3. Development of relationships with country experts
in Washington, D.C., particularly in the IMF and World
Bank;
4. Frequent meetings of the senior country risk
officer with country desk officers, along with the par-
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ticipation of other special Citibank groups to discuss
country-risk developments (minutes of such meetings were
kept and disseminated to the field);
	 -
5. Encouragement of all groups within the head office
to look to the country desk officers as sources of in-
formation and judgments;
6. Encouragement of all groups within the head office
to include desk officers in policy discussions and decision
making on their countries.
Bank of America
Bank of America Corporation provides diverse financial
services to its customers throughout the world. As of
December 31, 1987, Bank America had assets of $93 billion,
deposits of $76 billion, and primary capital of $8
billion. 4
 Its California Banking Group and Seattle-First
National Bank operate 1,040 domestic branches in California
and Washington. Its World Banking Group and Seattle-First
National Bank have 66 foreign branches and representative
offices in 51 nations.
It is easy to see why Bank of America is a tre-
mendously important international lender with a very large
international loan portfolio. With foreign branch and sub-
sidiary business on a global scale, it has long been
involved in most facets of international lending. How to
cope with country risk problems, then, has been a major
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concern of the bank's management, as indicated by the elab-
orate approach developed for country-risk and portfolio
management.
Though the country evaluation system developed by Bank
of America has been broadly characterized as a numerical
rating system that blends qualitative and quantitative data
sources, the bank's management style encourages substantial
delegation of authority and decentralized decision making.
Its country-risk assessment techniques combine quantitative
indicators with a judgmental component determined by a
consensus-building process of rating the creditworthiness
of many countries.
The requirements of Bank of America's country eval-
uation system were shaped by the great diversity of its
financial business abroad and its highly decentralized or-
ganizational structure, as well as by the bank's belief
that its purposes were best served by calculation of
country ratings and an approach that is not static. Even
this has reportedly evolved with the changing international
environment and the company's new staff capabilities.
Bank of America's Risk Management System
The Bank of America's system aims to effectively
manage a wide variety of risks inherent to global banking:
asset quality, liquidity, interest rates, foreign exchange,
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and country risk. 	 (Country risk also plays an indirect
role in what happens in these other risk categories.)
However, despite Bank of America's safeguards for
asset quality and credit risk by detailed credit analysis,
proper documentation, timely re-evaluation of outstanding
credits, and prompt follow-up of identified problems, some
uncertainty of loan repayment always remains. The bank is
protected against this potential problem both by including
risk premiums on interest rate charges to different major
loan categories and by adding sufficient loan loss provi-
sions to reserves to cover expected future losses for each
major loan category, as well as maintaining additional
reserves against less predictable losses. Net loan losses
from nonperforining loans are charged off or deducted from
loan loss provisions.
Bank of America manages its international liquidity to
meet the multicurrency needs of borrowers by trying to
secure deposits in the Eurocurrency market or elsewhere, by
maintaining additional sources of liquidity in the form of
marketable securities, and by setting shorter limits on the
funding of each currency.
Overseas interest rate risk is generally considered
less difficult to manage than its domestic counterpart
because international loans are typically priced at pre-
arranged spreads that remain constant regardless of
subsequent interest rate movements. Maturity mismatching,
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a major type of interest rate risk, is handled by
eliminating the potential for mismatching permitted for
each currency.
Foreign exchange risk arises from unexpected changes
in rates of exchange between currencies. Bank of America's
more than 30 worldwide currency trading units manage
foreign exchange risks by limiting the size of acceptable
trading positions, by decentralization of trading ac-
tivities, and by the many currencies involved. Even though
these categories are all influenced by country risk issues,
the Bank of America country evaluation system is quite
distinct from these risks.
Bank of America's Methods of Country Assessment
The Bank of America's method5 of country assessment
began as a judgment-based transfer-risk rating system in
the l960s and has become a computer-assisted system. It
combines an analytical formula with judgmental factors to
arrive at a comprehensive country-risk rating. This
country evaluation system consists of three major elements:
1. A country assessment method which culminates in
numerical ratings (country ratings are used mainly as one
of several determinants for adopting an overall country
lending limit) ;
2. A method for setting overall country lending limits
and subliiuits;
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3. Frequent monitoring of actual country loan exposure
levels.
The bank's model recognizes the importance of assim-
ilating subjective information in addition to quantitative
analysis when assessing a country's relative credit-
worthiness. The bank's approach, therefore, begins with
quantitative and statistical information, but is refined by
the inclusion of two distinct judgmental letter ratings: an
economic indicator and a political indicator. These are
arrived at by having the appropriate staff, line officers,
and economists fill out questionnaires to determine a
consensus on various country ratings. The two judgmental
ratings then serve as the distillation of the results of
the overall country assessment. The search for a reliable
set of statistical lead indicators of debt-service
difficulties has been made numerous times, but finding a
precise enough definition for the dependent variable
(debt-service difficulty) has been the main obstacle.
Country risk assessment factors are grouped under four
broad headings: external liquidity, economic policy,
economic structure, and sociopolitical factors. The quan-
titative point of departure is development of an analytical
data matrix, which Bank of America constructed in the
mid-l970s as sets of equations (agreed upon by a number of
senior line officers and economists) made to approximate a
set of subjective country ratings.
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Even though external liquidity factors were at first
separate from those of economic policy and economic struc-
ture in order to calculate two composite indices (the
debt-service rating and the so-called adaptability index),
it was soon found preferable to combine these into what
then became the debt-service capacity index. This included
the four weighted components of that original debt-service
index: debt-service capacity, import coverage, debt burden,
and compressibility. The eight weighted subindices of the
original adaptability index include gross domestic product,
inflation, exports, product concentration, and savings
patterns. An informal method was then used to gather less
readily quantifiable economic and sociopolitical
information, in part by tapping Bank of America's global
network of economists.
Influential factors not adequately covered in the
debt-service index were the focus of a questionnaire filled
out by the bank's country and regional managers. Flexible
enough to encompass possibly unique environmental factors,
the consistency of the questionnaire's format allows com-
parison between countries. Questionnaire responses are
then sent to divisional headquarters, at which point pre-
liininary ratings are assigned to each of the countries.
These are then sent to Bank of America's world headquarters
in San Francisco, where they are consolidated and checked
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for global consistency.	 The worldwide ratings are then
reviewed by senior management.
Changes made a few years ago in the Bank of America's
country evaluation system suggest that more emphasis has
begun to be placed on incorporating judgmental factors in
country-risk assessment. Any disagreements over proper
ratings are resolved, and other ratings are reviewed, by
the bank's world banking division executive council. The
country rating process then can be described as moving up
the organizational hierarchy and is based on consensus-
building along the way.
The three most important uses of country ratings are
to set country lending limits, to define overseas in-
vestment of bank capital in advance of opening a new
foreign branch, and to set loan loss reserves. This is
considered to be the key to managing country portfolios,
when coupled with an elaborate computerized monitoring
system to provide current information on actual cross-
border exposure levels for the bank. Actual risk exposure
levels, however, must be in compliance with the bank's
lending limits. Country ratings serve as one of a number
of inputs which are used when decisions are to be made on
country lending limits. Other criteria are the
profitability of country markets, the size of the country,
its external debt position, whether the bank has undue con-
centration of business in that country, and the long run
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goals and other business relationships. Another major use
of country rating is in the authorization of overseas in-
vestment of bank capital.
Most countries stipulate in law or regulation the
amount of capital required to establish a branch or sub-
sidiary in that country. Bank of America continuously
monitors actual loan exposure in many countries and tab-
ulates fairly detailed information. This information
consists of the agreed-upon country lending limits,
commitments made by all bank units, and the actual exposure
level.
Chase Manhattan
The Chase Manhattan Corporation is the holding company
of the Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., and numerous other sub-
sidiaries. It has assets in the area of $100 billion and
employs more than 42,000 people in 60 countries. 6 Chase
provides a comprehensive range of financial services to
individuals, corporations, and other financial institutions
and governments through its three major business com-
ponents:
1. Global Banking, which serves corporate, insti-
tutional and sovereign clients around the world through a
network of banking and trading locations,
2. Individual Banking, which serves consumers in the
U.S. and selected overseas markets with loan and deposit
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products,	 discount brokerage, trust and investment
services,
3. Institutional Banking, which offers corporations,
financial institutions, and middle-market companies such
specialized services as real estate and commodity finance,
leasing, service products, and correspondent banking.
Chase Manhattan operates from the point of view that
international lending requires not only the normal credit
risk analysis associated with extending financing to a par-
ticular customer, but also an assessment of country risk
which may result from government decisions or unforeseen
events and which may interrupt normal business activities
in the country, thus affecting a borrower's ability to
repay its loans. Attention is, therefore, focused on the
availability of foreign exchange to permit timely repayment
of cross-border loans by borrowers in that country.
Chase monitors and analyzes the economic, social, and
political environments in all the countries in which it
does business or in which its borrowers reside. These in-
depth assessments, performed by a team of economists and
political analysts in conjunction with local Chase man-
agement, are utilized by Chase within its planning cycle as
well as in its system of managing total country exposures.
However, Chase does not use any statistical or quantitative
techniques in its risk management system. Nor does it have
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a detailed credit analysis system like that of Citibank or
Bank of America.
Chemical Bank
Chemical New York Corporation7
 is the fourth-largest
bank holding company in the United States. It has assets
of more than $78 billion and is an international financial
services organization. Its principal subsidiaries are
Chemical Bank and Texas Commerce Bancshares, Inc.
Chemical, one of the nation's oldest banks, was originally
chartered in 1824 as a subsidiary of chemical manufacturing
and is today a top global financial services institution.
On May 1, 1987, Chemical and Texas Commerce were of f i-
cially merged. This action created an institution with
powerful capabilities in the consumer, middle market, and
corporate and institutional markets. This combined entity
is stronger than were the separate banks in providing
advisory and financing services to very diverse industries.
With Texas Commercial Bank, Chemical also enhances its
position in processing important categories of debt
instruments, such as commercial paper, medium-term notes,
and collateralized mortgage obligations.
Chemical Bank, like other banks, controls the various
degrees of country risk through continuing evaluation of
economic and political trends, and through a system of
predetermined exposure and maturity limits for each
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country. For some countries, sublimits are also estab-
lished with varying maturity limits by sectors (government,
banking, and private).
Te refine its methods of dealing with political risk,
Chemical Bank has made use of an analytic technique called
a political spread sheet. This technique is used to deter-
mine probable political disposition of various "actors" in
a particular country with respect to a specific country's
lending strategy. Weighing and categorizing this infor-
mation aims to give a useful measure for the likelihood of
potentially adverse political events.
The other elements of Chemical Bank's country exposure
system are the country rating categories and the country
review format. The former stresses grouping countries
according to their similarities; the latter focuses on the
uniqueness of each country. Financial, economic, and
political parameters are then combined to arrive at a par-
ticular country's rating with specific maximum capital
ratios (indicative rather than binding) assigned to various
country risk categories for the setting of country limits.
Chemical Bank's approach to credit analysis is not so
detailed as that of Citibank or Bank of America, and no
statistical techniques are used to assess a country's
relative creditworthiness.
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Continental Illinois Corporation
Continental Illinois Bank Corporation is a market-
driven bank holding company that serves corporations,
institutional investors, and individuals with complex
financial requirements. Through a 24-hour market-making
and distribution network centered in Tokyo, London, and
Chicago, Continental meets the investment, financing,
risk-management, and foreign-exchange requirements of
corporations, institutions, and governments throughout the
world. In 1989, Continental's corporate finance
transactions grew in number by 14 percent, representing $24
billion in total bank financing and $28 million in fee
income 8
In 1987, unusual provisions for possible losses on
loans to 17 less-developed countries (LDCs) were made in
the amount of $500 million (second quarter) and $200
million (fourth quarter) . This reserve for LDC exposure
amounted to 50 percent of medium-term loans, long-term
loans, and commitments to those countries, after con-
siderations for previous charge-offs. In 1989, medium- and
long-term loans to LDCs were cut by $900 million through
charge-offs, sales, and swaps.1°
Continental Illinois has integrated the use of
exposure limits into its planning process and its asset and
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liability management. In the planning process, corporate
direction is projected by determining an expected inter-
national loan portfolio growth that would be consistent
with prudent risk levels and with long-term profit growth.
This plan is then used to focus geographic division goals.
Attention is also focused on the cost of funding inter-
national loans, as well as on the interest rate spreads and
fees accompanying the making of loans.
Continental Illinois has created a committee of senior
officers from its international and multinational banking
departments and from its economic research division to
examine country exposure. This committee meets every two
weeks with the list of countries to be reviewed determined
by country risk rating. Committee members receive and make
their decisions based on three inputs: first, an economic
risk evaluation and forecast; second, a political risk
evaluation and outlook; and third, the recommendation from
the geographic lending division. Their decisions to
increase, reduce, or hold constant the exposure limit for a
country are then reviewed by top management.
Exposure limits cover all extensions of credit by the
bank and its branches, as well as by all its majority-owned
subsidiaries. Several subljinjts are established within
these overall limits. The most important of these include
sublimits on term credits (by amount and years of maturity
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for each country) as well as limits on extensions of credit
of less than one year.
In defining exposure, location of the borrower is also
an important determinant because branches of a borrower are
considered to be the responsibility of the borrower's head
office. Credit exposure to the branch of a borrower (in a
country other than that of the head office) is counted as
exposure in the country of the head office. Subsidiary
(located in a country other than that of the parent
company) borrowings are considered to be exposure in the
country in which the subsidiary is located. Credits that
are supported by guarantees are considered exposure in the
country of the issuer of the guarantee.
The impact of potential loan loss in capital funds is
regarded to be of paramount importance in determining
maximum exposure. The impact of such a possible write-off
varies from country to country depending on the tax struc-
ture of that particular country.
An economic risk rating for all countries is provided
by the economic research division, which is separate from
the international and multinational banking departments.
Their economic analysis is used to determine a country's
foreign borrowing requirements, their achievability, how
sustainable its growth targets are, and how stable its
economy is in its ability to generate hard currency
earnings to meet its obligations. Consideration is also
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given to how efficiently and effectively a country's
natural, human, and capital resources are, or might be,
employed. Government management of the economy is also
appraised.
Much consideration is given to the country's current
status in its balance-of-payments as well as to its future
prospects. Important early-warning indicators have been
developed to pinpoint possible problems in countries'
international financial conditions. A number of factors
correlate closely with potential debt-servicing dif-
ficulties,	 including debt service ratios, maturity
profiles,	 international	 reserve	 adequacy,	 selected
macroeconomic variables, and government policy indicators.
In their political risk-rating system, country
analysis is obtained from loan officers responsible for
each country and includes information from Continental
Illinois officers overseas.	 Reports are submitted reg-
ularly which provide estimates of the willingness and
political ability of the country's government to continue
to honor its foreign obligations. Attention is given to
the risk of expropriation or nationalization without
adequate compensation. The objective is to identify po-
tential difficulties in the centers of power inside the
country as well as those possible with other nations.
However, Continental Illinois makes no use of quantitative
or statistical techniques in its risk-evaluation procedure.
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First National Bank of Chicago
First Chicago Corporation is a bank holding company
which started the 1980's with only one major subsidiary,
First National Bank of Chicago. By 1989, First Chicago had
two major lines of business: the Superregional Bank, which
handles bankcard and local banking, and the Global
Corporate Bank (GCB). The GCB, with 22 banking locations
across the globe, delivers financial products and services
to large businesses, worldwide corporations, governments,
and other institutions. With average assets of $33.5
billion in 1989, GCB represented 69 percent of First
Chicago's total asset base.11
Since 1987, First Chicago has made an aggressive
effort to reduce troubled-country debt exposure. In 1989,
exposure was reduced by $800 million to a year-end total of
$1.3 billion, down from $3.1 billion at year-end 1987.
There is a strong resemblance between the way First
Chicago operates its country risk system and the way it
assesses the credit of an individual company. Countries
are specifically classified (in definition and use, just as
individual problematic credit are) according to each one's
short- and long-term creditworthiness, which is determined
by First chicago's country risk management committee. This
committee makes most of the decisions relating to country
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risk. Its chairman is also chairman of the credit policy
committee. Its membership is comprised of most of the
bank's senior management.
Risk ratings, exposure limits, and country marketing
strategies are all decided by this committee. However, the
chairman must ratify any proposals for large exposure in
high-risk countries. The two major inputs to the de-
liberations of the country-risk management committee are
country-risk reports done by analysts in First Chicago's
country risk division and by its country marketing
strategy.
The country-risk classifications used by First Chicago
are similar (both procedurally and functionally) to credit
classifications applied to individual credits. The bank
uses a 1-4 classification scale and assigns countries both
a short-term and a long-term rating.
First of Chicago management has stated that this
explicit classification is the main reason its inter-
national loan portfolio includes fewer countries classified
in high-risk categories than the average international
exposure distribution of other large U.S. banks. Country
limits have been set for over 100 countries, in terms of
both the size and the composition of competing product
areas of lending activities in that particular country.
Country analysis forms an important basis for setting
country limits. It focuses on seven factors:
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1. The external balance sheet of the country,
2. Foreign exchange earnings capacity and financing
needs,
3. Access to capital markets,
4. The quality of economic and political management,
5. Analysis of major political actors and insti-
tutions,
6. Resources available to government and other power
centers,
7. International context.
American Security Bank
American Security Bank is located in the nation's
capital. It is smaller in size than the very large banks
but has been heavily involved in international lending
because of its location--Washington, D.C., the center of
official world finance, headquarters of the IMF, the World
Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank.
American Security specifically defines country risk as
being based on the elements in the economic and political
environments of a given country. That is, despite the
financial condition of the borrower, events that take place
within a country can adversely affect the collectibility of
debt investments.
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In its corporate manual, 12 the bank notes the
following factors as possible adverse influences on debt
collectibility:
1. Economic: special taxes that are imposed on the
lender or borrower, interest rate management, government
imposed delays on liquidation of external obligations, de-
valuation of foreign exchange controls, and domestic pol-
icies--often imposed in a sudden unpredictable manner,
which would affect the borrower's ability to generate the
necessary cash flow to repay the debt.
2. Political: nationalization, confiscation, wars,
embargoes, revolutions, etc.
American Security's management system measures total
country risk in all countries separately for maturities of
under one year and over one year. Exposure is divided into
direct exposure--loans (including overdrafts and accep-
tances), placements, investments, guarantees and standby
credits, legal commitments to lend, and letters of
credit--and indirect exposure--unused portions of lines of
credit, including placements and foreign exchange lines.
Country risk is further defined in relation to the legal
and ultimate credit-responsible entity. Unsecured facil-
ities (those which do not have binding, third-party legal
support) are considered exposure in the country in which
the borrower is domiciled. Those which have legally
binding support from third parties (principally, guarantees
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and insurance) are considered as risk in the country in
which the third parties are domiciled. If secured by cash,
marketable securities, or real estate, the facility risk is
placed in the country where the security is physically
located. Bank branches are considered as exposure to the
head office of that bank regardless of where that branch is
located.
Any American Security division recommending or orig-
inating a country-risk transaction must obtain the agree-
ment of its international division. 	 The head of the
international division, a senior vice president, is
directly responsible for monitoring country risk and recoin-
mending changes in country limits. These recommendations
are then reviewed by the bank's consulting economist, the
chairman of credit policy, the president, or the chairman
of the bank. Even though the countries are not selected
for new business solicitations, the policy is to monitor
and evaluate risk in countries where the bank has exposure.
The two basic inputs into establishing country limits
are country-risk assessment and marketing strategy. Other
factors considered in establishing maximum lending limits
are credit risk, profitability and other benefits, capital,
tenor, and their impact on rating agencies.
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Morgan Guaranty
J. P. Morgan & Co., Incorporated, provides financial
services to institutional and individual clients worldwide.
Through its subsidiaries, it conducts international com-
mercial and private banking business, provides financial
advisory services, underwrites and trades securities in
international capital markets and (to the extent permitted)
in domestic capital markets, and manages some $65 billion
in pension and other investment funds.13
J. P. Morgan is a holding company incorporated in
Delaware, U.S.A. It maintains the strongest capital
position among major money-center bank holding companies in
the United States. Its principal subsidiary, Morgan
Guaranty Trust Company of New York, accounts for 85% of the
total assets of the holding company. As of December 31,
1987, their ratio of common stockholder's equity to assets
was 6.35%; that of common stockholder's equity to average
assets was 5.96%. Country exposure is measured according
to Morgan Guaranty's concept of credit risk.
Risk is assigned to the location reflecting the entity
having ultimate legal responsibility for repayment of the
obligation. There are two limits: maximum country exposure
and exposure over one year. International banking division
loan officers are allowed to request changes in country
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limits on an ad hoc basis and must submit country
evaluation reports with all such requests for countries in
which the bank already has appreciable exposure. Country
limits are reviewed frequently for countries undergoing
major changes, and even countries regarded as safe are
reviewed on an annual basis.
Morgan Guaranty's standard country evaluation proce-
dure is activated in meetings called by the senior credit
officer of the international banking division. The area
manager, the loan officers, and the international economist
who has written the most recent report about the country to
be discussed also attend.	 Following the economist's
presentation on the future of the country, and based on
country evaluation reports which examine policy factors,
basic economic factors, external finance, and political
factors, the area manager then outlines the bank's current
and contemplated position in that country. Statistical and
quantitative techniques play no role in this decision
process.
Conclusion
This chapter has shown the various views, preferences,
and practices in country-risk assessment by eight high-
ranking banks. Though they differ in format of country
assessments, professional background of analysts, sources
of information, and frequency and detail of analysis, it is
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important to note that they have shown the value and need
for country-risk assessments and country-risk management
systems. Each has its own ultimate responsibility, origins
of accountability for fixing and changing country limits,
use of sublimits, and ways of linking to business de-
cisions. The economic and financial complexity make it
easy to see why more and more bankers believe that a prac-
tical, efficient country risk system is essential. For an
example of the specific systems used by Manufacturers
Hanover Bank to manage country-risk assessment, see
Appendix B.
Only Citibank and Bank of America have consistently
used formal quantitative techniques in their country-risk
assessments. Although the other six banks have made some
improvements over the years, they still do not use
quantitative techniques to any great extent. None of thes
six banks has a country-risk assessment system in place
that is as sophisticated and efficient as that of Citibank
or Bank of America.
Quantitative techniques should be incorporated into
banks' assessment procedures because they do provide some
important information. However, as discussed in Chapter V
and reinforced in Chapter VII in this study, they should be
used only in an ancillary capacity, not as the sole means
of risk management.
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The next chapter will focus on country-risk assessment
for developing countries by both discriminant and logistic
analyses.
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CHAPTER VII
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF COUNTRY-RISK ASSESSMENT FOR LESS
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
This chapter presents linear discriminant function and
logistic regression models using economic indicators for
predicting debt reschedulings in developing countries.
These models were developed for the purpose of identifying
in advance those countries that will be unable to meet
their commitments on external debt.
Previous studies of debt rescheduling followed rela-
tively similar approaches. Those studies employed statis-
tical techniques, specifically discriminant, logistic, and
principal components analysis, that apply continuous
independent variables to explain a dichotomous dependent
variable--typically debt rescheduling vs. no rescheduling.
Gordon W. Smith1
 showed in his 1979 study that the
statistical models developed in the early 1970's tended to
over-predict the occurrence of debt-rescheduling problems
in the late 1970's. Using the 1971 Frank-dine and 1977
Feder-Just models, he discovered that when applied to data
in the niid-1970's to 1977, both models predicted several
rescheduling situations that did not happen.
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Fisher's LDF is estimated by:
= [S'd]'X = d's
where S = pooled sample covariance matrix
d = difference between sample mean vectors for two
groups
X1 -X2
Later it was shown by Welch 3
 that the LDF is optimal in the
sense that it minimizes the probability of mis-
classification. The actual classification rule for a new
observation X0
 is to assign it to group 1 if W ^ 0 and to
group 2 otherwise, where W is the classification statistic
of Anderson4
 defined as
W 
= 'Xo - (1/2)	 ' (X +
The efficiency of this LDF depends on the Mahalanobis
distance D between the mean vectors of the two multinormal
populations defined by
= d'S'd
The probability of misclassification5
 is estimated by
s ' (-D/2)
where	 is the cumulative distribution function of a
standard normal distribution.
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Fisher later showed that an alternative computational
procedure for discriminant analysis is to "formally" carry
out a multiple regression analysis on a dummy variable y
defined as
1, if an observation comes from group 1
1=
0, otherwise
of the variables X 11 . ..,X, for the combined set of N=n1+n2
observations in the two samples. If the estimated
regression is
Y = b0 + b 1 x 1 + b2X2 ^ ... + bX = b'X
Kshirsagar6
 shows that the regression coefficients b and
the discriininant function coefficients a 1 are related by
b =	 (n1n2) / (n 1 + n2)	 a
f+	 12	 D2
ni + fl2
where f=n 1 +n2-2, and further, that the relation between the
multiple correlation coefficient R 2
 between Y and the
variables X, and the Mahalanobis distance D is
R2 =	 (n 1 n2 ) / (n 1 + n2)	 • D2
f+ n1n2
n 1 + n2
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Also worth noting is the alternative expression
=	 (n1n2)	 (1 - R2)
(n 1 + n2)f
connecting LDF with the regression vector b.
Because of this regression analogy, we can test the
significance of the regression/discriminant function
coefficients by the t-test and decide which variables
contribute significantly to the LDF and which variables can
be omitted.
The validity of these t-tests might be challenged
because the usual assumptions of multiple regression that Y
is normal and X is fixed are not satisfied. On the
contrary, Y is fixed here and X is assumed normal. However,
Fisher used an ingenious geometrical argument to establish
a "duality" relation between two vectors and showed that
the distributional theory of the correlation coefficient r
or the multiple correlation coefficient R remains the same,
whether the dependent vector is fixed and the independent
vector is normal or the other way around. Kshirsagar
provides a mathematical derivation of this result.
Assuming that the a priori probabilities of membership
in group 1 and group 2 are equal, the classification proce-
dure is now simple. Predict Y by Y 0 for the new
observation x0 using the regression equation. Find Y
and V2 for the sample means X1 and	 and assign the
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new observation according to:
- 1/2 (Y 1 + Y2 ) ^ 0	 ==> Group 1
- 1/2 (i ^ Y2 ) < 0	 ==> Group 2
There are several procedures for estimating the
probability of misclassification using the LDF. These
procedures may be divided into two classes: empirical
methods, which require no distributional assumptions, and
normality based methods, which use the properties of the
normal distribution. Lachenbruch and Mickey 7 studied seven
techniques, some from each class.
They concluded that the methods based on normality are
consistently superior to the empirical methods when normal-
ity can be assumed, but are poor otherwise. Further study
showed that without normality, only the apparent error rate
method and the various sample partition methods are useful.
For moderately large samples, the apparent error rate may
be used, but for small samples, one of the partition
methods is preferable.
The apparent error rate is estimated by the resubsti-
tution method, in which the original observations on which
the LDF was developed are used to evaluate its performance.
This technique requires no distributional assumptions, but
is biased in the direction of underestimating the error
rate which will be found in future samples. Although this
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method is biased, Lachenbruch and Mickey found it to be
adequate for moderately large samples when normality is
violated.
One technique not studied by Lachenbruch and Mickey
was the holdout method, which uses part of the sample to
derive the LDF and the balance of the sample to estimate
the success rate. This method requires no distributional
assumptions, but does require initial samples large enough
to provide adequate sample size for estimating both the LDF
and the error rate.
Because the economic indicators used for the
restricted population in this study cannot be assumed to be
normally distributed, both the resubstitution and the
holdout approaches were used to estimate the probability of
misclassification.
A Logistic Analysis Approach to Predicting Debt
Rescheduling
Afifi and Clark8 remarked that "multiple logistic
regression equations are often used to estimate the
probability of a certain event occurring to a given
individual. Examples of such events are failure to repay a
loan, the occurrence of a heart attack, or death from lung
cancer." One way of obtaining estimates of such a model is
to select two random samples, one for which the event did
not occur. This is called a case-controlled sample and the
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classification problem and the problem of relating qualita-
tive to non-normal explanatory variables. They concluded
that logistic regression with MLE slightly outperformed the
classical linear discriminant analysis in both cases.
Harrell and Lee 11 offer a good account of the
comparative merits of both procedures. Harrell and Lee
stated that "When sampling from two multivariate normal
populations having equal covariance matrices, both the
Fisher linear discriminant function (LDF) and logistic
regression model (LRN) can be used to derive valid esti-
mates of the probability that a new observation comes from
one of the two populations. In this setting, the LDF has
been shown to yield asymptotically smaller relative
classification error rates. When assumptions for the LDF
are violated, LRM has been shown to be superior. In many
situations, one is interested in using more information
from a probability model than what is needed to devise a
binary classification rule."
Description of the Data on 40 Countries from 1974 to 1983
This period was chosen because it was a time of impor-
tant economic transition. The model also included devel-
oping countries that are viewed as very important in
international lending. Normally, commercial banks consider
loan requests only from the large, well known developing
countries. Since banks have to watch the economic and
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political situations in countries whose loans are in
arrears, there is some economy of scale in focusing their
lending to the larger developing countries.
Twelve economic indicators were considered for
building discriminant and logistic models for predicting
whether a particular country will need to reschedule its
debts or not. Data based on a record of ten years for 37
countries were used for this purpose. The following is a
description of the economic indicators (explanatory
variables) used in this study.
(1) DSR (Debt Service Ratio): The ratio of total
interest payments on all debt plus amortization
on long-term debt, divided by exports of goods
and services. Long-term amortization payments
were obtained from the Balance of Payments
Yearbook (BOPY) ; total interest payments were
calculated from the World Debt Tables (WDT) ;13
and exports of goods and services were obtained
from	 International	 Financial	 Statistics
(IFS) 14
(2) RSM (International Reserves to Imports Ratio): The
ratio of international reserves (excluding gold
holdings) to imports of goods and services.
Gold holdings were excluded from international
reserves because of the instability of gold
values on the world market and because national
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(3) AMZ
(4) SQCA
habits vary on gold valuation. The values of
international reserves minus gold were found in
the IFS, while those of imports of goods and
services were found in the WDT.
(Amortization Ratio): The ratio of amortization
of long-term debt to total outstanding long-
term debt at the end of the previous year. The
WDT was the source of the total long-term debt.
(Squared Ratio of Current Account to Exports):
The squared ratio of current account surplus or
deficit to exports of goods and services,
multiplied by a constant to retain the status
of the current account.
William Cline15 pointed out that the rela-
tionship between current account and exports
may be nonlinear. Accordingly, using a
quadratic specification to capture the nonlin-
earity and a constant to distinguish the
direction of the current account:
ICurrent Account	 12
SQCA = h i 	 I = hCAX2[xport of Goods and Servicej
If the current account shows a deficit, h=-l;
if the current account shows a surplus, h=+l.
The use of the constant h is necessary because
squaring the ratio makes all signs positive,
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preventing the distinction between deficit and
surplus.
The values for the current account balance and
exports of goods and services were found in the
WDT.
(5) GRO (Growth Rate of per capita GDP): The growth
rate of per capita income is obtained using
international financial statistics data on real
GDP and population.
(6) GDP (Per Capita Income): Level of real total
income divided by the corresponding population
count, i.e. level of real income per capita.
(7) X/M	 (Ratio of Exports to Imports):	 Exports of
goods and services divided by imports of goods
and services.
(8) XGR	 (Real Growth Rate in Exports):	 The export
growth variable is calculated as the ratio of
average real exports in years t and t-1 to that
average for years t-2 and t-3. A four year
growth period is sufficiently long to avoid
extremes of annual fluctuation and sufficiently
short to be considered relevant by creditors
for evaluation of recent performance. The IFS
was the source of estimation of the values of
the real exports.
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(9) NDX
(10)M/GDP
(11)DSR1
(12)ANZ1
(Ratio of Debt to Exports): The ratio of net
debt (gross debt minus international reserves)
to exports of goods and services. The values
of gross debt were found in the WDT.
(Ratio of Imports to GDP):	 Imports of goods
and services relative to nominal GDP.
(Debt Service Ratio): The ratio of total inter-
est payments on all debt and amortization on
long-term and short-term debt, divided by
exports of goods and services.
(Amortization Ratio): The ratio of amorti-
zation of long-term and short-term debt to
total outstanding debt at the end of the
previous year.
Two types of DSR and AMZ were considered because of
the difference involving amortization. Both of course have
amortization in their ratios. Long-term amortization is
actual amortization. Short-term amortization is net change
in loans, i.e., drawings minus amortization. Drawings are
withdrawal of the loans or use of the loans. If drawings
are larger than amortization, the net change will appear as
a positive entry (net drawing). If amortization is larger,
the net change will appear as a negative entry (net
amortization).
Although 40 countries were targeted for this study,
because of missing records, only 37 could actually be used.
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TabLe 7.1: LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES' DEBT RESCHEDULINGS, 1974-83
Country	 Year(s)
Argentina	 1976,1982,1983
BoLivia	 1981-83
BraziL	 1982,1983
ChiLe	 1975,1982,1983
Costa Rica	 1982,1983
Ecuador	 1982,1983
Gabon	 1978
Ivory Coast	 1983
Jamaica	 1978,1981,1983
Mexico	 1982,1983
Morocco	 1983
Nigeria	 1983
Peru	 1976,1978,1979,1982,1983
PhiLippines	 1983
*Sierra Leone
	
1977,1980,1982
*San	 1979-83
Turkey	 1978-80, 1982
Uruguay	 1982,1983
VenezueLa	 1983
YugosLavia	 1980,1982,1983
Zaire	 1976,1977,1979-83
Zantia	 1982,1983
*Dropp.i because of unavaiLabiLity of data
TotaL RescheduLing Years = 57 Years
A few missing observations were replaced by interpolation
between neighboring values to avoid complications, but when
a country lacked data for a number of variables in any
year, the whole case was dropped to avoid introduction of
bias. Table 7.1 lists the 22 rescheduling countries
included in the study, along with the years they resche-
duled their debts during the period of this model
(1974-1983). The rescheduling date begins when the country
proclaims its intent to reschedule and ends after an
agreement has been signed. Table 7.2 shows a list of all
40 countries targeted for this study.
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TabLe 7.2: COUNTRIES TARGETED FOR THIS STUDY
1. ALgeria	 21. Jamaica
2. Argentina	 22. MaLaysia
3. BoLivia	 23. Mexico
4. BraziL	 24. Morocco
5. Burma	 25. Nigeria
6. Carneroon	 26. Pakistan
7. ChiLe	 27. Peru
8. CoLonia	 28. PhiLippines
9. Costa Rica	 *29. PortugaL
10. Dominican RepubLic	 *30. Sierra Leone
11. Ecuador	 31. South Korea
12. Egypt	 *32. Sudan
13. EL Satvador	 33. ThaiLand
14. Gabon	 34. Tunisia
15. Ghana	 35. Turkey
16. Greece	 36. Uruguay
17. India	 37. VenezueLa
18. Indonesia	 38. YugosLavia
19. IsraeL	 39. Zaire
20. Ivory Coast	 40. Zaithia
* Dropped because of unavaiLabiLity of data
Statistical Analyses
All statistical analyses were carried out using the
SAS 16 (Statistical Analysis System) software package.
After examination of the preliminary analyses of the data,
it was noted that the correlation between DSR and DSR1
(-.958) and between ANZ and AMZ1 (.880) were too high to
include both variables in each pair in the analytical
models. DSR1 and ANZ1 were chosen for use in the models
because they use total debt (both long- and short-term
debt) in their ratios, whereas DSR and ANZ use only long-
term debt. DSR and ANZ were not examined further.
A complete listing of the data, along with the means,
standard deviations, and correlation matrices are contained
in Appendix C.
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Growth Curve Analysis
Since economic variables fluctuate over time and
economic variables for the same country over different
years are related, a preliminary time trend analysis for
the indicators was undertaken.
This analysis is an attempt to find out whether there
is a growth curve type relationship for the 12 indicators,
that is, whether any of these indicators has a pattern of
relationship to time--such as increasing or decreasing over
the years. If such a time trend exists, it would be neces-
sary to take this trend into consideration in building the
LDF.
A polynomial regression of the type
x = a+f31t+/32t2+p3t3+
where t = year - 1973 (i.e., t = 1,2,...,lO), and x
represents the value of the variable in the year
represented by t, was fitted to each variable, averaging
over all the countries and sequentially for powers of t.
R' 2 , the multiple correlation of each x with powers of t
fitted so far, was examined and when R' 2 did not show an
increase of a significant amount, the procedure was
terminated. The appropriate degree of the polynomial and
the value of R' 2 for some key variables are shown in Tables
7.3 and 7.4.
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TabLe 7.3: TIME TREND ANALYSIS FOR SIGNIFICANT VARIABLES IN LINEAR DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS
Variabtes	 Degree of PolynomiaL	 VaLue of
	
mt	 R2
DSR1	 2	 .1894
GRO	 3	 .1108
GDP	 --	 .0018
X/M	 1	 .0431
NDX	 3	 .1981
H/GOP	 . -
	 .0088
TabLe 7.4: TIME TREND ANALYSIS FOR SIGNIFICANT VARIABLES IN LOGISTIC ANALYSIS
VariabLes	 Degree of PoLynomiaL 	 VaLue of
	
mt	 R2
DSR1	 2	 .1894
RSM	 1	 .0468
X/M	 1	 .0431
XGR	 - -	 .0072
NDX	 3	 .1981
However, the value of R2 was so low in all cases that
it was concluded that time does not appear to be a signif-
icant cause of variation in the variables. Perhaps a
different econometric model is necessary to account for the
variation. In the absence of any such time trend, the 10
different values for each of the 12 predictor variables for
each country were treated as 10 independent observations.
This is not entirely satisfactory bacause the 10 values of
any variable in the same country are related. But any
attempt to take cognizance of these relationships in
building the LDF will introduce so many parameters that
effectively the degrees of freedom left for LDF will be too
few. Therefore, 370 observations (37 countries x 10 years)
were used to build the LDF, ignoring dependence over the
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years. Nicholas Sargen' T has also observed this problem.
A plot of the mean of each variable against time (years) is
shown in Appendix D.
Discriminant Analysis
The fundamental purpose of discriminant analysis is to
assign an observation, X, of unknown source to one of two
(or more) different groups, based on the value of the
observation. Some problems provide fairly thorough infor-
mation about the distribution of X in the two groups. When
this happens, the information may be used and the problem
treated as if the distributions are known. But, in the
greatest number of instances, the information about the
distribution of X originates from a relatively small sample
from each of the groups, and slightly dissimilar methods
are used.
To assess the ability of discriininant functions to
predict countries likely to reschedule, a sequential step-
by-step building up of Fischer's LDF was undertaken. The
procedure consisted of constructing an LDF for all the
countries, for all the years up to a time, using it to
predict the outcome for the next year, and then repeating
the procedure by including the next year in the construc-
tion of LDF and so on. This procedure permits assessment
of the predictive ability of the LDF, as well as of the
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stability of variables entering the LDF and their
contribution to its significance.
The results are suinmarized below for each set of years
except 1974, where no defaults occurred and thus no LDF
could be constructed. The syinbol 'Res' is used for
Reschedule and 'N-R' for Non-Reschedule.
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1974-1975: Combine 1974 and 1975 to estimate 1974-75 and
predict 1976.
Model: Intercept	 -0.10
RSM	 0.00
SQCA	 0.15
GRO	 0.21
GDP	 0.00
X/M	 0.07
XGR	 0.02
NDX	 0.02
M/GDP	 0.07
DSR1	 0.37	 (p < 0.1117)
ANZ1	 0.25
R2 : .1385
Classification for 1974-75
Res	 N-R
Res	 0	 1
Actual
N-R	 0	 73
Misclassification Rate: 1/74 = 1.4%
Type I Error Rate: 100.0%
Type II Error Rate:	 0.0%
Prediction for 1976
Res	 N-R
Res	 0	 3
Actual
N-R	 0	 34
Misclassification Rate: 3/37 = 8.1%
Type I Error Rate: 100.0%
Type II Error Rate:
	 0.0%
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1974-1976: Combine 1974 through 1976 to estimate 1974-76
and predict 1977.
Model: Intercept	 -0.34
RSM	 -0.04
SQCA	 -0.12
GRO	 0.3].
GDP	 0.00
X/M	 0.25	 (p < 0.0638)
XGR	 -0.03
MDX	 0.05
M/GDP	 0.07
DSR1	 0.47	 (p < 0.0948)
ANZ1	 0.04
R2 : .1808
Classification for 1974-76
Res	 N-R
Res	 0	 4
Actual
N-R	 0	 107
Misclassification Rate: 4/ill = 3.6%
Type I Error Rate: 100.0%
Type II Error Rate:
	 0.0%
Prediction for 1977
Res	 N-R
Res	 0	 1
Actual
N-R	 0	 36
Misclassification Rate: 1/37 = 2.7%
Type I Error Rate: 100.0%
Type II Error Rate:
	 0.0%
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1974-1977: Combine 1974 through 1977 to estimate 1974-77
and predict 1978.
Model: Intercept	 -0.33
RSM	 -0.03
SQCA	 -0.35	 (p < 0.0014)
GRO	 0.06
GDP	 0.00
X/M	 0.27	 (p < 0.0122)
XGR	 -0.04
NDX	 -0.01
M/GDP	 0.12
DSR1	 0.62	 (p < 0.0027)
ANZ1	 0.20
R2 : .2243
Classification for 1974-77
Res	 N-R
Res	 1	 4
Actual
N-R	 0	 143
Misclassification Rate: 4/148 = 2.7%
Type I Error Rate: 	 80.0%
Type II Error Rate:	 0.0%
Prediction for 1978
Res	 N-R
Res	 0	 4
Actual
N-R	 0	 33
Misclassification Rate: 4/37 = 10.8%
Type I Error Rate: 100.0%
Type II Error Rate:
	 0.0%
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1974-1978: Combine 1974 through 1978 to estimate 1974-78
and predict 1979.
Model: Intercept	 -0.47
RSM	 -0.08
SQCA	 -0.26	 (p < 0.0275)
GRO	 -0.01
GDP	 0.00
X/M	 0.37	 (p < 0.0019)
XGR	 -0.06
NDX	 0.05
M/GDP	 0.20	 (p < 0.0561)
DSR1	 0.41	 (p < 0.0384)
ANZ1	 -0.12
R2 : .1981
Classification for 1974-78
Res	 N-R
Res	 0	 9
Actual
N-R	 0	 176
Misclassification Rate: 9/185 = 4.9%
Type I Error Rate: 100.0%
Type II Error Rate:	 0.0%
Prediction for 1979
Res	 N-R
Res	 0	 3
Actual
N-R	 0	 34
Misclassification Rate: 3/37 = 8.1%
Type I Error Rate: 100.0%
Type II Error Rate:
	
0.0%
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1974-1979: Combine 1974 through 1979 to estimate 1974-79
and predict 1980.
Model: Intercept
RSM
S QCA
GRO
GDP
X/M
XGR
NDX
M/ GDP
DSR1
ANZ 1
-0.50
-0. 07
-0. 19
-0. 17
0.00
0.41
-0.07
0.07
0.16
0.35
-0.14
(p < 0.0890)
( p < 0.0004)
(p < 0.1031)
( p < 0.0150)
( p < 0.1023)
( p < 0.0569)
R2 : .2010
Classification for 1974-79
Res	 N-R
Res	 0	 12
Actual
N-R	 0	 210
Misclassification Rate: 12/222 = 5.4%
Type I Error Rate: 100.0%
Type II Error Rate:	 0.0%
Prediction for 1980
Res	 N-R
Res	 0	 3
Actual
N_RL	 0	 34
Misclassification Rate: 3/37 = 8.1%
Type I Error Rate: 100.0%
Type II Error Rate: 	 0.0%
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1974-1980: Combine 1974 through 1980 to estimate 1974-80
and predict 1981.
Model: Intercept
RSM
S QCA
GRO
GDP
X/M
XGR
NDX
M/GDP
DSR1
ANZ 1
-0.45
-0. 05
-0.18
-0. 02
0. 00
0.36
-0. 08
0.07
0.14
0.34
-0.10
(p < 0.0967)
( p < 0.0009)
( p < 0.0470)
( p < 0.0084)
( p < 0.0495)
R2 : .1925
Classification for 1974-80
Res	 N-R
Res	 1	 14
Actual
N-R	 0	 244
Misclassification Rate: 14/259 = 5.4%
Type I Error Rate:
	 93.3%
Type II Error Rate:
	 0.0%
Prediction for 1981
Res	 N-R
Res	 0	 3
Actual
N-R	 0	 34
Misclassification Rate: 3/37 = 8.1%
Type I Error Rate: 100.0%
Type II Error Rate:
	 0.0%
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1974-1981: Combine 1974 through 1981 to estimate 1974-81
and predict 1982.
Model: Intercept
RSM
SQ CA
GRO
GDP
X/M
XGR
NDX
M/ GDP
DSR1
ANZ 1
-0.42
-0. 05
-0. 10
-0. 14
0.00
0.32
-0. 07
0.07
0. 18
0.34
-0.14
(p < 0.0015)
( p < 0.0713)
( p < 0.0061)
( p < 0.0462)
( p < 0.0335)
R2 : .1825
Classification for 1974-81
Res	 N-R
Res T 0	 18
Actual
N-R	 0	 278
Misclassification Rate: 18/296 = 6.1%
Type I Error Rate: 100.0%
Type II Error Rate:
	 0.0%
Prediction for 1982
Res	 N-R
Res	 0	 13
Actual
N-R H 0	 24
Misclassification Rate: 13/37 = 35.1%
Type I Error Rate: 100.0%
Type II Error Rate:
	 0.0%
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1974-1982: Combine 1974 through 1982 to estimate 1974-82
and predict 1983.
Model: Intercept
RSM
S QCA
GRO
*GDP
X/M
XGR
NDX
M/ GDP
DSR1
AMZ 1
-0.39
-0. 06
0. 00
-0.54
0.00
0.32
-0. 05
0.04
0. 17
0.79
0.27
(p < 0.0933)
( p < 0.0953)
( p < 0.0039)
( p < 0.0803)
( p < 0.0001)
R2 : .2906
* GDP = -0.000019503
Classification for 1974-82
Res	 N-R
Res	 8	 23
Actual
N-R	 0	 302
Misclassification Rate: 23/333 = 6.9%
Type I Error Rate:	 74.2%
Type II Error Rate:	 0.0%
Prediction for 1983
Res	 N-R
Res	 6	 12
Actual
N-R	 0	 19
Misclassification Rate: 12/37 = 32.4%
Type I Error Rate:	 66.7%
Type II Error Rate:	 0.0%
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1974-1983: Combine 1974 through 1983 to estimate 1974-83.
Model: Intercept
RSM
S QCA
GRO
*GDP
X/M
XGR
NDX
M/ GDP
DSR1
AMZ1
-0.50
-0. 05
0.10
-0.86
0.00
0.40
-0.08
0. 07
0.26
0.86
0.31
(p < 0.0069)
(p < 0.0328)
( p < 0.0003)
( p < 0.0948)
( p < 0.0113)
( p < 0.0081)
( p < 0.0001)
R2 : .4016
* GDP = -0.000025391
Classification for 1974-83
Res	 N-R
Res	 23	 26
Actual
N-R	 2	 319
Misclassification Rate: 28/370 = 7.6%
Type I Error Rate:	 53.1%
Type II Error Rate: 	 0.6%
Stepwise:	 Combine 1974 through 1983 to estimate 1974-83;
non-significant variables deleted.
Model: Intercept
S QCA
GRO
X/M
XGR
NDX
N/GD P
DSR1
AMZ
R2 : .4048
-0.48
0.10
-0.85
0.37
-0.08
0.06
0.29
0.91
0.49
Misclassification Rate: 29/370 = 7.84%
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TabLe 7.5: SUMMARY OF DISCRIMINANT MODEL PERFORMANCE
	
Ctassjfica t jona	predictionb
Actual -	 I
	
ModeL	 NuTer	 N	 Type I
	
Type II	 TotaL	 N	 Type I	 Type II	 Total
	
Years	 of Res Res Error % Error % Error % Res Error % Error	 Error %
	
1974-75	 1/ 74	 0	 100.0	 0.0	 1.4	 0	 100.0	 0.0	 8.1
	
1974-76	 4/111	 0	 100.0	 0.0	 3.6	 0	 100.0	 0.0	 2.7
	
1974-77	 5/148	 1	 80.0	 0.0	 2.7	 0	 100.0	 0.0	 10.8
	
1974-78	 9/185	 0	 100.0	 0.0	 4.9	 0	 100.0	 0.0	 8.1
	
1974-79	 12/222	 0	 100.0	 0.0	 5.4	 0	 100.0	 0.0	 8.1
	
1974-80	 15/259	 1	 93.3	 0.0	 5.4	 0	 100.0	 0.0	 8.1
	
1974-81	 18/296	 0	 100.0	 0.0	 6.1	 0	 100.0	 0.0	 35.1
	
1974-82	 31/333	 8	 74.2	 0.0	 6.9	 6	 66.7	 0.0	 32.4
	
1974-83	 49/370	 25	 53.1	 0.6	 7.6	 .	 -	 -	 -
(a) CLassification for years on which modeL was based.
(b) Prediction for year (N = 37) foLlowing years on which model was based.
Table 7.5 presents the error rates for both the
classification in the development sample and the prediction
in the year following those on which the model was based,
along with a comparison of the actual, classified, and
predicted number of reschedulings. From 1975 through 1981,
when the rescheduling rate was very low, virtually all of
the reschedulings are missed by the model, and thus Type I
error rates are very high. For the periods 1974-82 and
1974-83, when the rescheduling rate increased considerably,
some of the reschedulings are predicted--25% for 1974-82
and over 50% for 1974-83--and the Type I error rate
decreases.
Because there were so few rescheduling cases (49/370)
during this time, the model generally indicated non-
rescheduling status in virtually all cases, leading to Type
II error rates of 0 except for the 1974-83 classification,
where two non-rescheduling cases were classified as
rescheduled.
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Table 7.6: SIGNIFICANT COEFFICIENTS FOR SUCCESSIVE DISCRIMINANT MODELS
I	 Years on Which ModeL Was Based
VariabLe	 1974-75 1974-76 1974-77 1974-78 1974-79 1974-80 1974-81 1974-82 1974-83
RSM
SOCA	 - .347	 - .260	 - - 192*	 - .175*
CR0	 - 535*	-
GOP	 .000*	 .000
X/M	 .249*	 .272	 .370	 .406	 .356	 .324	 .318	 .398
XGR	 ..067*	 - .080	 - .072*	 - .075*
WDX	 .071	 .075	 .075	 .071
M/GDP	 197*	 .159*	 .178	 .168*	 .262
DSR1	 468*	 .624	 .409	 .346*	 .337	 .335	 .791	 .861
AMZ1
R2 	.1385	 .1808	 .2243	 .1981	 .2010	 .1925	 .1825	 .2906	 .4016
NOTE: GOP = -0.00002 for 1974-82 and GOP = -0.00003 for 1974-83.
NOTE: Coefficients are significant at p < .05. except for those 	 cated , , nere
.05 < p < .11.
Table 7.6 presents the significant coefficients from
the successive discrixninant models. Only DSR1 and X/M were
consistently significant. M/GDP was significant in five of
the nine models, but with very low coefficients. NDX, XGR,
and SQCA were significant in four models, while GDP and GRO
showed up only when 1982 and 1983 were included in the
regression base. These were the two years of those studied
where a large number of reschedulings took place. These
two years also showed a substantial increase in R2.
Note that the R2 value shows a general tendency to
increase as more years are included in the regression base,
but even with all ten years, it is still quite low,
indicating only modest discriminating power for these
economic indicators.
To see the change in the LDF over the years, a
stepwise LDF was calculated for each year separately. The
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TabLe 7.7 SIGNIFICANT STEPWISE LDF MODEL COEFFICIENTS FOR EACH SUCCESSIVE YEAR
1975	 1976	 1977	 1978	 1979	 1980	 1981	 1982	 1983
Intercept -0.62	 -0.11	 -0.02	 -0.11	 -1.13	 -0.10	 -0.10	 -0.80	 -1.34
DSR	 -1.86	 -0.70	 -1.95
RSM
AMZ	 5.97	 2.89	 2.80
SOCA	 0.33	 -1.12	 -0.52	 0.58	 0.97
GRO	 -2.32	 -4.02
GDP
X/M	 0.58	 0.97	 1.00	 0.94
XGR
MDX	 -0.09	 0.13	 0.26	 0.20
M/GDP	 0.32	 0.51	 1.01
DSR1	 0.55	 0.73	 0.63
AMZ1	 0.79	 -6.35	 -4.03
R	 0.48	 0.45	 0.68	 0.33	 0.45	 0.15	 0.42	 0.58	 0.70
results are given in Table 7.7. Only the final models are
given--that is, after removing insignificant variables and
reconstructing the LDF's.
Logistic Analysis
The logistic analysis procedure used in this study is
contained in the SAS SUGI Supplemental Library User's
Guide. SUGI contains a procedure called LOGIST, which
provides maximum likelihood estimates of logistic
regression parameters. The predictive ability of the
logistic model is provided by a likelihood ratio goodness-
of-fit statistic, akin to the R 2 provided by regression
models.
Stepwise selection can be misleading. Variables may
turn out to be significant even when no real associations
with the dependent variable exists.
	 When the absolute
value of a parameter being tested becomes very large, the
- 295 -
standard error estimate becomes too large and the Wald
statistic becomes too small. LOGIST indicates this condi-
tion by declaring an estimate to be tinfiniteIt and
suppressing the calculation of the standard error and the
Wald statistic. An alternative is to use a likelihood
ratio test by running the procedure with and without a
variable and testing the difference in the likelihood ratio
chi-square.
The successive model-building approach used for the
LDF was also used here for the logistic model. That is,
the model was first constructed for 1974-75; one additional
year was then added at each step, providing a total of nine
models.
The logistic coefficients and associated test
statistics and the classification table for the successive
models are shown below. In these tables, 'Res' means
Reschedule and 'N-R' means Non-Reschedule. Rescheduling is
predicted if the estimated probability of rescheduling is
greater than a given number. Otherwise, non-rescheduling
is predicted. Sensitivity is the proportion of true
positives (rescheduling countries) that were predicted to
be positive (rescheduling), the complement of the Type I
error rate. Specificity is the proportion of true
negatives (non-rescheduling countries) that were predicted
to be negative (non-rescheduling), the complement of the
Type II error rate. False positive rate is the proportion
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of predicted positives that were actually negative. False
negative rate is the proportion of predicted negatives that
were actually positive.
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1974-1975: Combine 1974 and 1975 to estimate 1974-75
and predict 1976.
Model: Intercept	 -73.36
RSM	 -60.22
SQCA	 17.55
GRO	 53.14
GDP	 0.00
X/M	 53.39
XGR	 6.73
NDX	 8.48
M/GDP	 19.40
DSR1	 49.33
AMZ1	 94.62
No variables ' were significant at the 10% level.
Classification for 1974-75
Res	 N-R
Res	 1	 0
Actual
N-R	 0	 73
Misclassification Rate: 0/74 = 0.0%
Type I Error Rate:	 0.0%
Type II Error Rate: 	 0.0%
Sensitivity: 100%
	 False Negative Rate: 0.0%
Specificity: 100%
	 False Positive Rate: 0.0%
Prediction for 1976
Res	 N-R
Res	 0	 3
Actual
N-R	 2	 32
Misclassification Rate: 5/37 = 14.0%
Type I Error Rate: 100.0%
Type II Error Rate:	 5.9%
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1974-1976: Combine 1974 through 1976 to estimate 1974-76
and predict 1977.
	
Model: Intercept	 -33.11
RSM	 -11.01
SQCA	 -9.23
GRO	 9.08
GDP	 0.00
X/M	 18.51
XGR	 0.92
NDX	 4.23
M/GDP	 8.06
DSR1	 2.12
ANZ1	 -22.73
No variables were significant at the 10% level.
Classification for 1974-76
Res	 N-R
Res	 2	 2
Actual
N-R	 1	 106
Misclassification Rate: 3/111 = 2.7%
Type I Error Rate: 	 50.0%
Type II Error Rate: 	 0.9%
Sensitivity: 50.0% False Negative Rate: 1.9%
Specificity: 99.1% False Positive Rate: 33.3%
Prediction for 1977
Res	 N-R
Res	 1	 0
Actual
N-R	 4	 32
Misclassification Rate: 4/37 = 10.8%
Type I Error Rate: 0.0%
Type II Error Rate: 11.1%
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1974-1977: Combine 1974 through 1977 to estimate 1974-77
and predict 1978.
Model: Intercept 	 -17.55
RSM	 -8.72
SQCA	 -6.29
GRO	 4.19
GDP	 0.00
X/M	 11.28
XGR	 -1.46
NDX	 0.46
M/GDP	 3.08
DSR1	 15.86
ANZ1	 13.17
No variables were significant at the 10% level.
Classification for 1974-77
Res	 N-R
Res	 1	 4
Actual
N-R	 1	 142
Misclassification Rate: 5/148 = 3.4%
Type I Error Rate:
	 80.0%
Type II Error Rate:
	 0.7%
Sensitivity: 20.0% False Negative Rate: 2.7%
Specificity: 99.3% False Positive Rate: 50.0%
Prediction for 1978
Res	 N-R
Res	 1	 3
Actual
N-R	 1	 32
Misclassification Rate: 4/37 = 10.8%
Type I Error Rate: 75.0%
Type II Error Rate: 3.0%
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1974-1978: Combine 1974 through 1978 to estimate 1974-78
and predict 1979.
Model: Intercept	 -17.06
RSM	 -8.64
SQCA	 -4.44	 (p < 0.0845)
GRO	 7.66
GDP	 0.00
X/M	 9.51	 (p < 0.0207)
XGR	 -1.44
NDX	 1.81	 (p < 0.0446)
M/GDP	 3.65
DSR].	 4.84
ANZ3.	 -2.55
Classification for 1974-78
Res	 N-R
Res	 3	 6
Actual
N-R	 2	 174
Misclassification Rate: 8/185 = 4.3%
Type I Error Rate:	 66.7%
Type II Error Rate: 	 1.1%
Sensitivity: 33.3% False Negative Rate: 3.3%
Specificity: 98.9% False Positive Rate: 40.0%
Prediction for 1979
Res	 N-R
Res	 0	 3
Actual
N-R	 1	 33
Misclassification Rate: 4/37 = 10.8%
Type I Error Rate: 100.0%
Type II Error Rate:	 2.9%
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1974-1979: Combine 1974 through 1979 to estimate 1974-79
and predict 1980.
Model: Intercept 	 -17.65
RSM	 -4.36
SQCA	 -3.38
GRO	 1.51
GDP	 0.00
X/M	 9.72	 (p < 0.0030)
XGR	 -1.63
NDX	 2.02	 (p < 0.0141)
M/GDP	 3.46
DSR1	 5.79
ANZ1	 -1.74
Classification for 1974-79
Res	 N-R
Res	 2	 10
Actual
N-R	 3	 207
Misclassification Rate: 13/222 = 5.9%
Type I Error Rate: 83.3%
Type II Error Rate: 	 1.4%
Sensitivity: 16.7% False Negative Rate: 4.6%
Specificity: 98.6% False Positive Rate: 60.0%
Prediction for 1980
Res	 N-R
Res	 1	 2
Actual
N-R	 0	 34
Misclassification Rate: 2/37 = 5.4%
Type I Error Rate: 66.7%
Type II Error Rate: 0.0%
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1974-1980: Combine 1974 through 1980 to estimate 1974-80
and predict 1981.
Model: Intercept
RSM
S QCA
GRO
GDP
X/M
XGR
NDX
M/ GDP
DSR1
AMZ 1
-14 . 55
-4. 67
-2.40
3.81
0.00
7.63
-1. 68
1.72
3 . 03
5.18
-1. 06
(p < 0.0059)
( p < 0.0113)
Classification for 1974-80
Res	 N-R
Res	 3	 12
Actual
N-R	 2	 242
Misclassification Rate: 14/259 = 5.4%
Type I Error Rate:
	 80.0%
Type II Error Rate:
	 0.8%
Sensitivity: 20.0% False Negative Rate: 4.7%
Specificity: 99.2% False Positive Rate: 40.0%
Prediction for 1981
Res	 N-R
Res	 0	 3
Actual
N-R	 0	 34
Misclassification Rate: 3/37 = 8.1%
Type I Error Rate: 100.0%
Type II Error Rate: 0.0%
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1974-1981: Combine 1974 through 1981 to estimate 1974-81
and predict 1982.
Model: Intercept
RSM
S QCA
GRO
GDP
X/M
XGR
NDX
M/ GDP
DSR1
AMZ 1
-14.22
-4 . 62
-1.41
2.00
0.00
7.14
-1.52
1.69
3.79
5.24
-3.80
(p < 0.0051)
( p < 0.0081)
( p < 0.0934)
Classification for 1974-81
Res	 N-R
Res	 3	 15
Actual
N-R	 3	 275
Misclassification Rate: 18/296 = 6.1%
Type I Error Rate: 	 83.3%
Type II Error Rate:	 1.1%
Sensitivity: 16.7% False Negative Rate: 5.2%
Specificity: 98.9% False Positive Rate: 50.0%
Prediction for 1982
Res	 N-R
Res	 6	 7
Actual
N-R	 0	 24
Misclassification Rate: 7/37 = 18.9%
Type I Error Rate: 53.9%
Type II Error Rate: 0.0%
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1974-1982: Combine 1974 through 1982 to estimate 1974-82
and predict 1983.
Model: Intercept	 -10.77
RSM	 -6.73	 (p < 0.0373)
SQCA	 -0.65
GRO	 -2.51
GDP	 0.00
X/M	 6.20	 (p < 0.0056)
XGR	 -0.94
NDX	 0.96	 (p < 0.0690)
M/GDP	 1.72
DSR1	 7.64	 (p < 0.0028)
AMZ1	 4.18
Classification for 1974-82
Res	 N-R
Res	 13	 18
Actual
N-R	 5	 297
Misclassification Rate: 23/333 = 6.9%
Type I Error Rate: 58.1%
Type II Error Rate: 1.7%
Sensitivity: 41.9% False Negative Rate: 5.7%
Specificity: 98.3% False Positive Rate: 27.8%
Prediction for 1983
Res	 N-R
Res	 9	 9
Actual
N-R	 0	 19
Misclassification Rate: 9/37 = 24.3%
Type I Error Rate: 50.0%
Type II Error Rate: 0.0%
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1974-1983: Combine 1974 through 1983 to estimate 1974-83.
Model: Intercept
RSM
S QCA
CR0
GDP
X/M
XGR
NDX
M/GDP
DSR1
AMZ 1
-11.69
-5.75
0.31
-6. 08
0.00
6.82
-1.29
1.10
2 . 53
8. 19
5.76
(p < 0.0307)
(p < 0.0006)
( p < 0.0133)
( p < 0.0005)
Classification for 1974-83
Res	 N-R
Res	 29	 20
Actual
N-R	 5	 316
Misclassification Rate: 25/370 = 6.8%
Type I Error Rate: 40.8%
Type II Error Rate: 	 1.6%
Sensitivity: 59.2% False Negative Rate: 6.0%
Specificity: 98.4% False Positive Rate: 14.7%
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Stepwise: Combine 1974 through 1983 to estimate 1974-83;
all non-significant variables deleted.
Model: Intercept 	 -11.07
RSM	 -7.28
X/M	 6.76
XGR	 -1.70
NDX	 1.27
DSR1	 6.74
Classification for 1974-83
Res	 N-R
Res	 28	 21
Actual
N-R	 8	 313
Misclassification Rate: 29/370 = 7.8%
Type I Error Rate: 42.9%
Type II Error Rate:	 2.5%
Sensitivity: 57.1% False Negative Rate: 6.3%
Specificity: 97.5% False Positive Rate: 22.2%
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TabLe 7.8: SUMMARY OF LOGISTIC MODEL PERFORMANCE
Classificationa
Actual - ________ ________ ________ - ________ ________ ________
	
Model	 Nunber	 N	 Type I
	
Type II
	
Total	 N	 Type I	 Type II	 Total
	
Years	 of Res Res Error % Error % Error % Res Error % Error X Error %
	
1974-75	 1/ 74	 1	 0.0	 0.0	 0.0	 2	 100.0	 5.9	 14.0
	
1974-76	 4/111	 3	 50.0	 0.9	 2.7	 5	 0.0	 11.1	 10.8
1974-77	 5/148	 2	 80.0	 0.7	 3.4	 2	 75.0	 3.0	 10.8
	
1974-78	 9/185	 5	 66.7	 1.1	 4.3	 1	 100.0	 2.9	 10.8
	
1974-79	 12/222	 5	 83.3	 1.4	 5.9	 1	 66.7	 0.0	 5.4
	
1974-80	 15/259	 5	 80.0	 0.8	 5.4	 0	 100.0	 0.0	 8.1
	
1974-81	 18/296	 6	 83.3	 1.1	 6.1	 6	 53.9	 0.0	 18.9
	
1974-82	 31/333	 18	 58.1	 1.7	 6.9	 9	 50.0	 0.0	 24.3
	
1974-83	 49/370	 34	 40.8	 1.6	 6.8	 -	 -	 -	 -
(a) CLassification for years on which model was based.
(b) Prediction for year (N = 37) foLlowing years on which modeL was based.
Table 7.8 presents the error rates for both the
classification in the total development sample and the
prediction in the year following those on which the model
was based, along with a comparison of the actual,
classified, and predicted number of reschedulings. Type I
error rates are high because most of the reschedulings are
missed by the model, especially when the actual
rescheduling rate was very low. Type II error rates are
consistently very low because the model generally indicates
non-rescheduling status for most of the cases.
Table 7.9 presents the significant coefficients from
the successive logistic models. There were no significant
coefficients prior to the 1974-78 analysis. After 1977,
X/M and NDX were consistently significant, with DSR1
showing up as significant beginning in 1974-81. RSM was
significant in two of the time periods, while SQCA was
significant in only one time period. It is worth noting
that RSM showed up only when 1982 and 1983 were included in
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TabLe 7.9: SIGNIFICANT COEFFICIENTS FOR SUCCESSIVE LOGISTIC MODELS
Years on Which ModeL Was Based
Variable	 1974-75 1974-76 1974-77 1974-78 1974-79 1974-80 1974-81 1974-82 1974-83
RSM	 -6.73	 -5.75
SQCA	 .444*
GRO
GOP
X/M	 9.51	 9.72	 7.63	 7.14	 6.20	 6.82
XGR
NDX	 1.81	 2.02	 1.72	 1.69	 0.96*	 1.10
M/GDP
DSR1	 5.24*	 7.64	 8.19
AMZ1
NOTE: Coefficients are significant at p < .05, except for those indicated by *, where
.05 < p < .10.
the model base. These were the two years of those studied
where a large number of reschedulings took place.
Comparison of Model Performance with Chance
The performance of the discriminant and logistic
models was tested by comparing the probabilities of cor-
rectly classifying the rescheduling and non-rescheduling
countries with each of these models to the a priori
(chance)	 probabilities	 of	 rescheduling	 and	 non-
rescheduling, respectively. This approach is described by
Taffler and Abassi.'8
The a priori (chance) probabilities of rescheduling
and non-rescheduling are shown in Table 7.10 for each set
of model years in this study. For the total period, the a
priori probability of rescheduling is .132, and the a
priori probability of not rescheduling is .868.
- 309 -
TabLe 7.10: PERCENT OF CORRECT CLASSIFICATIONS BY NELS VS. CHANCE
Actual	 Chance	 LDF ModeL	 Logistic ModeL
Res
Year	 Cases	 Res	 N-Res	 Res	 N-Res	 Res	 N-Res
	
1974-75	 1/ 74	 1.4	 98.6	 --	 98.6	 100.0	 100.0
	
1974-76	 4/111	 3.6	 96.4	 --	 96.4	 66.7	 98.1
	
1974-77	 5/148	 3.4	 96.6	 100.0	 97.3	 50.0	 97.3
	
1974-78	 9/185	 4.9	 95.1	 --	 95.1	 60.0	 96.7
	
1974-79	 12/222	 5.4	 94.6	 --	 94.6	 40.0	 95.4
	
1974-80	 15/259	 5.8	 94.2	 100.0	 94.6	 60.0	 95.3
	
1974-81	 18/296	 6.1	 93.9	 -.	 93.9	 50.0	 96.8
	
1974-82	 31/333	 9.3	 90.7	 100.0	 92.9	 72.2	 94.3
	
1974-83	 49/370	 13.2	 86.8	 92.0	 92.5	 85.3	 94.0
(a) '--' indicates that no rescheduLing cLassifications were made
by the modeL for that period; thus no percentage can be conuted.
Table 7.10 also shows the probability of correct re-
scheduling and non-rescheduling classifications for the
discriininant and logistic models. Overall, the probability
of a correct rescheduling classification using the dis-
criminant model was .92, significantly greater than the a
priori probability of .132. The probability of a correct
non-rescheduling classification with this model was .925,
significantly greater than the a priori probability of
.868, although this difference is primarily due to the
improved performance when 1982 and 1983 are included in the
model base. Prior to those years, the model did not show
better than chance performance for the non-rescheduling
countries. Thus, the discriminant model performs
significantly better than chance.
For the logistic model, the overall probability of a
correct rescheduling classification was .853, significantly
greater than the a priori probability of .132. The prob-
ability of a correct non-rescheduling classification with
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this model was .94, significantly greater than the a priori
probability of .868, although again this difference is due
primarily to the improved performance of the model for 1982
and 1983. Thus, the logistic model also performs
significantly better than chance.
Comparison of Discriminant and Logistic Approaches
The discriminant and logistic approaches produced very
similar results. Table 7.11 presents a comparison of the
error rates for both models. Generally, the Type I error
rates for the logistic models are lower than those for the
discriminant models, while the Type II error rates tend to
be lower for the discriminant models, though they are still
quite low for the logistic models. The high Type I error
rates for both models indicate that they are of limited use
for identifying rescheduling countries. The reason is not
inherently a problem with either statistical approach, but
instead a result of having so few rescheduling countries in
the sample, especially prior to 1982.
Table 7.12 presents the year/variable combinations
where significant coefficients were found for either the
logistic or the discriminant analyses or both. There is
fairly strong agreement in the results of both statistical
models. Except for the years prior to 1978, where the
logistic model failed to find any significant variables,
the same significant year/variable combinations were found
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TabLe 7.11: ERROR RATES FOR DISCRIMINANI AND LOGISTIC MODELS
Discriminant ModeLs	 Logistic ModeLs
	
ModeL	 ActuaL
	
Years	 Res	 Type I	 Type II	 TotaL	 Type I	 Type II	 TotaL
	
1974-75	 1/ 74	 100.0	 0.0	 1.4	 0.0	 0.0	 0.0
	
1974-76	 4/111	 100.0	 0.0	 3.6	 50.0	 0.9	 2.7
	
1974-77	 5/148	 80.0	 0.0	 2.7	 80.0	 0.7	 3.4
	
1974-78	 9/185	 100.0	 0.0	 4.9	 66.7	 1.1	 4.3
	
1974-79	 12/222	 100.0	 0.0	 5.4	 83.3	 1.4	 5.9
	
1974-80	 15/259	 93.3	 0.0	 5.4	 80.0	 0.8	 5.4
	
1974-81	 18/269	 100.0	 0.0	 6.1	 83.3	 1.1	 6.1
	
1974-82	 31/333	 74.2	 0.0	 6.9	 58.1	 1.7	 6.9
	
1974-83	 49/370	 53.1	 0.6	 7.6	 40.8	 1.6	 6.8
TabLe 7.12: SIGNIFICANIVARIABLES FOR DISCRIMINANT AND LOGISTIC MODELS
Years on Which ModeLs Was Based
VariabLe	 1974-75 1974-76 1974-77 1974-78 1974-79 1974-80 1974-81 1974-82 1974-83
RSM	 L	 L
SQCA	 0	 L&D	 0	 D
GRO	 D	 D
GOP
X/M	 0	 D	 L&O	 L&0	 L&D	 L&D	 L&D	 L&D
XGR	 0	 D	 0	 0
NDX	 L	 L&D	 L&D	 L&O	 L	 L&D
M/GDP	 D	 D	 D	 D	 D
DSR1	 0	 D	 D	 D	 D	 L&D	 L&D	 L&D
AMZ 1
NOTE: D = Discriminant AnaLysis
L = Logistic AnaLysis
in 14 of 34 cases. The most important variables, X/M, NDX,
and DSR1, were consistently found to be significant by both
models, although DSR1 failed to achieve significance in the
logistic model before 1974-81.
Comparison of Results with Prior Research
Model Performance in Development Sample
The performance of the models developed in the present
study is compared with that of prior studies in Table 7.13
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TabLe 7.13: COMPARISON OF LOGISTIC ANALYSIS WITH PRIOR STUDIES
Feder,
Present	 Feder	 Just,	 Mayo &	 Saini &
Studya &
	
& RossC Barrett dined	Batese	 Morgan
Period
Tested	 1974-83	 1965-72	 1965-76	 1960-75	 1967-82	 1960-77	 1975-82
Nuri>er of
Cases	 370	 238	 580	 571	 670	 159	 240
Nunber of
Res Cases	 49	 21	 40	 28	 22	 22	 40
Error Rates
Type I
	
40.8%	 4.8%	 20.0%	 25.0%	 9.1%	 31.8%	 15.0%
Type II
	
1.6%	 2.3%	 5.9%	 13.1%	 12.9%	 18.1%	 13.0%
TotaL	 6.8%	 2.5%	 6.9%	 13.7%	 12.8%	 19.2%	 13.3%
* Cutoff	 .50	 .40	 .20	 --	 .041	 ---	 .16
(a) Classification of cases on which model was developed.
(b) 5-variable case.
(C) ModeL 1 (linear).
(d) Model C.
(e) Dependent VariabLe 1 (rescheduLing vs. non-rescheduling).
(f) Model B.
for the logistic model and Table 7.14 for the discriiuinant
model. The Type II and total error rates found here for
the logistic model are generally lower than those found in
earlier studies, but the Type I error rate is substantially
higher than that for the earlier studies. The reason for
this is the relatively high cutoff P* used in the present
study, which tends to reduce the number of reschedulings
predicted and thus results in more actual reschedulings
missed by the model.
The same pattern as that for the logistic model occurs
again in the comparison of the discriminant model error
rates with those of prior studies. The Type II and total
error rates found here are consistently lower than those
found in prior studies, but the Type I error rate in this
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Table 7.14: COMPARISON OF DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS WITH PRIOR STUDIES
Present	 Frank	 Saini &	 TaffLe &
	
Studya & clineb sargenC Batesd	Morgane Abassi
Period
Tested	 1974-83	 1960-68	 1960-75	 1960-77	 1975-82	 1967-77
WuTer of
Cases	 370	 145	 466	 159	 240	 681
Nuer of
Res Cases	 49	 13	 24	 22	 40	 50
Error Rates
Type 1	 53.1%	 23.1%	 33.3%	 13.6%	 15.0%	 10.0%
Type II	 0.6%	 10.6%	 7.9%	 7.3%	 13.5%	 8.9%
Total	 7.6%	 11.7%	 9.2%	 8.2%	 13.8%	 9.0%
(a) Classification of cases on which modeL was deveLoped.
(b) 3-variabLe case, Linear, iteration 1 (equaL covariance structure).
Cc) Cut-off value of discriminant function 	 0.
(d) Replicates procedure used by Feder and Just, with modified dependent
variable.
Ce) Model B.
(f) Devetopnent sanDte.
study is substantially higher than those for earlier
studies.
Comparison of significant Predictors
Some of the variables found to be significant in the
logistic model developed here were also found by earlier
studies. The debt-service ratio appeared as a significant
predictor in both Feder and Just studies and in the dine
study.	 The ratio of reserves to imports was found by all
prior studies except the Saini and Bates study. The
squared current account to exports ratio found by dine was
significant here in the 1974-78 model. The net debt to
exports ratio found significant here was not found
elsewhere, but total debt to exports was a significant
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predictor in both the Morgan and the Mayo and Barrett
models.
On the other hand, some variables found by the earlier
models were not confirmed here. The growth rate of exports
and per capita income variables found by Feder and Just,
the amortization ratio found by dine, the ratio of imports
to GDP found by Mayo and Barrett, and the real GDP growth
rate found by Morgan were not confirmed as significant
predictors of debt payment problems in the logistic model
developed here.
The discriminant model in this study generally
confirmed the variables found significant in earlier
studies. Debt service ratio, found by Frank and dine and
by sargen, was also found to be significant here. Real GDP
growth rate, a significant predictor in Morgan's model, and
the growth of rate of exports, significant in the Sargen
study, were significant predictors here as well. Net
debt/exports, a significant factor in the discriminant
model in this study, confirms the debt/exports variables
found by Morgan and by Taffler and Abassi.
However, the imports to reserves ratio, found by Frank
and dine and by Morgan, was not found to be significant in
this discriminant model. Nor was the amortization ratio,
which was found significant by Frank and dine confirmed
here.
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TabLe 7.15: COMPARISON OF VALIDATION RESULTS WITH PRIOR STUDIES
Discriminant Analysis	 Logistic Analysis
Present	 Taffter &	 Present	 Feder, Just,
Study	 Abassi	 Study	 & ROSSa
Model DeveLonent
Period Used	 1974-82	 1967-77	 1974-82	 1965-76
NtJTter of Cases	 333	 681	 333	 580
Muiter of Res Cases	 31	 50	 31	 40
ModeL VaLidation
Period Tested	 1983	 1979-83	 1983	 1977-79
Niaier of Cases	 37	 390	 37	 135
Nuiter of Res Cases	 18	 73	 18	 10
Error Rates
Type I	 66.7%	 31.5%	 50.0%	 10.0%
Type II	 0.0%	 26.2%	 0.0%	 12.0%
TotaL	 32.4%	 27.2%	 24.3%	 11.9%
(a) Model 1 (linear); cut-off P = .20.
Model Performance in Validation Sample
Table 7.15 compares the out-of--sample validation
results for the discriminant and logistic models in the
present study with those for the two prior studies that
reported such validation.
The discriminant model developed here has a much
higher Type I error rate, a much lower Type II error rate,
and a somewhat higher total error rate than those found by
Taffler and Abassi's discriminant model. Similarly, the
logistic model developed here has much higher Type I and
total error rates and a much lower Type II error rate than
those found in Feder, Just, and Ross's logistic model. The
primary reason for this poorer performance by the models
developed here is the very limited sample on which they
were validated.
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CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUS IONS
The primary purpose of this research was to determine
whether U.S. commercial banks could have predicted in
advance the debt crises of the developing countries. A
secondary purpose was to determine whether the debt crises
were the fault of the banks or the developing countries who
reneged on their loan contracts. What the banks have to do
to prevent this from happening and what they have to do to
manage country risk effectively are also very important
concerns of this research.
This study has demonstrated that the contributing
elements most directly responsible for the serious problems
in the external financial positions of many developing
countries in 1982, and possibly beyond, were the higher oil
prices in 1973-74 and 1979-80, unprecedented high interest
rates in 1980-82, a deterioration in the prices and volumes
of exports linked to the global recession in 1981-82, and
inappropriate domestic and financial policies of these
developing countries.
While theoretical studies are helpful in country-risk
analysis, determination of risk should be treated case by
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case--there is no general theory. Determining the
sustainability of debt policy, optimal level of country
borrowing, optimal bank foreign lending, and theory of
credit rationing is a difficult task.
In practice, of course, a country's external borrowing
may not be the result of optimizing decisions by a central
authority. Rather, it may mirror the conduct of a loosely
organized group of households, firms, banks, and government
agencies. Cooper and Sachs1 specified an idealized
supposition where optimal levels of savings, investment,
and external borrowing can be attained in a free-market
system where interest rates adjust to equate the worldwide
supply of and demand for loanable funds. Cooper and Sachs
went further to emphasize the difficulties in achieving the
optimal amount of borrowing by adopting a laissez-faire
attitude toward capital inflows and outflows.
Analysis of the quantitative and qualitative
techniques discussed in this study suggest that banks
should concentrate on qualitative techniques. The survey
of statistical work shows that it is not a very useful
method for predicting. Predicting and managing country
risk cannot rely solely on statistical analysis, but should
be an ongoing managerial process.
In Chapter VI, an examination of country-risk
management by eight U.S. banks was presented. Overall, all
eight banks have an effective to somewhat effective country
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management system in place. Citibank and Bank of America
both have effective systems in place, while the other banks
discussed, Chase Bank, Chemical Bank, Continental Illinois
Corporation, First National Bank of Chicago, American
Security Bank, and Morgan Guaranty, need to improve on
their present system to be in line with the suggestions
given in this chapter. The procedures of Citibank and Bank
of America are by no means perfect. They too can use some
improvements by strictly following the suggestions given in
this chapter. A revision of these banks' systems will go a
long way toward curtailing country risk.
The country-risk rating system for Manufacturers
Hanover Trust (Appendix B) proposes an effective and
detailed approach to evaluating the economic, financial,
political, and social aspects of a country. However, it
cannot compensate for the lack of strong macroeconomic
policies in the developing countries or for the absence of
greater international cooperation among major economies.
Summary of Present Study
Both the discriminant and logistic analyses show
modest discriminatory power for predicting the rescheduling
of debt of a country with the set of economic predictors
used in this study. The moderate value of R2 , which
corresponds to a moderate value of Mahalanobis' D2
(distance), indicates that the differences between the
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"bad" and "good" countries are not fully explained by these
economic predictors as a whole. Nonetheless, both models
perform better than chance, and the sequential analyses do
show a consistent pattern whereby some indicators generally
discriminate and others do not. Moreover, this general
consistency is found for both logistic and LDF models.
The sequential building up of LDF's and logistic
functions produces three indicators that appear to be
consistently better than the others--DSR1, X/M, and NDX.
RSM shows up in the logistic model as the number of
reschedul ings increases.
The consistency of the variables in both models, along
with the fact that the misclassification rates are about
the same in both models, leads to the conclusion that both
models produce very similar results. This confirms the
findings of J. Morgan 2
 and Krishan Saini and Philip Bates,3
who observed that both forms of analysis produce comparable
results.
The variables appear not to have any significant
relation to time, as shown by the plots of the variables
over the years, as well as by the insignificant polynomial
regressions on time (growth curves). This finding was used
to justify combining all countries over all years as if the
bservations were independent over time.
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Limitations of the Analyses
One reason why the models demonstrated only modest
efficiency is that the economies of the various countries
are so vastly heterogeneous that combining the data for
such a non-homogeneous set is likely to create a non-
sensitive model. Also, John Morgan 4 rightly points out
that the values of many economic predictors tend to change
over the years, and the pooling of data over time,
especially when there are structural economic changes (oil
price shocks, warfare, coups, etc.), is undesirable.
Pooling has some technical implications as well. A
country may be in group 1 at one time and in group 2 at
another time, so the observations in the two samples are
not strictly independent. However, without pooling, the
data are too scanty to produce a very useful model.
Moreover, there are both analytical relations
(Dhonte5 ) and stochastic relations (Domar 6 ) in the economic
system, which neither the logistic nor the LDF model is
capable of taking into consideration. Frequently, debt-
rescheduling is a political decision, which exacerbates the
problems of building up a valid model. Furthermore, the
role of domestic price levels, exchange rates, and interest
rates that influence foreign borrowings is unknown.
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Another factor that upsets the performance of the
models in the earlier years is that fewer countries
rescheduled in the years before 1980 than after. The
increase after 1980 produces "better" samples later in
time. Prior to 1980, the models have almost no ability to
discriminate between the rescheduling and non-rescheduling
countries.
Yet another factor is the limitation on the quality of
the data available. The data that pertain to the whole
country are frequently of poor quality. No wonder then
that the results are only modest.
Comments About the Statistical Approaches
It is the contention of many authors that Fisher's LDF
is appropriate only if the variables are normally
distributed; otherwise, the logistic discriminant function
should be used. Normality of variables is an assumption of
the LDF approach; that is, the vector of independent
variables needs to be multi-normal for exact tests of
significance. However, when the number of observations is
large (greater than 1000), Bartlett 7 has shown that the
tests, if properly formulated, will be asymptotically
correct and therefore still useful. Also, E. J. Williams8
has made some comforting comments on the robustness of
statistical tests in canonical analysis, which is a
generalization of discriminant analysis.
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The only difference between the two methods is whether
to start with a linear combination first or to linearize
the likelihood later. Operationally, therefore, both
methods suffer from some minor drawbacks and ultimately
produce comparable results, as is shown by their similar
misclassification rates. Also, the analogy between
regression and discriminant analysis pointed out earlier
indicates that the least squares estimates of parameters
are obtainable in both methods. 	 By transforming P to
log(P/l-P), the logistic model is linearized, and then a
least squares approach is used. Thus, there is great
similarity between both methods and no distinctive
differences upon which to base a choice between them.
Many analysts (for example, see Dhonte, cited earlier)
use principal components analysis on economic variables to
construct indicators and then use these indicators to build
an LDF. In this connection, a cautionary note is needed.
Principal components analysis picks out the linear
combinations in decreasing order of their contribution to
the total variation. Thus, the first few components (those
most likely selected for use in the LDF) are those with the
maximum variation. These are not necessarily the same as
good discriminators. Kshirsagar, S. Kocherlakota and K.
Kocherlakota9
 have shown that a considerable loss of
efficiency--even up to l00%--can arise if the direction of
the first principal component is orthogonal to that of the
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LDF. Because of the necessity of reducing a large number
of variables to a manageable size, people do use principal
components, but a judicious screening of economic variables
may yield better results.
Proposals for Effective Risk Management
The successful management of an international port-
folio is by necessity complex. Banks operating on a global
scale must make many decisions regarding individual assets
and liabilities. Most are made by a somewhat large number
of individual officers and committees with delegation of
authority as an accepted management principle, because no
one officer or single committee would be able to cope with
the volume of decisions that are necessary.
First, an international bank needs to be aware of its
exposure to country risk around the world. To do this, it
must develop an information system that holds information
on all cross-border loans, investments, and other forms of
exposure. The system must classify these by type,
maturity, borrower, and other characteristics. This will
keep the bank constantly informed of its exposure in each
country where it does business. And, no matter in what
country a loan originates, the information must be promptly
and accurately placed in the bank's central tracking
system, usually at the head office or at a specific
facility. This information must be made immediately avail-
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able so that bank officers can effectively develop business
and make decisions on the bank's activities in that
country.
The country-risk system is an essential part of a
bank's business decisions, and country-risk management is a
direct function of the bank's management skills. There is
clear accountability for judgments on countries and the
resulting business recommendations that are made. That is
also why clear responsibility for leadership within the
bank for analyzing countries and for management of the
system must be established. This development of analytical
approaches for evaluating country risk and for controlling
international exposure make possible a better evaluation of
resulting financial gains or losses. This improved
evaluation, in turn, strengthens the bank's ability to plan
future strategy and to establish documented information and
methods to enhance the knowledge of future managers.
International banks exposed to country risk would be
well advised to develop improved country information
systems.	 A country's economic performance and debt
position should be readily available. There should be
increased direct knowledge of countries and experience in
evaluating countries. Banks should make every effort to
rely on their own organization in judging the policies of
the countries involved.
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There should be improved interaction and communication
among all the participants of international lending. Banks
should come to the realization that country-risk evaluation
and management are a part of banking and not a distinct
function of the bank. Specifically, what is being said
here is that the problem should be viewed as one of bank
management, not principally as one of analysis. The
results of this study have shown that statistical/
quantitative methods are not the solution to the problem of
country risk; the solution has to be management control and
judgment.
The most effective system of country risk management
is one based on substantial past experience in lending in a
country and on timely analysis of the country's political,
social, and economic conditions, and of its cyclical
foreign exchange revenues relative to its foreign exchange
needs. The presence of personnel with a long history in
international lending, past data on resources and loans,
and information on conditions and changes in the environ-
ment are essential to the formulation of management
approaches to country-risk problems.
It should be clear that the ultimate objective of any
proposal for dealing with the debt problem of developing
countries should be to permit these countries to become
creditworthy in as little time as possible. The proposal
should be realistic and economically sound, while
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minimizing costs to all involved. The important infor-
Ination for banks includes the short-term position of the
countries' banking institutions, on both the liability and
the asset side. This information consists of short-term
accounts, trade credits and documents, deposit accounts,
foreign and domestic currency reserves (both public and
private), and foreign investments--direct, portfolio, and
others.
Any successful country-risk management plan by the
banks must be compatible with sustained economic growth in
the debtor countries. This means that the debtor countries
must be able to finance the imports needed for growth as
well as the interest on their accumulated debts.
Why should international banks be so concerned about
the economic situations and policies of the developing
countries? The answer is simple: both sides would benefit.
The banks would profit from the loans they make without the
difficulties involved in rescheduling and possible
repudiation, and the developing countries would enjoy all
the benefits of the loans--sustained growth without being
engulfed in uncontrolled debt. The following information
supports this point. From 1973-1982, the seven largest
U.S. banks found that the amount earned from foreign
operations increased from 22 percent to 60 percent of total
profits.	 Furthermore, the five largest U.S. banks all
enjoyed record profits from 1982 to 1986 (fully one quarter
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of Citicorp's 1985 profits came from payments on its Latin
American loans).
Debt equity swap is sometimes used as a means of debt
reduction, and, consequently, risk management. Debt equity
swap presents a useful way to reduce the external debt of
developing countries through a process of converting the
creditors' claims for repayment to claims on assets in the
debtor country. Banks normally sell their discounted,
developing-country loans to multinational corporations who
then resell them to the original debtor nation, payable in
local currency that is used by the multinational
corporation for investment in that country.
Debt equity swaps have been used successfully in
Chile, where the profit derived from the purchase of the
debt at a discount is properly shared between the central
bank and the investor, who is conunitted not to repatriate
earnings or sell the equity for a specified period of time.
The main reason why debt equity swap can contribute to
effective management of risk by banks in developing
countries is that it helps the banks to reduce their
outstanding debt on their books. At the same time, the
developing country's economy is able to move toward greater
dependence on a market-oriented system. Any situation that
benefits both sides is a more lasting solution to the debt
problem. Banks will not enjoy successful risk management
of their loans to the developing countries if they enact a
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policy that benefits them but might disrupt the economy of
the developing countries.
It is obvious that the international debt policy
pursued during the last six years has been faulty. Debts
of major debtor countries have been increasing, despite all
the adjustment efforts. The World Bank's World Development
Report in 1988 stated:10
Since 1980, matters have turned from bad to
worse: economic growth rates have slowed, real
wages have dropped, and growth in employment has
faltered in most developing countries. . . . In
some the prolonged economic slump is already more
severe than it was during the great depression in
the industrial countries. The tide of poverty
and misery in those countries is rising, not
receding. . . . Without significant changes in
policies, the present economic uncertainty may
soon be followed by a world-wide recession. .
This is a fragile situation--one that could
rapidly deteriorate.
Also the 1988-1989 edition of World Debt Tables (a World
Bank publication) stated "an end to the debt crises remains
elusive."
When the debt problem occurred in 1982, new bank
lending to developing countries with severe debt-servicing
difficulties was suspended. But through 1985, the foreign
debt of these countries continued to increase in both money
and real terms. These increases were the result of new
lending to countries that were regarded as creditworthy
countries by the capital market. These countries in turn
borrowed heavily to supplement their domestic resources.
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The countries include India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand,
Egypt, Algeria, and Greece. Indonesia and Greece
experienced balance-of-payments problems, and Egypt found
itself in a serious financial problem.
There was also the case of the countries that were
already in serious financial problems by 1982. Their debts
continued to grow, even though they were making heavy
debt-service payments from 1982-1985, because their export
prices were falling during that period, Consequently,
their debts rose faster in real terms than in money terms.
The country case-by-case approach which earlier had
great promise has not worked as anticipated. Despite the
fact that it enables developing countries to concentrate on
domestic efforts to improve the balance of payments and
raise savings, and also allows solutions specific to
individual countries, this approach has been eclipsed by
more important matters. Issues like interest rates,
commodity prices, and trade restrictions are so essential
in solving this debt problem that only an across-the-board
approach can put them in focus. However, a country case-
by-case approach which can recognize the importance of
these issues for each debtor country will serve a very
useful purpose.
It is important to have representatives of the banks
and the developing countries develop a policy that is
agreeable to both sides.	 It sometimes appears that the
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creditors are forming policies without trying to understand
the individual countries. Also, the countries relate to
the international banks as adversaries. A dialogue between
the representatives of the banks and the developing
countries will go a long way toward producing a debt policy
that can be sustained.
Even though some international policies to resolve
debt problems have been pursued over the last few years,
many serious proposals have not been considered. It is not
enough to have conferences and make important policy
statements; a way must be found to analyze these policies.
There should be an end to situations where academics and
international bankers make proposals which are hailed, but
never evaluated. One possibility would be to form an
international policy group which is acceptable to the
international banks and the debtor nations. This group
would function differently from the Institute of
International Finance, Inc. The major objective of this
new group would be to find a solution to the crisis of
international debt of developing countries. As long as
both sides agree on the composition of this body, there
would be no mistrust by either side, and mutual cooperation
should prevail.
There should also be further work done to improve the
techniques and methods for forecasting debt rescheduling
problems since early warning of such problems will not only
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benefit banks but enable the international community to
provide assistance to countries in trouble. The updating
and improvement of techniques and methods are essential to
the demands of the ever-changing world of international
lending. Again, suggestions outlined in this chapter
should be extremely helpful here.
Summary
The results of the statistical studies indicate that
statistical or econometrical methods in country-risk
management should be only one of the segments of an inclu-
sive evaluation system. They should not be used as the
only instrument for an evaluation. The need for debt
rescheduling is not a process; it is virtually a unique
event. This might tend to discourage the idea of creating
a generally applicable early-warning system for detecting
the probabilities of debt-servicing problems. In spite of
this, statistical or econometric methods may be useful to
identify the kinds of financial interruptions that are
likely to result in a fully developed debt crisis and help
to understand the reason for debt-servicing problems that
have occurred.	 By doing this, a repeat of previous
mistakes may be avoided.
The need for country-risk analysis and management
systems must be emphasized in international banking. The
lending banks need to be well informed about the countries
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and then transform this information into effective deci-
sions to improve their country-risk assessments. The banks
need to strengthen their high-level professional country-
risk management systems. Ideally, a relationship of mutual
trust would exist between the banks and the borrowing coun-
tries; an adversarial relationship benefits no one. As a
matter of fact, it is detrimental to a smooth running
international banking system.
The banks should be aware of how the developing coun-
tries manage their domestic economy and their balance of
payments, including external debt management, when deter-
mining the country t s creditworthiness. The international
banks need to realize that reasonable exchange and domestic
interest rates are crucial to prevent capital flight in
developing countries. Also, the banks should make these
countries realize that internal savings is essential to
their financial development. These measures will encourage
foreign direct investment, stimulate growth, and diminish
reliance on foreign borrowings.
Industrial countries must effectively implement
regulatory laws. Interest rates need to be reduced.
Economic growth in the industrialized countries is
extremely important for continued progress in the debt
situation because the developing countries' exports are
dependent on this growth.
	
Of course, the developing
countries' governments must demonstrate genuine interest in
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establishing procedures essential to the restructuring of
their economies.
In order to reduce the vulnerability of the U.S.
banking system to developing countries' debt-servicing
problems, the United States banking system must improve its
present state of affairs through increasing capital,
diversification of income, and reserves for international
debt. The risks caused by the developing countries' debt
crises, which are presently faced by the largest U.S.
banks, will need enduring and cautious management by the
banks and will require the development of suitable
regulatory policies to accommodate new ideas for managing
country risk.
Finally, to answer the question of who is at fault for
the debt crisis: Was it the banks who lent too much money
and charged a very high interest premium, or was it the
LDCs who did not always use the money for the development
of their economy and reneged on their contractual
obligations? Despite all the literature, there has been no
conclusive evidence on who is to blame for the debt crises.
There has, however, been much circumstantial evidence.
This research has chosen not to lay blame on either
side because of that lack of clear-cut evidence. What is
suggested is that the international banks follow a well-
defined policy and show genuine commitment to resolution
and management of the crises.
	 The developing countries
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must demonstrate more responsibility and follow sound
economic policy. Not until these actions are taken will
there be a lasting solution to the debt problem of
developing countries. For international banks to be
profitable, they need to lend money. This lending process
can be successful only when developing countries have a
sound economic foundation in place.
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APPENDIX A
CLASSIFICATION CATEGORIES
I.	 Substandard: This category applies when:
1. A country is not complying with its external
service obligations, as evidenced by arrearages,
forced restructuring, or rollovers; and
2. The country is not in the process of adopting an
IMF or other suitable economic adjustment
programs, or is not adequately adhering to such
a program; or
3. The country and its bank creditors have not
negotiated a viable rescheduling and are
unlikely to do so in the near future.
II.	 Value Impaired: This category applies when:
1. A country has protracted arrearages, 	 as
indicated by more than one of the following:
a. the country has not fully paid its interest
for six months;
b. the country has not complied with IMF
programs (and there is no immediate prospect
for compliance);
c. the country has not met rescheduling terms
for over one year;
d. the country shows no definite prospects for
an orderly restoration of debt service in the
near future.
III. Loss
This category applies when the loan is considered
uncollectable and of such little value that its
continuance as a bankable asset is not warranted.
An example would be an outright statement by a
country which repudiates obligations to banks, the
IMF, or other lenders.
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APPENDIX B
COUNTRY RISH RATING SYSTEM FOR
MANUFACTURERS HANOVER TRUST
1 Definition of Country Risk
For purposes of this system, country risk is defined
as the sum of economic, financial, political and social
factors which influence the ability and willingness of
borrowers within a country to meet their external obliga-
tions to creditors in a timely fashion. The intent here
is to evaluate the probability of a payments interruption.
2 Objectives of the Country Risk Rating System
The primary objective is to provide information (pre-
pared in a consistent way and that is comparable across
countries) to enable management to evaluate the effect of
country risk on the bank's international portfolio. The
system should also provide sufficient lead time to
function as an effective tool for portfolio analysis, by:
(1) acting as an early warning system for countries with
potential payments problems; (2) identifying possible
courses of action to protect MHT exposure where such
exposure cannot be reduced, such as, where an actual
payments interruption has occurred; and (3) identifying
areas of potential profitability.
- 342 -
3 Structure of the System
In designing the system over the last few years, three
basic premises were kept in mind:
(a) The system had to be clean and simple, organizing and
assessing as much measurable or substantive qualitative
information as possible and then reducing it to a form
which is usable as a tool for evaluating country risk in
the Sector's business activities. This was achieved
through a process of completing standard worksheets,
determining relative weightings of various factors and
arriving at a letter rating.
(b) The system had to be flexible and non-mechanistic,
allowing for differences in the quantity and quality of
information available for individual countries and differ-
ences in the relative importance of components in the
rating system for each country. This was achieved by
building into the process a "productive tension" by
sharing responsibility for analysis between staff and line
professionals. Economics staff is charged with preparing
the economic/financial component of the overall assessment
while line account officers are responsible for the polit-
ical/social element.
(C) Further, the system had to provide crosscountry
comparability, a uniform framework against which all coun-
tries are evaluated. In order to reduce possible subjec-
tive bias, the economic/financial assessments of individ-
ual analysts must be defended before other staff
economists and are subject to review by the head of the
International Economics Group and to comment by regional
credit officers, sectoral management, and Sovereign Risk,
in certain cases. A further crosscheck is provided by
using the summary statistics table which provides a
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snapshot of a country's economic performance as compared
to the performance of other debtor countries.
The structure of the system is based on one used by the
U.S. bank regulatory authorities--the Office of
Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Reserve and the
FDIC--as part of the broader bank examinations process.
However, it has been modified and we believe improved by
taking account of the strengths and weakness pointed out
by the GAO (General Accounting Office) in its assessment
of the ICERC's (Interagency Country Exposure Review
Committee) system as well as incorporating many of the
recommendations the GAO and other agencies made to improve
its effectiveness. Not that the system used by U.S.
examiners was so flawed, in fact, the ICERC system
correctly identified with at least one year's lead time
all but one country that experienced actual or imminent
payments arrearages between 1977 and 1982, with one
exception, Nicaragua.	 In addition, many other existing
systems were examined and evaluated.
The modifications to the ICERC system centered upon giving
greater emphasis to political and social factors, and to
market sentiment; and making the system more "forward-
looking."
4 CoRponents of the BysteR
A. The Screening Process. The screening process is
used both to determine the frequency and depth of country
assessments and as a cross-check to the subjective analy-
sis. It identifies those countries with both high MHT
exposure and a high debt burden, the latter consisting
simply of ratio analysis of a number of indicators which
have been shown to be highly correlated to debt servicing
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problems. The indicators which go into this screen and
the most recent results are included in Exhibit I.
B. Economic/Financial Component. Exhibit II is an
Economic/Financial Analysis Worksheet. It is completed by
the International Economics Group. Exhibit III provides a
more detailed explanation of each of the components of the
Economic/Financial Analysis Worksheet. Under each com-
ponent is a description of the quantitative and
qualitative factors that contribute to the overall
assessment of economic/financial risk.
C. Economic/Financial Summary Statistics.
Statistics which highlight key indicators (including those
on the screen) for Sections I through IV of the
Economic/Financial Analysis Worksheet for all countries
where MHT outstandings are in excess of 2 percent of bank
capital are tabulated on a summary table as shown in
Exhibit IV. Each ratio is ranked across all countries and
the resulting ranking is divided in quintiles, with the
first quintile being the "best," and the fifth being the
"worst" On the summary table, the value for each ratio
is given along with the respective quintile ranking.
These rankings are not intended to lock the economist into
a particular rating for the section; rather, they provide
a perspective on one aspect of a country's performance
relative to all other countries in the portfolio.
D. Political/Social Component. Exhibit V is a
Political/Social Analysis Worksheet. I is completed by
the Region. Exhibit VI provides a more detailed
background on the components of the Political/Social
Analysis Worksheet.
E. Summary Worksheet. A Summary Worksheet for
Country Risk Rating is shown in Exhibit VII. The matrix
provides an orderly and concise method of scrutinizing a
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country vis-a-vis others. The purpose of rating a country
is to categorize it in accordance with its broad
similarities to other countries. The country rating
methodology has been developed with an understanding that
the relative weight of each aspect varies from country to
country. The International Economics Group and the Senior
Loan Officer for each country jointly decide the relative
weighting of the factors prior to each occasion that a
country is rated.
F. Requirements and Sources of External Financing.
Additionally, for those countries with MHT outstandings in
excess of 2 percent of bank capital, and with a high debt
burden, the International Economics Groups will continue
to provide a Requirements and Sources of Financing (cash
flow) Table to augment the assessment of the country's
ability and willingness to service external debt by
identifying its payments obligations over the coming
period compared to its access to financing. This table
will typically include projections for the principal
macroeconomic variables, mentioned before.
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Exhibit I. Country Risk Screen Ratios
The purpose of the screen is to separate countries
into high and low debt burden categories. Debt burden is
assessed by the following seven ratios:
1. Net external debt/GDP
2. Debt service payments/Total exports
3. Interest payments on external debt/Total exports
4. Net external debt/Total exports
5. International reserves minus gold/Total imports
6. Short-term external debt/Total imports
7. Short-term external debt/Int'l reserves minus
gold
Based on these ratios, the countries are divided into
high and low debt burden categories as follows:
1. The ratios are computed for all countries
included in the screen.
2. The ratio values are ranked from best to worst.
3. Any country which has more than three ratios
below the median value in the rankings, of which
at least three are in the bottom quartile of the
ranking, is categorized a high debt burden
country.
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Exhibit II. Economic/Financial Analysis Worksheet
Country	 Year
Assign a rating (at 0.5 intervals), between 0 and 5, to
each of the five factors. Sum the ratings and divide by 5
(this implicitly gives equal weight to each of the 5 fac-
tors). The overall rating for this section, which will be
between 0 and 5, should then be transferred to the
economic/financial portion of the summary worksheet.
Favorable	 Unfavorable
0.0- 1.1- 2.1- 3.1- 4.1-
1.0	 2.0	 3.0	 4.0	 5.0
I. THE DOMESTIC ECONOMY
Performance
Policy
II. THE EXTERNAL ECONOMY
Performance
Adjustment
Capabilities
III. EXTERNAL DEBT
Level
Composition
IV. DEBT SERVICING
CAPABILITY
V. MARKET SENTIMENT
Sum of scores / 5 = Raw Score
_H= L
Adjusted Overall Economic/Financial Rating =
(Raw Score x 0.8) + 1 =
Worksheetcompleted by: _______________________
Date:
A. GDP Data
*--Real and nominal
growth rates
--Sectoral analysis
B. National Accounts Data
--In real terms,
and as of GDP
C. Other Data
--Real wages and
incomes
--Income distribution
--Real GDP/capita
--tJnemployment/
underemployment
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Exhibit III: Economic/Financial Analysis
Domestic Economic Performance and Policy
Quantitative Components	 Qualitative Components
The analysis will focus
on the question of how and to
what degree the performance
and structure of the domestic
economy will affect markets,
profitability and the ability
to service external debt.
The sectoral composition and
growth of GDP gives an
indication of the nature and
development of the country's
natural resource base.	 Is
growth	 broadbased	 or
concentrated in certain
sectors? What is the outlook
for growth in each sector?
This sectoral examination
permits assessment of the
vulnerability of overall
growth to both internal and
external shocks as well as
assessment of the impact of
economic	 policy	 on
particular areas of the
economy. In addition, cur-
rent prospective performance
of individual sectors is a
useful input in assessing the
credit risk of a borrower
operating in that sector.
Quantitative Components
D. Fiscal Policy
1. Government budget
components (in
local currency
and as % of GDP)
*2. Size of budget
surplus or deficit
and method of
financing
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Exhibit III: Economic/Financial Analysis (Cont.)
Domestic Economic Performance and Policy (Cont.)
Qualitative Components
An evaluation of fiscal
policy and its effectiveness
is important to determine the
nature and extent of the
government's influence on the
economy. What government
policies influence domestic
savings and investment? What
kinds of incentives and
disincentives are built into
the nation's	 fiscal	 and
regulatory system?	 Is the
current revenue base
sufficient to support current
and planned expenditures? If
not, what changes in tax
policy or other revenue (e.g.
reduction or subsidies) are
necessary to maintain fiscal
discipline?
E. Monetary Policy
(in local currency
and % change)
*1. Money and
quasi-money
2. Domestic credit
3. Net foreign
assets
4. Interest rates
*5 Prices
*6. Exchange rate
An important component of the
economic analysis is the
monetary sector. Monetary
disturbances may originate
domestically or from the
foreign sector. In addition
to their inflationary and
exchange rate effects, these
disturbances may also impact
on the real sector in
consumption, savings, capital
formation and the like.
Quantitative Components
A. Balance of payments
1. Merchandise trade
2. Current account
3. Capital account
*4, Current account
ba 1 ance/GDP
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Exhibit III: Economic/Financial Analysis (Cont.)
External Economic Performance and Adjustment Capabilities
Qualitative Components
The diversity of the export
sector is an important indi-
cation of the volatility of
export earnings. How diver-
sified is the export base and
as such how vulnerable are
overall export earnings on
import payments to price
movements in one or a few
internationally	 traded
products? On the import
side, how compressible are
merchandise imports? On both
the import and export side,
what is the government's
policy context in terms of
incentives and the structure
of effective tariff and
nontariff protection and its
impact on domestic resource
allocation and production
efficiency? Finally, how
diversified are the country's
trading partners?
Because	 multinational
companies and private
domestic companies are often
sensitive to changes in
national policy environments
and because they can often
portend shifts in a country's
creditworthiness, shifts in
foreign direct investment
patterns and patterns of
non-government	 long-term
capital flows deserve close
attention, Similarly,
short-term capital outflows
on the part of domestic
residents, which are often
sensitive to the domestic
outlook,	 may	 also	 be
important	 indicators	 of
changes	 in	 a	 country's
creditworthiness.
Quantitative Components
B. Liquid Assets
1. International
reserves, less
gold
Gold reserves
Commercial bank
external assets
Int'l reserves/
imports of goods
& services
2.
3.
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Exhibit 111: Economic/Financial Analysis (Cont.)
External Economic Performance and Adjustment Capabilities
(Cont.)
Qualitative Components
It is important to look at
more than just the overall
level of international
reserves for a country. The
composition of reserves and
in particular the level of
"free reserves" provides a
better indication of a
country's liquidity since the
latter does not include
reserves that are committed
or collateralized. In
addition, a country's gold
stock may add significantly
to liquidity.	 Finally, an
evaluation of market
sentiment and its potential
impact on liquidity is an
important component of this
section.
C. Regulatory Framework
*1. Exchange rate
arrangement
*2. Specific exchange
restrictions
In general, those countries
with a greater amount of
restrictions on foreign
exchange and trade systems
are those which perceive an
increased need to control
foreign exchange resources.
Is this control an attempt to
implement	 certain	 policy
measures	 (e.g.	 import-
substitution,	 export
promotion),	 or	 does	 it
reflect a need for foreign
exchange earnings for
external debt repayment? How
do the restrictions affect
the climate for outside
participation in the economy?
How effective are they in
terms of accomplishing short-
and long-term policy goals?
A. Total Debt
1. Long-term
2. Short-term
B. External Assets
C. Net Debt
D. Ratios
**]. Net external
debt! GDP
**2. Net external
debt/exports
*3 Short-term
debt/imports
*4 •
 Short-term
debt/reserves
Debt Service
Quantitative Components
A. Total Debt Service
1. Public long-term
2. Private long-term
3. Short-term
interest
B. Ratios
**l. Total debt
service/exports
**2. Interest/exports
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Exhibit III: Economic/Financial Analysis (Cont.)
External Debt Level and Composition
Quantitative Components	 Qualitative Components
Analysis of the composition
of external debt by maturity
structure and type of lender
is important in determining a
country's ability to repay
and/or borrow additional sums
abroad, or to refinance
existing debt, as well as the
sensitivity to interest rate
changes and to changes in the
availability of credit
extended by types of lenders.
Ratios such as net external
debt to exports or to gross
domestic product are used in
virtually all country
analyses, as are ratios which
compare short-term debt to
imports and reserves, since
high levels of short-term
debt can signal increasing
vulnerability.
Qualitative Components
The interpretation of the
debt service ratio and any
other ratios used in this
part of the analysis is
important since these ratios
have different meanings for
different countries and for
the same country at different
times. Changes in the ratios
over time,	 and in the
specific context of
particular country situations
are more indicative of debt
servicing ability than the
actual levels themselves.
A. Access to
Export Credits
B. Access to
Commercial Paper
Markets in U.S.A.
C. Direction of
Lending Margins
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Exhibit III: Economic/Financial Analysis (Cont.)
Market Sentiment
Quantitative Components 	 Qualitative Components
These indicators attempt to
assess a country's ability to
access bank and non-bank
commercial sources of credit.
The direction of lending
margins on bank debt is a
leading indicator of future
access because banks tend to
stop lending rather than
continue at ever increasing
margins.
*Indicates a ratio is used in the country risk screen.
**Indicates a key ratio for the particular component,
meaning it is either particularly illustrative or easy
to get data for, or both.
Economic/Financial Summary Statistics
1. Domestic Economy Performance Indicators
Real GDP Growth	 CPI	 Average
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Exhibit IV:
Country Name
REGION I
Alger i a
Bulgaria
Caine roon
Czechoslovakia
Egypt
German Gem. Rep.
Hungary
Jordan
Kuwait
Morocco
Nigeria
Pot and
Romania
Saudi Arabia
South Africa
U.A.E.
U.S.S.R.
Z i rrabwe
REGION 11
Australia
Indonesia
Japan
Malaysia
New Zealand
Philippines
South Korea
Taiwan
Thai Land
REGION III
ColuTia
Dominican Rep.
Ecuador
Jamaica
Mexico
Panama
Peru
VenezueLa
REGION IV
Argentina
BraziL
Chile
Uruguay
REGION V
Demnark
Finland
Iceland
Norway
Sweden
REGION VI
Belgiun
France
Germany
Italy
Netherlands
Switzerland
United Kingdom
REGION VII
Greece
IsraeL
Portugal
Spain
Turkey
Yugoslavia
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Exhibit IV: Economic/Financial Summary Statistics (Cont.)
2. External Economy Performance Indicators
CAB/Country Name	 CAB/GDP
REGION I
Algeria
BuLgaria
Cameroon
Czechoslovakia
Egypt
German Dem. Rep.
Hungary
Jordan
Kuwait
Morocco
Niger i a
Poland
Romania
Saudi Arabia
South Africa
U.A.E.
U.S.S.R.
Zintabwe
REGION II
Australia
Indonesia
Japan
Malaysia
New Zealand
Phi Lippines
South Korea
Ta i wan
Thailand
REGION III
Coluia
Dominican Rep.
Ecuador
Jamaica
Mexico
Panama
Peru
Venezuela
REGION IV
Argentina
Brazil
Chile
Uruguay
REGION V
Dervnark
Finland
Iceland
Norway
Sweden
REGION VI
Be Ig i i
France
Germany
ItaLy
Netherlands
Switzerland
United Kingdom
REGION VII
Greece
Israel
PortugaL
Spa in
Turkey
Yugoslavia
- 356 -
Exhibit IV: Economic/Financial Summary Statistics (Cont.)
3. External Debt Performance Indicators
Country Name
REGION I
Alger i a
Bulgaria
Cameroon
Czechoslovakia
Egypt
German Den. Rep.
Hungary
Jordan
Kuwait
Morocco
Niger i a
P01 and
Romania
Saudi Arabia
South Africa
U.A.E.
U.S.S.R.
Zimbabwe
REGION II
Australia
Indonesia
Japan
Ma lays i a
New Zealand
Ph it ippines
South Korea
Taiwan
Thai land
REGION III
Cot uitia
Dominican Rep.
Ecuador
Jamaica
Mexico
Panama
Peru
Venezuela
REGION IV
Argentina
Brazi
Chile
Uruguay
REGION V
Derinark
F inland
Iceland
Norway
Sweden
REGION VI
Bet g i u
France
Germany
Italy
NetherLands
SwitzerLand
United Kingdom
REGION VII
Greece
IsraeL
Portugal
Spain
Turkey
Yugoslavia
NED/GDP NED/EXP TED/EXP TED/GDP ST/TED
Economic/Financial Summary Statistics (Cont.)
4. Debt Service Performance Indicators
RES/IMP DSR ST/IMP ST/RES INT/EXP
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Exhibit IV:
Country Name
REGION I
Algeria
Bulgari a
Cameroon
Czechos L ovaki a
Egypt
German Dem. Rep.
Hungary
Jordan
Kuwait
Morocco
Nigeria
Pot and
Romania
Saudi Arabia
South Africa
U.A.E.
U.S.S.R.
Z i ntabwe
REGION II
Australia
Indonesia
Japan
Malaysia
New Zealand
Philippines
South Korea
Taiwan
Thai land
REGION III
Coluthia
Dominican Rep.
Ecuador
Jamaica
Mexico
Panama
Peru
Venezuela
REGION IV
Argentina
Brazil
Chile
Uruguay
REGION V
Demark
Finland
Iceland
Norway
Sweden
REGION VI
Belgiul,
France
Germany
Italy
Netherlands
Switzerland
United Kingdom
REGION VII
Greece
Israel
Portugal
Spain
Turkey
Yugoslavia
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Exhibit IV: Economic/Financial Summary Statistics (Cont.)
5. Market Sentiment Performance Indicators
Country Name	 Survey Average
REGION I
Alger i a
Bulgaria
Cameroon
Czechoslovakia
Egypt
German Den. Rep.
Hungary
Jordan
Kuwait
Morocco
Nigeria
Poland
Roman Ia
Saudi Arabia
South Africa
U.A.E.
U.S.S.R.
Ziriabwe
REGION II
Australia
I ndones i a
Japan
Ma Lays i a
New Zealand
Philippines
South Korea
Taiwan
Thai land
REGION III
Cotuitia
Dominican Rep.
Ecuador
Jamaica
Mexico
Panama
Peru
Venezuela
REGION IV
Argentina
Brazil
Chile
Uruguay
REGION V
Derinark
Finland
Iceland
Norway
Sweden
REGION VI
Be I gi un
France
Germany
Italy
Netherlands
Switzerland
United Kingdom
REGION VII
Greece
IsraeL
Portugal
Spain
Turkey
Yugoslavia
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Exhibit V: Political/Social Analysis Worksheet
Assign a rating between 1 and 5 to each of the factors.
sum the ratings and divide by the number of factors. You
will arrive at an overall rating for this section which
will lie between 1 and 5. Transfer this overall rating to
the political/social portion of the summary worksheet.
1. Political Management
A. Competence of government
officials.
B. Ability to implement unpopular
but necessary policy changes.
2. Political Environment
Strong	 Weak
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
High	 Low
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
A. Political change is likely to
be by institutionalized process
with reasonable continuity
of fundamental policies. 	 -
	
Low	 High
	
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
B. Fractionalization of political
power.
C. Degree to which concessions
must be made to appease
factions, regions, or special
interest groups.
D. Extent of restrictive measures
required to retain power.
E. Degree of control on channels
for voicing dissent. (A system
would be rated "5" if there is
little or no freedom of the
press, freedom to organize
parties and unions and freedom
to assemble, etc.)
F. Frequency of demonstrations
against government or symbols
of government.
G. Frequency of resort to violent
means to exhibit anti-
government sentiment.
H. Level of terrorism and impact
of insurgency movements on
stability.
	Low	 High
	
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
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Exhibit V: Political/Social Analysis Worksheet (Cont.)
	
Low	 High
3. External Political Factors 	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5
A. Dependence on and/or
importance to a major power.
B. Negative influence of
regional political forces.
C. Presence of border or
territorial dispute.
4. Social Factors
A. Overall level of nationalist
sentiment and xenophobia.
B. Likelihood of unrest resulting
from unequal social conditions
and wealth distribution.
C. Potential for future social and
physical resource allocation
problems because of population
growth.
D. Frequency of societal conflict
involving demonstrations,
strikes and street violence
aimed at non-government
institutions or groups.
E. Fractionalization by language,
ethnic or religious groups.
5. Other Factors, not included elsewhere (Optional).
(The questions below are illustrative only; any three
questions the analyst deems important may be used.)
Impact on Debt-Servicing
Capability
A. Does this country fall under
the "umbrella" of a major
political power?
B. Does this country supply
strategic materials to a
major political power?
C. Does this country have any
special currency convertibility
arrangements (e.g. CFA zone)?
D. Other
Positive	 Negative
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
Sum	 Number of	 Overall
of	 + Items	 = Political/Social
Ratings	 Answered	 Rating
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Exhibit VI: Political/Social Analysis
Assessing Political Risk
In assessing political/social risk, the analyst is asked
to evaluate the probability of a payments interruption or
other financial loss associated with adverse political
developments (e.g. foreign or civil war, expropriation or
nationalization, crippling legal restrictions, freezing of
assets, forced divestment, etc.). One problematic area
immediately arises, that of separating the inherently
interrelated areas of political/social risk and economic!
financial risk. Simply put, for purposes of this
exercise, the former is associated with the willingness to
maintain external payments on a timely basis while the
economic/financial area relates to the country's ability
to maintain debt servicing. Political factors are
generally taken to mean trends and decisions caused by the
activity of political actors in the host country. To a
broad extent, some of these "political" considerations are
incorporated explicitly in the economic/financial
analysis, specifically in the assessment of domestic
economic policy (monetary and fiscal policy as well as
various indicators of labor market activity and social
welfare indicators) and external adjustment capabilities
(exchange rate and trade policies, foreign investment
restriction, international reserve management, etc.).
These considerations need not be duplicated in the
political/social analysis and assessment.
Components
1. Political Management
Assessment of the competence of government officials
involves a determination of whether current government
officials, particularly those in the economic, financial,
defense, and internal security sectors are competent and
effective. Are they able to plan and implement realistic
and sustainable policies? Do officials have the ear of
political leadership? Are there good lines of coinmunica-
tion between technocrats and politicians?
Do officials have a full political mandate to do what is
necessary to service external debt? Does the overall
leadership have the political strength to implement deci-
sions, particularly if they involve austerity measures,
once decisions are made? Is the government firmly en-
trenched enough (or popular enough) to carry them out?
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2. Political Environment
It is necessary to determine the direction, magnitude and
timing of political shifts if any. The most important
element is to determine the likelihood of change being
sudden, violent and by non-constitutional means. We try
to determine whether change in leadership will leave
fundamental economic policies unchanged, improved or
deteriorated, especially insofar as it concerns the will
to honor external debt obligations.
Symptoms of political drift will usually be evident by
fractionalization of power (fragmented political base, in
which elite interests dominate). Political players such
as military leaders, regional leaders, religious leaders
or labor leaders will use their power to obtain government
actions that shift resources to them. Government will
give in to unreasonable demands or refuse to comply with
reasonable demands, resorting instead to coercive measures
to implement policies or curb dissent.
Violent manifestations are the most dramatic stage of a
political system about to change. Strikes, terrorism and
sabotage disrupt the workings of the domestic economy with
serious consequences for the balance of payments and
possible impairment of ability to service debt.
3. External Political Factors
It is necessary to assess the strength of any insurgency
as well as the ability of a government to control it.
Often the existence of support from a hostile neighbor
requires an analysis of the neighboring state's motives,
strengths, weaknesses and staying power. The existence of
a border dispute is significant only if the parties have
to divert an unacceptable level of resources, material or
human, to maintaining the status quo.
A country's relationship with major powers and the conse-
quences of that relationship are important. Is the rela-
tionship a matter of geographic strategic importance? Is
it mutually beneficial? Is it based on underlying cominer-
cial significance or is it a matter of being a buffer or a
useful base for expanding regional influence of the major
power.
For non-OECD countries, the highest grade would go to a
country that is able to maintain relationships with all
major powers based on shared national interests.
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4. Social Factors
The existence of conditions such as rapid population
growth, sharply unequal distribution of wealth and sharp
contrasts in social conditions within a nation can have
long-terni impact on stability. The more critical element
is the direction of trends, recognition of the problems by
political leadership and whether appropriate policies are
being implemented.
Some societies are more affected by emotions, such as
nationalism and xenophia than others. This can have an
ultimate impact on willingness, rather than ability, to
honor external obligations. Existence of fractionaliza-
tion, even when not political, can put governments in dif-
ficult no-win decision positions that lead to dissatisfac-
tion, unrest and instability.
5. Other Factors, not included elsewhere (Optional)
This section builds in flexibility for the analyst by
allowing for the addition of country-specific considera-
tions not included elsewhere in the questionnaire that may
impact on a country's ability to repay external obliga-
tions. The three questions listed on the worksheet are
intended to be examples only; their inclusion or exclusion
is left to the discretion of the analyst. At most, this
section should contain three separate items.
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Exhibit VII: summary Worksheet for Country Risk Rating
Country
Country	 Desk
Economics
Year
Sovereign
Risk
Regional
Manager
Date
Assign weights to factors A and B in the second-to-last
column according to your assessment of the relative impor-
tance of each summary factor. Weights must sum to 100.
Then multiply the value you have assigned to each factor
by its weight, and add the products for items A and B.
The total weighted country risk rating will lie somewhere
between 100 and 500. This translates to a letter rating
as follows:
Numerical Letter Narrative
Rating	 Rating	 Rating
100 - 180 = A = Top Quality
181 - 260 = B = Favorable
261 - 340 = C = Medium
341 - 420 = D = Marginal
421 - 500 = E = Poor
Overall Rating
Rating x Weight = Product
Weighted Country Rating
LetterRating __________
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APPENDIX C
RAW DATA, SUNXARY STATISTICS, AND CORRELATION MATRICES
FOR 40 LDCS (1974-83)
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PLOTS OP AVERAGE ECONOMIC INDICATORS OVER TIME
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